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An Examination of the Decision-making Process of the 
Wolf Management Committee Negoti^fCions: A Case Study
Director: David H. Jackson
In late 1990, Congress enacted legislation calling for the 
appointment of a Wolf Management Committee to prepare a réintroduction 
and management plan for gray wolves fCanis lupus) in Yellowstone 
National Park and the Central Idaho Wilderness Area. The Committee 
consisted of ten members representing the Fish and Game Departments of 
Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, the National Park Service, the U.S. Forest 
Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, conservation organizations, 
and the livestock and hunting community. The Committee met six times in 
early 1991 to prepare a plan which was forwarded to Congress in May of 
that year. The plan failed to meet the Congressional mandate, requiring 
special Congressional action to implement because it was outside the 
parameters of the Endangered Species Act.
This paper presents a descriptive narrative of the events and group 
dynamics of the negotiations of the Wolf Management Committee and 
briefly examines them in the context of negotiation theory. Information 
was gathered through personal interviews and questionnaires of fifteen 
Management Committee and technical committee members and one observer. 
Both committees are described in terms of structure, members, level of 
knowledge about wolves, interpersonal relationships, and negotiation 
dynamics such as outside influences, mindset, cooperation, and emotions.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks go to Wolf Management Committee members Galen 
Buterbaugh, George Bennett, Jerry Conley, K. L. Cool, Hank 
Fischer, Jim Magagna, Lorraine Mintzmyer, John Mumma, and 
Pete Petera; Technical Committee members Renee Askins, 
Michael Bean, Wayne Brewster, Jim Claar, Arnie Dood, and Pat 
Tucker; and Dan Neal of the Casper Star-Tribune, Casper,
W Y., for taking the time to respond either to interviews or 
questionnaires; Sharon Rose and Barbara Henry of the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service, Denver, CO., for supplying copies 
of documents as needed; Professor David H. Jackson, who as 
my advisor allowed me the freedom to pursue qualitative 
research, even though his heart is in quantitative methods 
and who generously provided funds to an otherwise unfunded 
project; and Professors Jon J. Driessen, Daniel H.
Pletscher, and Ronald Wakimoto who as advisory committee 
members encouraged me to take the step to do a thesis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A b s t r a c t ....................................................... ii
Acknowledgements .......................................... iii
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 1
History ................................................. 2
CHAPTER 1: M E T H O D S ........................................... 10
Introduction ............................................  10
The Case Study M e t h o d .................................. 10
The Interviews .......................................11
The Respondents/Informants .......................  12
Method of Analysis .................................. 14
Nature of R e s p o n s e s .................................... 16
Response Problems ................................... 17
Observations about Interviews ..................... 18
Respondent Language ..............................  22
Selective Memory ................................... 24
CHAPTER 2: SETTING THE S T A G E ................................28
Introduction ............................................ 28
The Wolf Management C o m m i t t e e .........................28
Appointment of the Committee ...................... 28
Initial Controversies ..............................  3 0
S t r u c t u r e ..............................................34
The Technical Committee ..............................  35
Selection of Members ..............................  35
Assignment of the Technical Committee ...........  37
Technical Committee Ground Rules ................  37
Background Information ............................ 38
I s s u e s .....................................................40
Level of Background K n o w l e d g e ....................   . 44
S u m m a r y .................................................. 49
CHAPTER 3: ELEMENTS OF NEGOTIATION RELATIONSHIPS . . . .  50
Introduction ............................................  50
Previous Relationships of Committee Members . . . .  50
Future Working Relationships .........................  55
C o o p e r a t i o n ..............................................61
E m o t i o n s .................................................. 66
M i n d s e t s .................................................. 71
Interpretation of the Congressional Mandate . . . . 8 3
Interpretation of Federal Members ................  8 4
Interpretation of Other Members ..................  86
S u m m a r y .................................................. 87
CHAPTER 4: THE NEGOTIATIONS ................................88
Introduction .......................................... 88
The M e e t i n g s ..............................................88
Endangered Species Act ............................ 89
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A t t o r n e y s ..............................................98
The Alternatives........................................ 100
Mumma's Proposal .....................................  102
The Final P r o p o s a l ......................................108
CHAPTER 5: A N A L Y S I S .......................................... 115
Introduction .......................................... 115
Organizational Questions ............................ 115
Were all parties represented that should have
b e e n ? ............................................... 117
Were the hunters represented adequately? . . . 118
What was the quality of the leadership? . . . .  119
Would a mediator have h e l p e d ? ..................... 120
Was the time deadline a f a c t o r ? ................... 124
External Influences ................................  13 0
Political Pressure ..............................  130
Other External Influences .......................  134
Public Hearings ................................... 138
Incentives To Negotiate ............................ 141
C o n c e s s i o n s .......................................... 142
Incentive to Appear Effective ..................  14 6
Underlying Conflicts ................................  149
Negotiators' Consistency .......................  149
Voting Coalitions ................................  152
A Master Negotiator ..............................  162
One Reluctant Bargainer .........................  172
Unwillingness to Suspend Disbelief ............ 175
An "Involuntary" Negotiation Process? .........  177
C O N C L U S I O N ....................................................182
P O S T S C R I P T ................................................... 187
N O T E S .......................................................... 190
A P P E N D I X ......................................................192
LITERATURE CITED .......................................... 196
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
OF THE WOLF MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE NEGOTIATIONS
A Case Study
INTRODUCTION
After a lengthy, controversial history of attempts to get 
the Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan (U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service 1987) written and implemented, Congress 
enacted legislation in late 1990 providing for the appointment 
of a Wolf Management Committee. The specific charge to the 
Committee was to develop a plan for réintroduction and 
management of gray wolves (Canis lupus) in Yellowstone 
National Park and the Central Idaho Wilderness Area (Public 
Law 101-512, November 5, 1990, 104. STAT 1915). The
Committee^ met for the first time on January 23, 1991, with a 
deadline of May 15, 1991, imposed by Congress. Over the
course of the next four months, the Committee met six times to 
answer the charge of Congress (Wolf Management Committee 
Minutes 1991).
The purpose of this thesis is to present a descriptive 
narrative of the events and group dynamics of those meetings 
and briefly examine them in the context of negotiation theory. 
The Wolf Management Committee and its technical committee are 
each described in terms of structure, members, level of 
knowledge about wolves, interpersonal relationships, and 
negotiation dynamics such as outside influences, mindset, 
cooperation, emotions and underlying conflicts.
1
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
It is necessary to examine the historical context of the 
controversy over the proposed wolf réintroduction into 
Yellowstone National Park in order to set the stage for the 
establishment of the Wolf Management Committee. From the time 
of the release of the first recovery plan, supporters of wolf 
recovery have pushed for funding for an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) which would be the first step toward 
implementation of the recovery plan. Opponents have 
continually blocked the funding.
The gray wolf was listed as an endangered species with 
the enactment of the Endangered Species Act in 1973 [87 Stat. 
884; 16 use 1531 et seq. as amended; hereinafter referred to 
as Endangered Species Act (ESA)]. By 1977, the first draft of 
a recovery plan was written. It was approved in 1980, but its 
weaknesses were so obvious that conservation organizations, 
scientists, and others insisted on immediate revision of the 
plan and inclusion of réintroduction of wolves into 
Yellowstone National Park (YNP) (Little 1991).
Rewriting of the recovery plan began in 1982, amid 
growing controversy. Stockmen, hunters, and anti­
conservationists successfully lobbied Congressmen from 
Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho to join the fight against wolf 
réintroduction in YNP. National Park Service (NPS) Director 
Russell Dickenson was so influenced by the anti-wolf campaign 
that he denied that•any réintroduction effort was underway
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(McNamee 1986, Little 1991).
In 1985, conservation groups persuaded Yellowstone 
National Park Superintendent Robert Barbee to allow the 
Defenders of Wildlife exhibit, "Wolves and Humans", to be 
displayed in the Park. The exhibit was seen by approximately 
250,000 Park visitors (Little 1991). At the same time, a 
survey found that 75% of YNP visitors polled supported 
réintroduction (McNaught 1987) . New NPS Director William Mott 
hinted indirectly at the annual meeting of the Greater 
Yellowstone Coalition that he was in favor of wolf recovery in 
Yellowstone (McNamee 1986). Late in 1986, as the revised 
draft Recovery Plan was awaiting approval by U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service Director Frank Dunkle, wolf proponents were 
feeling hopeful that the réintroduction plan would finally 
move forward (McNamee 1986, O 'Gara 1986).
The final recovery plan was approved in 1987 by the 
National Park Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 
NPS Director Mott immediately ordered the preparation of an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) (Little 1991). In 
September of that year, FWS Director Dunkle, a former director 
of Montana Fish, Wildlife Parks, promised timber-industry 
officials that he would not allow the Fish and Wildlife 
Service to fund any wolf recovery work. "The wolf stops at my 
desk," he said (Steinhart 1988). While public support across 
the U.S. had been continuously growing. Western Congressmen 
were ever mindful of their powerful constituents in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ranching and hunting industries and issued public statements 
opposing wolf recovery. Idaho Senator Steve Symms warned 
children that wolves pose a real danger to humans. Wyoming 
Senator Alan Simpson claimed that wolves eat people. Montana 
Senator Conrad Burns predicted "there'll be a dead child 
within a year," following return of wolves to Yellowstone 
(Williams 1990). Montana Representative Ron Marlenee declared 
that wolves breed like cockroaches and would fan out across 
the countryside to devour sheep and cattle by the thousands 
(Little 1991). Montana and Wyoming congressional
representatives also pledged to stop the National Park Service 
from funding any EIS directed at wolf réintroduction 
(Steinhart 1988).
Richard Cheney, then Representative from Wyoming wrote a 
letter to Secretary of Interior Donald Model, stating, "I just 
wanted you to know that I ' m every bit as committed to 
preventing introduction of wolves to Yellowstone as Bill Mott 
is to put them there. If he wants to fight. I'm ready" 
(Little 1991). In a letter to Mott, he wrote, "I don't know 
how to make myself any clearer on wolf recovery. I am 
strongly opposed to it. I would like to see some evidence 
that officials in your department get the message." Director 
Mott then announced that he was putting the recovery plan on 
hold (Cohn 1990).
In 1988, Utah Congressman Wayne Owens, fed up with the 
constant delay, introduced a bill requiring wolf
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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réintroduction forthwith (Skow 1989). Hank Fischer of 
Defenders of Wildlife and other conservationists persuaded him 
to change the bill to call for an EIS as a politically more 
palatable approach (Cohn 1990, Little 1991). Pro-wolf 
lobbyists made the rounds and convinced House members to 
appropriate funds to conduct the EIS. Once again, the "Rocky 
Mountain Curtain of anti-environmentalist senators," (Little 
1991) Symms, Simpson, Malcolm Wallop (WY), and James McClure 
(ID) , rose to the occasion to block the EIS funding (Cohn 
1990). Senators McClure and Simpson declared that Owens' bill 
did not provide enough protection for ranchers* interests 
(Cohn 1990). Senator McClure wielded a lot of power as Chair 
of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee which 
wrote appropriations bills for the Department of Interior. He 
agreed instead to support special appropriations for the 
"Yellowstone Congressional Studies" (Cohn 1990, Little 1991).
In 1989, a public opinion poll showed that a majority of 
Wyoming residents favor wolf réintroduction into Yellowstone 
(Noreen 1989). Opponents continued to be outspoken. Carolyn 
Paseneaux, future member of the Wolf Management Technical 
Committee and Director of Wyoming Woolgrower's Association 
said, "The howl of the wolf is a real macho, sexy sound to 
some, but to ranchers it can be the sound of death. Ranchers 
fear they would not have any means of control over wolves. If 
wolves left the park, there could be a mass slaughter and 
could lead to a Jim Jones scene at calving time." Larry
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Bourret of the Wyoming Farm Bureau pronounced that wolf 
réintroduction amounted to importing an exotic species (Noreen
1989) .
The amended Owens bill, now calling for an EIS instead of 
réintroduction, was under consideration by the House of 
Representatives. James Ridenour, NPS director, called the 
bill "clearly premature", stating that he wanted no EIS done 
until the Yellowstone studies were finished. Rep. Marlenee 
declared the bill to be "blatantly anti-sportsman." Rep. 
Young (AK) criticized it as "meddlesome" and called wolf 
proponents "romantic". Rep. Craig (ID) said that he would 
support stockmen killing wolves in defense of their animals. 
Rep. Hensen of Utah called the bill "foolish" (AP 1989a).
In mid-1990, the Yellowstone Congressional Studies 
report, "Wolves for Yellowstone?," was released. The report 
concluded that wolves could be reintroduced into Yellowstone 
without any of the serious negative effects that so many 
opponents had feared (Cohn 1990, Melnykovych 1990). Wyoming 
Game and Fish Director Francis "Pete" Petera, future member of 
the Wolf Management Committee, commented on the report. 
"Anyone reading this report who is in the business of wildlife 
management next to the national park shouldn’t feel too 
comfortable about the whole idea" (Wright 199 0). Jim Magagna, 
future member of the Wolf Management Committee and sheep 
rancher near Rock Springs, Wy., suggested that ranchers can 
lose animals to bears, eagles, and coyotes and complained "now
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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they want to add one more factor . . . Can't they be
satisfied just to have coyotes in Yellowstone?" (Satchell
1990).
Perhaps concerned that the movements of wolves naturally 
recolonizing northwest Montana could bode ill for flexible 
management of wolves in Yellowstone, Senator McClure 
introduced a bill proposing réintroduction of three wolf pairs 
into Yellowstone and encouraging populations in the Bob 
Marshall Wilderness Complex and the Selway-Bitterroot 
Wilderness (AP 1989b, Williams 1990). However, the bill also 
proposed that wolves would lose their endangered status 
outside the Park and that management authority be turned over 
to the States (Wright 1990). The bill was promptly opposed by 
proponents of wolf recovery. Meanwhile, the House once again 
approved money for an EIS and once again Senator McClure 
blocked it. Once again, he came up with what he called a 
compromise. Funds were approved for a Wolf Management 
Committee to be appointed by Department of Interior Secretary 
Lujan that would bring together all parties affected by the 
réintroduction issue to develop a réintroduction and 
management plan (Cohn 1990).
Rep. Marlenee reacted strongly. "The Committee has been 
stacked with a pre-determined bias to reintroduce the wolf .
. The Secretary himself (Lujan) has been sold down the 
river. The environmental activists have eaten his lunch . .
if Hollywood made a movie of what's been going on . . .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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they'd have to title it 'Dunces with Wolves'" (Lindler 1990). 
Executive Vice President Andy Neal of the Montana Farm Bureau 
reported that the Bureau asked Governor Stephens not to permit 
K. L- Cool to serve on the committee, saying Montana should 
not support "a process in which the deck has been stacked" 
(Lindler 1990).
The Idaho Cattle Association and Senator Symms asked 
Governor Andrus of Idaho to pull State Fish & Game Director 
Jerry Conley off the committee in protest of what they 
perceived as Idaho's under-representation. The Governor 
refused, saying he "wants Conley to remain on the panel so he 
can remain apprised of the committee's progress." Senator 
Symms' spokesman, David Pearson, threatened more stonewalling, 
declaring that by "omitting Idaho ranchers and 
conservationists from the panel, the final plan could be dead 
on arrival in Congress" (AP 1990).
Following their appointments to the Committee, Pete 
Petera and Jim Magagna both made public comments. Petera 
complained that the Committee's deadline of May 15 appeared 
too fast for him. Magagna suggested that the deadline 
"doesn't leave any time for anyone to do any research . . .
[and] doesn't provide enough time to allow adequate public 
input" (AP 1991).
On January 2 3 and 24, 1991, the Wolf Management Committee 
met for the first time, charged with the responsibility of 
developing a plan for réintroduction and management of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9
gray wolf in Yellowstone National Park and central Idaho. A 
May 15, 1991, deadline was imposed by Congress.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1
METHODS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will introduce the research and analysis 
method, discuss respondents and their language, and present 
observations about the nature of the responses-
THE CASE STUDY METHOD
The subject of this study is the investigation of the 
factors involved in the decision-making process of the Wolf 
Management Committee. Therefore, the case study method was 
used to conduct the research for this project. Case study 
research typically focuses on questions that ask how and why. 
Those types of questions lead an investigator to the discovery 
of "what happened." Case studies concentrate on contemporary 
events and neither require nor allow control over behavioral 
phenomena. Sources of information are direct observation, 
participant-observation, systematic interviewing, documents, 
physical artifacts and archival information. Case studies can 
be single- or multiple-case studies, and may be exploratory, 
descriptive, explanatory, or a combination of these types (Yin
1984) . The descriptive, single-case design was chosen because 
the Wolf Management Committee was a single, unique event that 
may never be repeated in this exact format.
10
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
Information was gathered through interviews and from 
documents. Case study research is often akin to playing 
detective (Yin 1984) because people may make comments that 
need to be further investigated by tracking the information 
through several sources.
The Interviews
One-on-one interviews were conducted with seven Wolf 
Management Committee members and six technical committee 
members, either in person or by telephone. The interviews 
were tape-recorded and later transcribed. Responses from two 
Committee members were obtained by questionnaire.
The interview method is preferred over the 
questionnaire/survey method. It is a more desirable means of 
obtaining the story, i.e., getting the details in a manner 
that is not possible without an impossibly lengthy 
questionnaire. Surveys can try to deal with phenomenon and 
context, but their ability to investigate the context is 
extremely limited (to numbers of variables, numbers of 
questions, numbers of respondents, etc.) (Yin 1984).
A list of questions was developed to begin the interview 
phase (see Appendix). As the research progressed and 
information was accumulated, questions were added or changed 
as new information was revealed, or deleted when a particular 
question became obsolete.^
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The Respondents/Informants^
The case study does not represent a "sample; " the 
investigator's goal is to expand and generalize theories and 
not to enumerate frequencies (Yin 1984). The number of people 
who could be interviewed from either committee was fixed at 
22, rendering a meaningful random sample useless and
impossible to derive. Additionally, the focus of this study 
was the group decision. Therefore, it was desirable to
interview as many of the total population as reasonably 
possible. As the interviews progressed, respondents made
suggestions of other people who could be interviewed that were
not a part of the process, but attended meetings in an 
observation capacity. Only one of those persons, Dan Neal of 
the Casper Star Tribune, was interviewed in order to use a 
source from a different perspective. The decision to 
interview only one person outside the committees was also a 
result of the ever enlarging pool of people who could be 
interviewed and the need to confine a reasonable number of 
interviews to the given time frame allowed for conducting the 
research.
When conducting research through interviews, a phenomenon 
termed "saturation" occurs; i.e., the interviewer begins to 
hear the same information repeatedly, no matter who is 
interviewed (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Saturation began to 
occur in a general way very early in this research no matter 
which side the person represented. However, in most cases.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the people were able to provide greater information on some 
events, ensuring the necessity of continuing with the 
interviews. Once saturation is reached on a given topic, the 
investigator should seek out sources of opposing information 
on the same topic (Douglas 1985) . Only in this way is an 
investigator able to piece together the whole story. The 
fourth interview with a Committee member appeared, at the 
time, to be the first instance of a different version. Nearly 
all information reported by that person was in opposition to 
what had been revealed in the first three interviews. It 
almost seemed as if he was giving answers that were just the 
opposite of the answer he thought was being sought. When 
combining his information with that of other people during the 
analysis phase, it was apparent that his version was the 
opposite of the stories of nearly all of the other members.
A second phenomenon that may occur during research 
interviewing is the appearance of "superinformants" (Douglas
1985). A superinformant is an extraordinarily observant 
person with a significant amount of life experience, seeking 
wisdom and human understanding in a certain area of life. 
Such a person has a great deal of self-understanding and has 
spent much time observing and analyzing some aspect of human 
life. The superinformant becomes critical to interview 
research because of that superior level of human understanding 
and insight.
During this research, the conservation representatives
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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became superinformants. They appeared to have a unique 
ability to understand the underlying influences that affected 
the workings of the Committee. The reasons for that 
understanding are not apparent through the interviews. It may 
simply be that conservation representatives were able to speak 
more freely than any other member since they "lost" in the 
final vote and, therefore, didn't have to defend the final 
product, didn't have constituencies to placate/satisfy/pacify, 
and didn't have jobs to protect as did the other Committee 
members. It may also be that through many years of experience 
with controversial issues conservationists have developed a 
deeper understanding of underlying influences on processes 
such as this Committee, although many were surprised by the 
level of lobbying by outside influences. Consequently, an 
effort was made to talk to all the conservation 
representatives.
Method of Analysis
Topical analysis was used to evaluate the content of the 
interviews (Driessen n.d.). Topical analysis is a method 
typically used to examine open-ended narrative for key topics. 
The narrative is obtained through open-ended questions that 
ask an informant to describe a certain experience. Within 
that narrative are found the key ideas, the topics, mentioned 
by the informant. However, since this research was designed 
primarily to examine negotiation theory, key topics were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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mentioned in the interviewer's questions. Nonetheless, many 
informants expanded their answers to a single question and 
included other topics. People's interpretations of the 
questions were not always identical, nor did they necessarily 
answer the question or discuss the topic the investigator had 
in mind. Thus, topical analysis was a useful method of 
evaluation.
This method involves searching the narrative of the 
interviews for topics and themes, highlighting them in the 
text, and then rearranging all of the same topics from all of 
the interviews together to form a rough manuscript."*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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NATURE OF RESPONSES
A case study which uses interviews as the primary method 
of data collection has some inherent weaknesses. First and 
foremost, where different participants have different versions 
of the same event, objective truth may not exist (Yin 1984). 
However, by searching for instances of oppositional 
information after saturation occurs, the truth emerges 
(Douglas 1985). Some shortcomings of the interview process 
include selective memory, passage of time since the original 
event, the tendency of the human mind to change thoughts in 
mid-answer, and deliberate avoidance of a question or change 
of subject.
Weaknesses specific to this case include the tendency of 
public agency representatives to talk in "agency-ese", a de­
personalized, general language designed to uphold the agency 
line and to avoid putting their job at risk. Most people had 
files of notes that could have been reviewed but were not. 
Having been told of the interview subject prior to the 
interview resulted in some people planning what they were 
going to talk about. In some cases, very little useful 
information was provided after the informant's topic was 
exhausted.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Response Problems
Two particular difficulties arose with this research. 
The first was a lack of preparation for the interview by those 
interviewed. In all cases but two, appointments for the 
interviews were scheduled at least two days prior to the date 
of the interview. In the majority of cases, people had one 
week's notice of the upcoming interview. Despite advance 
notice, all respondents failed to review their files prior to 
the interview. Almost every person made a comment to the 
effect that he or she should have taken some time to review 
their files. One person, acknowledging that he felt "stupid" 
because of his lack of memory, did interrupt his interview to 
go get his files. In one instance, the interview was conducted 
on the spot when the interviewee and interviewer had been 
playing telephone tag for a couple of weeks and finally 
managed to reach each other. Nevertheless, the interviewee 
knew the subject of the interview, since at least two messages 
had been left explaining the nature of the desired interview. 
Therefore, ample time had been available for review of files. 
While recognizing the busy schedules of Committee members, 
reviewing the files, even briefly, would have refreshed the 
memories of the informants, providing greater detail instead 
of more generalities.
The second difficulty was the passage of time. One year 
had passed since the conclusion of the Wolf Management 
Committee negotiations. Time elapsed since the original event
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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naturally decreases the details that are remembered so that 
general observations are then reported with a subsequent lack 
of supporting details. However, most respondents were able to 
recall vividly those details that were most important to them, 
enabling the investigator to piece together the "truth", 
because what was important to each person was in many cases 
different from that of other people.
Observations about Interviews
Certain events unique to particular interviews are worth 
noting. Some informants emphasized a particular point about 
the negotiation process throughout their interview. One 
member of the technical committee repeatedly emphasized how 
politically sensitive the Committee's mandate was. He
mentioned that he had previously had assignments like this, 
though not quite this politicallv sensitive. He talked about 
dealing with a subject like the wolf that's very politically 
sensitive and how the taking of game animals by wolves is 
exceptionally controversial among the public. The politically 
sensitive nature of the issue turned out to be an important 
component of the process.^
One Committee member expressed his frustration with the 
process numerous times, saying that he got very irritated at 
the whole process, especially at the extremely short time 
frame the Committee was given to complete the task. "We had 
a very specific, a very difficult if not impossible task to
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accomplish in an extremely short time frame.** He expressed 
frustration at the need to educate some of the Committee 
members about wolves saying, "we had a mandate that says to 
prepare a plan to reintroduce, it didn't say to study them." 
He also expressed frustration at the unwillingness of some 
Committee members to bargain in good faith, saying, "Well, 
you know we've given it our best shot. Our report's due 
tomorrow . . . It's obvious that some of you have just taken
a position. You worked on the process. And then you don't 
bargain in good faith right here at the end."
A technical committee member spoke several times of how 
the whole process took much longer than it should have because 
all the members were familiar with the issue. It had been 
going on for several years. At one point, she said, "I mean, 
this is just not a new issue."
Some people were profuse in their offers of help, 
suggesting other possible sources of information, other 
potential respondents, or that they could forward copies of 
documents. While those offers were appreciated and did in 
fact yield some benefits, it sometimes appeared that the 
offers were being made in order to appear helpful while at the 
same time not providing much information in the interview 
itself.
A few interviews appeared to yield a lot of information 
at first glance due to the length of answers given but in fact 
were long-winded renditions of the "party" line.
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Some respondents clearly had spent a considerable amount 
of time thinking about what they wanted to discuss in the 
interviews. As a result, questions about those topics 
received answers that were well thought out. However, those 
people subsequently had a tendency to be less responsive to 
questions they had not anticipated or they decided that 
certain subjects were then "off the subject".
One Federal representative had it in his mind to discuss 
the proposal he presented at the second to last meeting (April 
10-11) and the utter frustration with a fellow Committee 
member over the whole thing. When he'd said all he wanted to 
say about it, he said, "How're we doing?", indicating he was 
ready to move on and finish the interview. Following that 
comment, the questions asked elicited short, to-the-point 
answers.
It's not clear what topic a technical committee member 
had decided would probably be discussed but occasionally he 
would say, "maybe you can shut that [tape recorder] off. " 
Then he would report something that he deemed off the subject. 
However, the information that he presented was directly 
germane to the study.
One State director had difficulty directly answering the 
questions at the beginning of his interview. He appeared to 
be prepared to discuss the Committee process in a brief, 
chronological sequence. No matter what the question was, he 
would give a short-sentence answer and go right on with his
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plan. Once his plan was accomplished, for the most part he 
answered the questions more directly and more at length.
Q: . . .  Getting into the meetings of the Committee .
. . Were there divisions that occurred along some
of the issues?
A: Yes, there were some divisions. I'd have to think
carefully on that one. I can't remember the exact 
procedure, etc., but the wolf committee met, had an 
organizational meeting and they made two 
significant decisions that I felt were appropriate 
(From this point on in this answer he 
discussed those two organizational decisions.)
Q: . . .  You mentioned endangered, experimental, or
delisting. Which of the three did you prefer?
A: Well, we started, I believe as I recall, and again
I'm not [sure I'm] correct on this point, was first 
preference was delisting and then we go ahead and 
manage them under that concept but what come out 
was nonessential experimental which would allow the 
governor of the states involved to sign off on the 
plan, and that we be allowed to address the 
livestock, big game, and multiple land uses issues.
Q; So, that was the final proposal, but which of the
three would you have preferred? Is that your
preference then?
A: My preference to begin with was that they be
delisted and go ahead and manage them as we would 
other species but the Wolf Management Committee 
recommendation is the one that we finally agreed to 
and that's our stand at this time.
At the beginning of his interview, another Federal 
representative did not want to spend time on "detail"
questions; for example, "What ground rules were established?"
You'll have to look at the minutes of the meetings to get
that information . . .
I really—  You'll just have to go to the minutes for a
lot of that information . . .
In discussing the issues for his agency, he named the two 
major ones, then said.
There were many lesser ones that we also discussed
that would be in the minutes.
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The same person began his interview with very brisk, 
business-like answers that stayed strictly with the questions 
asked. By mid-interview, he began to broaden out with his 
answers and relax somewhat and by the end of the interview, he 
was freely stating his opinion. The change in response style 
may have been a matter of trust (Emerson 1983), of feeling 
comfortable with the interviewer, and also a matter of 
discovering the nature of the questions.
Two members spoke in a manner that was much more 
deliberate than any of the other respondents. They chose each 
word very carefully and precisely. The fact that both are
attorneys may contribute to that type of response.
Respondent Language
Some respondents had a tendency to attempt to de­
personalize comments by using plural pronouns, general terms, 
reference by position, or by speaking "agency-ese” .
So, I think our (speaking only of himself or he and 
his constituents) background was more in terms of 
impacts, whether you're talking about the negative 
impacts that I saw from wolf réintroduction, uh, the 
positive impacts that, sav. a Hank Fischer saw in terms 
of completing a missing link in the ecosystem . . .
If I discuss individual ones, I don't mean to imply
by that that others of us didn't have them.
1 think they worked pretty well with the group. 
Since their backgrounds were different, both in their 
life experiences and educationally, some of them 
(speaking of only two people) didn't go through the 
institutional things that the rest of us did . . .
And I really came to feel as we went through the 
process that, and this is my perspective on some of the
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pro-wolf groups that were involved, not necessarily on 
the individual players on the Committee but at least 
their constituencies . . .
"Agency-ese" is a language that contains very official- 
sounding statements, as though the interviewee is speaking to 
reporters. Words are chosen carefully, seeming to avoid 
taking a stance on any given issue. Examples of such language 
can be found throughout the interviews of some of the Federal 
and State members.
We had the technical committee put together 
information that was then furnished to us as Committee 
members with which we then tried to come to some 
consensus on a plan from that. The technical advisors 
were the people, the experts, who put the material 
together, uh, and they, the technical committee was also 
comprised of all the different corresponding individuals, 
uh, from the different agencies and private sector as 
well.
The concern [for the agency] was from the very 
beginning that the general management plan for 
Yellowstone did indicate that the ultimate objective 
would be to reintroduce wolves into the Yellowstone 
ecosystem. Umm, within Yellowstone National Park, to 
provide the predatory, umm, umm, impact on the, uh, 
ungulate herds and also because it was a needed balance 
in the ecosystem, et cetera.
The assignment of the committee was to look at the 
possibility and probability of reintroducing wolves into 
the Yellowstone and . . . Central Idaho Wilderness Area, 
and that was from direction in an appropriations bill 
from Congress of the United States and they were given 
fairly definite charges or directions . . . The report
was due on a particular date and on Congressional reports 
of that sort typically work under a time frame of about 
a year to do it and an extension in the time frame was 
not really a consideration. Congress wanted a report 
back and so it was structured such that the report would 
be finished on that report date.
There are some differences from the stand point of 
the State approaches legally that tend to determine 
policy as opposed to the Federal agencies that, of 
course, are subject to following the implementation of
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the Endangered Species Act and National Environmental 
Protection [Act] and all the other acts. So, the 
backgrounds legally are a little different. The 
backgrounds from a policy standpoint are different as 
well and then you throw in all the personal preferences 
and values of different managers . . . And, if you're in 
a state management agency and your objective is to 
produce as many elk as you can for hunters to take, then 
I can see how you might be a little concerned about 
wolves coming along.
The same person went off the record for several minutes during
his interview and his language during that time switched to
common everyday language.
Selective memory
While it is true that time is the great eraser, memory 
can also be deliberately selective. Such was the case during 
this research. Respondents were able to recall many events 
yet appeared unable to remember others. Perhaps the most 
interesting facet of selective memory in this situation is 
that those who used it tended to be the persons named by other 
Committee members as those involved in or causing the conflict 
during the process, those perceived as being under the most 
outside pressure, and those most resistant to the Committee 
mandate. Selective memory would typically occur when 
discussing issues that were controversial during the Committee 
meetings.
The following question and answer sequence demonstrates 
an example of such selective memory. The discussion with one 
of the State directors was about the proposal that was put on 
the table at the second to last meeting, April 10 - 11. Every
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other person who was asked remembered the proposal, if not in 
fine detail, at least the fact that it occurred because the 
presenter was so frustrated with the process up to that point 
that he expressed that frustration. His feelings were clearly- 
remembered by most other respondents who then commented on it.
Q: Can you tell me about the situation with the
proposal . . . presented where you ended up with a
9-1 vote?
A: 9-1 vote?
Q: Yeah. He presented a proposal and he wanted a 10-0
vote on that and it ended up being 9-1 and I guess 
part of the stipulation of the proposal was that he 
wanted a 10-0 vote and that it not go to Congress 
if it wasn't a 10-0 vote?
A: I can't recall off the top of my head exactly how
that read.
Q: . . .  The thing that [he] told me was that [a
certain Committee member] was the person who voted 
no on that particular proposal and this was the one 
where as [he] explained it, the group worked 
through the proposal line by line and everybody 
agreed to every language change that was made and 
then the final vote was taken and [a certain 
Committee member] voted no.
A: Uh—  I don't have that right in front of me but,
uh, I do remember the vote.
Q: Well, can you just talk about, the vote in
particular and what you remember about how that 
came about?
A; Well, Alethea, I ’m just searching the top of my
head here and I can't get back to the details of
that.
Q: Okay. Well, . . .  I just found it here in the
minutes . . .  It was that wolves in the three- 
state area be classified as experimental 
nonessential except for the Glacier portion . . .
A: I agreed to that.
Q: . . .  a management plan would be prepared that uses
the conceptual guideline of Alternative F, option 
1, which I don't have right here . . .
A: That was a proposal that I had placed forward,
although [ ]that was one of them, I believe it
was the same one that I [ ].
Q: Okay. Yeah, it says with the substitution of
nonessential experimental for the delisting 
proposal except in so far as Alternative F is not 
consistent with other portions of this motion. And
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it provided for a federally funded joint State- 
Federal EIS . . .
A : Umm , hmm.
Q : . . .  also would include budget estimates for five
yearsf cooperative agreement with the States and 
Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture, standing 
committee established and a subcommittee to carry 
out information and education activities.
A: Uh, I can't, it seems to me that I did vote for
that alternative but it was supposed to be, uh, it 
didn't go through anyway.
Q: Yeah. And I was hoping that maybe you could
enlighten me as to why. . . .  If six was the 
agreed upon majority that was needed, I don't 
understand why this proposal wasn't sent to 
Congress.
A: Yeah. I can't, I still don't have it here in front
of me and to jog my memory. I'd have to go back and 
get it.
Another State director generally excused his poor memory
through his interview.
Oh, gosh. Huh! Well, this will take a little time 
to kind of work my way back through this.
You know. I'm kind of blanking out myself.
Yeah. Again, a better individual for these kind of 
details would probably be the Fish and Wildlife Service 
because they were sort of responsible for the mechanics 
of it, but, without having, I really couldn't sit down 
and tell you specifically.
Let's see, as I recall, there was one part of it 
that had to have unanimous agreement. I probably would 
be wasting your tape because I really can't without 
having refreshed my memory, go back and tell you about an 
individual vote.
No, not without, again, looking back through.
Another member was also frequently "forgetful."
You know. I'd be hard pressed to put a real definite time 
frame on it.
. . . and again this tests my memory a little bit.
I can't recollect that at this point in time.
Following a question about divisions of members around
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the issues, in which he was a key factor, the same person 
said, ", . . s o  much goes on it's just sort of like digging
back into history for me now so I have to think a little so 
I'm sure I'll miss some things for you."
Regarding the proposal on which he was the lone 
dissenting vote:
Q: Speaking of [his] proposal, he and others have
explained how you worked through the process and 
talking about specific points and that sort of 
thing and that at the end you found yourself unable 
to vote "yea" on that one. Can you explain your 
decision on that?
A: On his proposal?
Q: On his proposal.
A: You know, I even have to stop and think, I ’m not
sure that I remember the nature of his proposal at 
this point in time.
Q: Well, here, I can find it real quick. In fact . .
A: It'll come back to me if you give me a few hints. .
A: Okay. I ’m, again I should have reviewed some notes
or something.
This person commented that Congressmen were helpful 
whenever he asked for help. Again, he had a memory "failure" 
when asked what kind of help they gave. He answered, "Oh, I 
really can't [remember] offhand."
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CHAPTER!
SETTING THE STAGE 
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter reviewed the historical perspective, 
the methods, and the nature of the responses. This chapter 
will describe how the Committee was formed, discuss its 
structure and the technical advisory committee, and the level 
of knowledge of members about wolf ecology prior to entering 
the negotiations. The issues are also presented as well as 
controversies that occurred prior to the first meeting.
THE WOLF MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
Appointment of the Committee
The law setting up the Committee reads as follows:
The Secretary shall, within 3 0 days of enactment, 
appoint a 10 member Wolf Management Committee. The
Committee's task shall be to develop a wolf re- 
introduction and management plan for Yellowstone National 
Park and the Central Idaho Wilderness Area. The 
Committee shall consist of the following:
1. One representative from the Fish & Game
Department of each of the States of Idaho, 
Montana and Wyoming.
2. One representative from the National Park
Service.
3. One representative from the U.S. Forest
Service.
4. One representative from the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service.
5. Two representatives from conservation
organizations.
6. Two representatives from the livestock/hunting
community.
The panel shall make available to the Secretary and 
the Congress by May 15, 1991 its completed plan along
28
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with its recommendations. The Committee's plan shall 
represent a consensus agreement of Committee members with 
at least six members supporting the plan (Public Law 101- 
512, November 5, 1990, 104. STAT 1915).
The members appointed were Galen Buterbaugh*, Regional 
Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Denver, Colorado; 
Lorraine Mintzmyer*, Regional Director, National Park Service, 
Denver, Colorado; John Mumma*, Regional Director, U.S. Forest 
Service, Missoula, Montana; Jerry Conley*, Director, Game & 
Fish Department, Idaho; K. L. Cool**, Director, Fish, Wildlife 
and Parks Department, Montana; Francis "Pete" Petera*. 
Director, Game & Fish Department, Wyoming; Tom Dougherty, 
Central Rocky Mountain Regional Executive, National Wildlife 
Federation, Boulder, Colorado; Hank Fischer*, Northern Rockies 
Representative, Defenders of Wildlife, Missoula, Montana; 
James "Jim" Magagna*, Vice President, American Sheep Industry 
Association, Rock Springs, Wyoming; and Ron Somerville, 
Director of National and International Affairs, Wildlife Fund 
of America, Washington, D.C. Numerous people, from members of 
Congress, sportsmen's groups and individuals to the Fish and 
Wildlife Service, submitted names of potential Committee 
appointees to Secretary of the Interior Manuel Lujan (Anon. 
Intv., pers. comm.). The Secretary appointed the Fish and 
Wildlife Service representative as Chair (Buterbaugh, pers. 
comm., 1992)^. Most selections to the Committee seem fairly 
obvious.
The three Federal regional directors were selected as a
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result of the wolf activity occurring in their regions. As 
chief wildlife manager of state wildlife divisions in their 
states, the State directors were logical choices.
Hank Fischer and Tom Dougherty are representatives from 
conservation groups. Defenders of Wildlife and the National 
Wildlife Federation, that have campaigned heavily for wolf 
réintroduction. Both Fischer and Dougherty represent regions 
where wolf recovery is occurring.
Jim Magagna was asked jointly by the Wyoming Woolgrowers 
Association and the Wyoming Stockgrowers which represent the 
cattle industry in Wyoming, if he would be agreeable to their 
submission of his name as a candidate for Committee membership 
as someone they were willing to support.
Ron Somerville declined his appointment as the hunters' 
representative, saying that he more accurately represented the 
conservation position (AP 1990). He also was reported to have 
taken a professional position in Alaska (Bean, pers. comm., 
1992, Neal, pers. comm., 1992).
Initial Controversies
Controversy continued to plague the wolf réintroduction 
and recovery issue even as the Committee was being formed. 
There was some jockeying for the conservation appointments. 
One informant reported that while Renee Askins, of The Wolf 
Fund, had been nominated by John Turner to be one of the 
conservation representatives and Tom Dougherty the other one.
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lobbying by Hank Fischer and other national conservation 
groups resulted in Fischer's appointment instead.
The appointment of Ron Somerville's replacement caused 
more controversy. George Bennett**, Executive Director, Gem 
State Hunters' Association of Idaho, was appointed to fill the 
vacancy left by Somerville. One informant speculated that 
political pressure applied by the Congressional delegations 
resulted in a pro-agriculture person being appointed to 
replace him rather than someone who was truly a representative 
of the hunting community. Another person noted that through 
Senator Symms of Idaho a lot of pressure was put on the 
Secretary of Interior to appoint George Bennett as the 
sportsmen's representative. A third member reported that 
Bennett was lobbied against heavily by all Committee members 
as not being a good addition.
In part, Bennett's appointment satisfied the feelings of 
Idaho politicians that Idaho had been under-represented in the 
initial appointments. However, nearly every person reported 
on the fact that Bennett more accurately represented the 
livestock industry than hunters.
Is he another member of the livestock industry, or 
is he really out there representing the hunters? He'd 
give these great pronouncements at the start of the 
meeting that I'm here representing all the hunters, you 
know. I'm looking after your welfare. Yet when we'd have 
the little breaks, you know, there they'd go, Carolyn and 
Jim and George, off to their little corners and 
commiserate (Anon.).
While George denied, I mean, he said he was there 
representing the hunting interests, uh, just based on his
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contacts and everything else in the way he handled 
himself, he was obviously representing the livestock 
industry, also. I mean, in a lot of cases it was the 
same issues but he was very adamant about that, that he 
was there to represent the hunters (Anon.).
But, I think the feeling very clearly was of 
everybody else on the Committee that George was 
representing the Cattlemen’s Association . . . George was 
a sportsman and he belonged to these clubs but really his 
agenda came from the livestock industry . . . On the
other hand, there were some cases in which the sportsmen 
and the livestock agendas were very close together. So, 
it was kind of convenient for George to say, "Well, I ’m 
a sportsman rather than a livestock representative." So, 
it was hard for people to view George as anything but a 
livestock representative because of the approach he took 
. . . plus the fact he was working, at least part-time, 
for the Cattlemen's Association in Idaho . . .  I think it 
was really unfair to have listed George as a sportsmen's 
representative. . . he may have been knowledgeable here
in state, but he really didn't know anything in any other 
state very much . . . I'm just saying that the
impression that the Federal folks had, the other State 
directors and certainly environmental groups was that 
George was representing the livestock association and not 
sportsmen (Anon.).
Basically he said that he represented this entity 
Gem State Hunters which turned out to . . . have, I
think, no membership and I don't really know as an entity 
what its structure was. I think there was something 
about his representing, being a paid lobbyist for the 
livestock industry and the basic gist of the controversy 
was that he was simply a livestock representative and not 
at all a fellow with hunting interests. So a lot of 
hunting constituencies, I think, felt really angry about 
the choice of him as their representative (Anon.).
Toward the end of the negotiation process. Committee
members reached the point where they quit playing Bennett's
"game" that he was representing hunters.
. . . and [Mumma] turns to George Bennett and says, 
"And I think it will handle your cattlemen's interests," 
and George is standing up and pointing back at Magagna,
'cause of course Bennett was supposed to be representing 
the hunters—  Mumma just wasn't playing the game 
anymore, said, you know, clearly, your —  It was clear 
to him that Bennett was there to represent cattlemen
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(Neal).
In addition to the matter of under-representation, 
another controversy occurred in the State of Idaho. According 
to Jerry Conley, Idaho has a restriction that prohibits the 
Fish and Game Department from expending any funds on wolf 
issues or management with specific exceptions. One exception 
would be work on the central Idaho wolf recovery. Money could 
be spent to control problem wolves, but expenditures on this 
type of réintroduction effort was prohibited. Even though all 
expenses were paid by Federal money, there was a feeling among 
Idaho state officials that the Fish and Game Department 
shouldn't be represented on the Committee. An informal 
opinion was sought from the Attorney General. The decision 
reached was that this Committee could be viewed as an 
extension of the central Idaho wolf recovery work; therefore, 
Conley's participation would be approved, since no State funds 
were being expended. Additionally, the determination was made 
that it was essential that he be on the Committee.
The formation of a technical committee was also a 
controversial matter (Tucker, pers. comm., 1992, Magagna,
pers. comm., 1992). Initially, only the Federal and State
Committee members were to be allowed technical advisors. The 
minutes of the January 2 3-24 meeting reflect this decision, 
naming only Federal and State technical advisors. The private 
sector Committee members objected to the unequal treatment, 
and the matter was resolved with all Committee members being
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
allowed technical advisors, those not yet named to be named 
later, according to the minutes.
Structure
The structure under which these negotiations operated was 
relatively simple. Some ground rules for the process were 
established at the first meeting, although it is not clear 
from the minutes what process was used to establish the ground 
rules. There was quite a bit of disagreement among Committee 
members as to what the rules were, how many rules there were, 
and whether there even were any ground rules. The minutes of 
the first meeting contain very little mention of ground rules. 
Nevertheless, it appears from the interviews that there were 
some rules established.
The Congressional legislation stated that six of ten 
votes would be considered consensus so there was no need to 
determine how many votes were necessary to pass a motion. The 
Committee did decide that only officially appointed members 
could vote on the issue. An alternate sitting in for a voting 
member could not vote. Any member could make a motion.
Decisions were made as to where to hold meetings. The 
business meetings were held in Denver to facilitate access to 
documents and secretarial and support staff. Public hearings 
were held in each State capital.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
The Technical Committee
According to several Committee members, an important 
facet of the Committee structure was the establishment of a 
technical committee to assist the Committee in gathering 
technical information. The technical committee's primary 
responsibility was to formulate alternatives after collecting 
information and evaluating testimony by experts. The 
technical committee prepared nine alternatives for the 
consideration of the Committee. Technical committee members 
were not permitted to participate in the actual discussions of 
the Committee itself.
Some committee members had an agreement with their 
employers that time would be made available for them to give 
this project top priority. The remainder of their duties were 
set aside during the time they were working on the technical 
committee (Claar, pers. comm., 1992).
Selection of Members
Committee members each selected their own technical 
advisor. Members of the technical committee were intended to 
be people who brought some special expertise - scientific, 
legal, economic, or otherwise - to the Committee member they 
served (Bean, pers. comm.). Federal technical committee 
members were Jim Claar*, Forest Service, Missoula, MT. , Wayne 
Brewster*, National Park Service, Yellowstone National Park, 
WY. , and Steve Fritts, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Helena,
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MT. Jay Gore, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Idaho, was an 
ad hoc member.
State technical advisors appointed were Arnie Dood*, 
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, Montana, Wayne 
Melquist, Game and Fish Department, Idaho, and John Talbott, 
Game and Fish Department, Wyoming.
Conservation representatives were Pat Tucker*, National 
Wildlife Federation, Missoula, MT., Renee Askins*, The Wolf 
Fund, Moose, WY. , and Michael Bean*, The Environmental Defense 
Fund, Washington, D.C. Askins and Bean shared an 
appointment. Because of Bean's location in Washington, D.C., 
it was difficult for him to attend all the meetings. 
Therefore, he attended the meetings that focused on legal 
issues. Askins attended the meetings that were more policy 
oriented where the background of the region had more 
relevance. When both attended the same meetings, only one 
could act in an advisory capacity, according to the ground 
rules.
Carolyn Paseneaux, Wyoming Wool Growers Association, 
Casper, WY., was the livestock technical advisor and Lois Van 
Hoover, of Boise, ID. , was the technical advisor for the 
hunting representative.
Management Committee members frequently sat in on 
technical committee meetings so that the distinction between 
the technical committee and the Management Committee was not 
always sharply defined (Bean, pers. comm.). From time to
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time, other interested persons sat in on committee meetings. 
Galen Buterbaugh reported that there was an informal agreement 
that some ad hoc members were needed, although the reason was 
not explained. The Committee allowed that as long as it 
didn't get out of control.
Assignment of the Technical Committee
The primary responsibilities of the technical committee 
were to supply technical information to the Management 
Committee and develop alternatives (plans) for various 
scenarios under which wolf réintroduction into Yellowstone 
National Park and Central Idaho could be accomplished. The 
Management Committee gave them broad guidance.
In addition to supplying informational literature, 
committee members gave technical presentations on several 
topics during Management Committee meetings. They arranged 
for presentations by wolf management experts from Minnesota, 
Canada and Alaska. The technical committee also did much of 
the work identifying the issues. They also made
recommendations when requested by the Management Committee. 
They did not, however, make policy or political decisions.
Technical Committee Ground Rules
The technical committee had a few informal ground rules.
Wayne Brewster, Chair, listed them.
" . . .  that only one person could get mad at a time, 
that everyone's opinion was legitimate but you had to be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
able to explain your reason for it, that we were 
operating from a technical standpoint. Our job, the 
technical committee's job was to provide the information 
that the Management Committee asked for in a format that 
was useable by them and, to the best of our abilities, 
stay away from the pure politics of the debate, 
recognizing that each one represented a Committee member 
that had a particular interest that he was representing. 
Uh, I guess the two other parts of the ground rules were 
that we would attempt to talk out areas of question or 
areas of debate and we would present them as a technical 
committee recommendation or position or whatever and 
where we could not, we would present both positions or 
one or more positions. I guess that was about it.
A few other rules were mentioned by other members (Claar,
pers. comm., Tucker, pers. comm.). Assignments had to be done
on time. The committee wouldn't try to resolve any issues.
That was left to the Management Committee. The committee
agreed to avoid attempts to influence the Management
Committee.
Background Information
Most of the technical committee members were more 
knowledgeable about wolf ecology than the Management 
Committee. Jim Claar's primary work is with large carnivores, 
including wolves, in land management. Wayne Brewster works on 
the wolf recovery issue for the National Park Service in 
Yellowstone National Park and was previously wolf coordinator 
in Glacier National Park. According to Mintzmyer, Brewster 
was identified as being of such magnitude as a technical 
advisor that he worked as an advisor to the whole committee. 
Steve Fritts worked in wolf management in Minnesota for much 
of his career. Arnie Dood is Threatened and Endangered
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Species Coordinator for the State of Montana.
Pat Tucker works extensively on wolf issues and wolf 
education. Renee Askins has worked on wolf réintroduction in 
the Yellowstone area for the past ten years. Michael Bean, as 
an attorney for the Environmental Defense Fund, was chosen 
because of his expertise on the Endangered Species Act, 
although he admitted that his knowledge about wolves was 
limited.
Carolyn Paseneaux and Lois Van Hoover appeared to have 
extremely limited scientific knowledge about wolves, but were 
very concerned about all the common rumors of wolf 
depredation, restrictions under the Endangered Species Act, 
and economic impacts. Van Hoover also had some knowledge 
about wolf hybrids.
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ISSUES
Issues were outlined at the first Committee meeting. 
Each member had the opportunity to state his or her 
"interests" (concerns). According to the minutes of the 
first meeting (January 23-24), the issues were listed as 
follows.
Hank Fischer was concerned with establishing viable, 
self-supporting wolf populations in the Yellowstone area and 
in central Idaho as defined in the Northern Rocky Mountain 
Wolf Recovery Plan, establishing wolf recovery boundaries that 
reflect the wolf's ecological needs, having a wolf management 
plan that's biologically supportable and that will 
demonstrably lead to recovery, the development of management 
plans that adhere to the Endangered Species Act, and a wolf 
control program that's efficient, effective, and fair.
Tom Dougherty stated his interest in the experimental 
population concept, and in the establishment of the wolf in 
the concerned areas 5-50 years before natural recovery could 
be expected to occur.
Jim Magagna was concerned with undue burdens, economic or 
otherwise, being placed on the livestock industry. Quality of 
product was important to protect as well as compensation. 
Adequate wolf control would be preferable to compensation. He 
wanted to see a maximum degree of predictability [of numbers 
of livestock taken by wolves (Minutes, April 2-3)]. He wanted 
the wolf to be represented for itself, not as a surrogate for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
Other issues. He also stated that this effort should not be 
a forum for amending the Endangered Species Act (ESA); 
however, exempting or lessening the constraints of the ESA 
should be examined by the Committee.
Jerry Conley stated that he wanted to see the wolf 
recovered, returned to State control and management. He said 
he wanted this Committee effort to be very visible. Idaho 
preferred natural recovery over réintroduction. He was in 
favor of réintroduction without amending the ESA. He was 
concerned with reduction of impacts on people. He mentioned 
funding as a concern.
K. L. Cool listed State management as his primary 
interest. He also said that the State does not advocate 
réintroduction anywhere in Montana. He proposed delisting the 
wolf or amending the ESA.
Pete Petera's primary concern was movement of wolves 
outside the Park. His desire was to establish a target number 
of wolves (exclusive of numbers in Yellowstone).
Lorraine Mintzmyer was concerned with management of the 
wolf outside the Park, and funds for the recovery program.
Jim Claar, substituting for John Mumma, expressed the 
concerns of the Forest Service. They were also concerned with 
management outside the Park, and vigorous information and 
education "up front"; he also stated that the Forest Service's 
position on réintroduction was mandated by the Secretary of 
Agriculture, but did not state what that position was.
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Galen Buterbaugh wanted states to have a major role in 
management outside the Park, stated that the plan needed to be 
in the context of the ESA and experimental population 
designation, biologically defensible, and the livestock 
industry accommodated. The Fish and Wildlife Service 
supported compensation for livestock depredation, and would 
possibly consider less than ten pairs of wolves as a recovery 
goal.
No hunting representative was present at the first 
meeting, since a replacement for Somerville had not yet been 
named.
The technical committee later compiled the above concerns 
into a list of eleven major issues (Minutes, February 6) . 
Those issues were:
1) the role of the States and the State wildlife 
management agencies in wolf management planning and 
wolf management ;
2) a range of management alternatives under Section 
10(j). Endangered Species Act, that will address 
wolf management concerns;
3) defining the boundaries ;
4) coordinating wolf management with wild ungulate 
management;
5) livestock predation;
6) effects or consequences for other land uses;
7) social and economic consequences;
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8) criteria for recovery and delisting
9) the réintroduction;
10) funding; who pays for what; and,
11) identifying the public planning process.
These eleven issues then formed the basis for the alternatives 
which the technical committee formulated for the Management 
Committee's consideration.
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LEVEL OF BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
In any negotiation, the parties come to the table with 
varying levels of information, or background knowledge about 
the parties, the dispute and the evidence that supports the 
concerns of each side. Each party needs adequate information 
on which to base their decision. One of the first decisions 
that should be made during a negotiation is what information, 
and from what source, the group will accept as a valid basis 
for rethinking assumptions, opinions, and initial positions 
(Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). The point of such joint fact­
finding is to have a shared base of knowledge and to eliminate 
advocacy science. Negotiators are more likely to have trust 
in information that comes from mutually acceptable sources.
There are two types of background information. One type 
is previous knowledge of the negotiators, which will be 
discussed later. The other type of background information is 
knowledge of the subject of the negotiation. Most of the Wolf 
Management Committee members did not have much technical 
knowledge about wolf ecology and management. In particular, 
knowledge about the Endangered Species Act was limited 
(Fischer, pers. comm., 1991). Some members had general
managerial experience and information or were somewhat aware 
of the literature (Mumma, pers. comm., 1992, Petera, pers.
comm. , 1992) . For that reason, one of the charges to the
technical committee was to supply technical information and 
provide expert testimony.
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If ranked according to knowledge, a likely sorting would 
put Hank Fischer at the top. Federal and State representatives 
in the middle, and livestock and hunting representatives 
having the least amount of knowledge. (Adequate information 
is not available to assess Tom Dougherty's level of 
knowledge.) However, one member would disagree with the 
ranking above: "[Background knowledge] varied considerably
amongst the members of the Committee. The Federal agency and 
the State agency heads had the . . . most information about
wolves but even some of them had some misinformation." It is 
more likely true that those agency personnel had the most 
information available but it is clear from the interviews that 
the conservationists had more knowledge.
Dan Neal reported Fischer's obviously superior level of 
knowledge.
I know [the necessity for education of Committee 
members] was very painful for Fischer because, of course, 
he's been living and breathing wolves for years and he 
had to sit there and listen to basic education about 
wolves. . . Hank could have been, should have been 
prepared. He should have known that these people were 
going to come in and be basically dealing with myth as 
well as fact when they talk about wolves. . .
While most of the respondents reported the need for more
information, a particular concern was that some Committee
members apparently held beliefs that were grounded in
unscientific information, myths and childhood stories.
Your other members of the Committee had impressions 
of wolves without real experience and of course they 
brought that information to the table without, you know, 
necessarily some of the biological information (Mumma).
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There was on the part of some people . . .  I believe 
they were non-scientific opinions about what was 
happening or could happen . . . There was a lack of
knowledge about the history of what wolves have actually 
done and, uh, in the continental United States as far as
. what kind of things they’ve been involved in 
(Mintzmyer).
Of course we were dealing with all these different 
rumors of what happened in Minnesota, what happened in 
Canada, what happened. . . wherever wolves had occurred 
in the past. So, we tried to dispel some of that . . .
[The information was] extremely [useful in expanding my 
knowledge] because what [we] had [was] so many people in 
there throwing out all these wild opinions on what was 
really happening in Minnesota. You know, every farmer's 
going broke in Minnesota because there's wolves in every 
feedlot chewing on cows (Conley).
It was also mentioned that some Committee members seemed to
hold to the belief that wolves were like those in Little Red
Riding Hood.
Despite the presentation of scientific information, there 
were some Committee members who were not inclined to learn 
from or accept that information. Several persons commented on 
that notion.
Some of the State directors were biased against 
wolves or really concerned about what wolves would do to 
some of their species that they hunt in their states and 
so there was some bias there and even though we had 
experts tell us, you know, and explain things, they 
didn't really want to accept some of the information that 
was presented to them. Some of the folks in the private 
sector had very little information about wolves beyond 
hearsay and it was a major education process for them and 
some of them remained with very high biases, even right 
to the end. George Bennett, primarily. Jim Magagna to 
a lesser sense. He was a lawyer. Once the facts were 
presented to him, he was more willing to accept 
information . . . where the evidence . . . clearly
pointed . . . something out (Anon.).
Not everybody was at the same level of knowledge at 
the start of the process and some of ’em weren't much 
farther along at the end of the process (Anon.).
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I think in some cases [Magagna and Bennett] weren't 
as willing to accept some of the scientific work that had 
been done as were some of the other groups . . . They
might question whether the work done in Minnesota would 
directly apply to Montana, those sorts of things (Anon.).
It came out throughout the meeting that the wolves 
would kill people. . . There were certain members of the 
Committee that we could never get convinced that that had 
never happened and wasn't going to happen. It was, . .
. Jim was, George was another, that was an example of 
that. And it was just like, "It doesn't make any 
difference what you say, it will happen" (Anon.).
Buterbaugh related the unwillingness to regard the
information as truthful to the emotional aspect of the wolf
issue. He said emotions make it:
difficult to rationalize with people and to deal with 
facts versus hearsay and old wives and fairy tales and 
things like that. I think of all the species that we 
work with there is more misinformation out there about 
wolves than any other species by far. So, that makes it 
extremely difficult to get people to . . . understand the 
true facts and then deal with that rather than with the 
emotions and . . . half truths or . . . misinformation.
Magagna was asked to respond to the question, "Is it fair
to say that some people came to the table with some
misperceptions about wolves?" His reply:
I really would not say that I would classify them as 
misperceptions. Uh, I think that there are a lot of 
things about wolves in this particular setting that are 
simply unknown. You know, we know a fair amount about 
what wolves have done in one place or another place . .
We're all trying to make some educated guesses as to 
what the behavior and the impact of wolves in Yellowstone 
would be and that is so much of an unanswered question 
that I think it provides a basis for . . .  a broad array
of opinion. So, I really would . . . say there was great
diversity of opinion but I . . . can't pinpoint what I
would classify as misperceptions.
While Magagna was apparently more willing to accept 
certain information when supported by evidence, he was not
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willing to accept that the scientific work done in Minnesota
could be applicable to Wyoming.
There were a lot of things thrown at us in terms of 
the wolf impact on livestock in other places. In 
Minnesota, for example, that the number of . . .
livestock taken by wolves was very small and this and 
that. Well, I had toured Minnesota several years ago, 
actually as a guest of the Defenders of Wildlife, to look 
at the wolf situation there and, while the numbers I 
don’t dispute, the situation is so different in terms of 
topography and the type of ranching operations, that I 
don't think you could transpose those numbers to the 
rugged country surrounding Yellowstone and have them be 
meaningful. The same with some of the numbers we looked 
at in Canada. So there was ongoing disagreement about, 
if you did have a wolf population, what the anticipated 
level of loss could be . . .  My experience in Minnesota 
in particular was that what you have is densely forested 
country where these, by our terms in the West, small 
ranches have been carved out of the forest. They've 
removed the trees and it's quite flat land. Several 
places I visited, in most cases, the rancher could see 
most of his ranch holdings, all of which was fenced 
incidentally, from his ranch headquarters. So it doesn't 
mean he could prevent all losses, but it certainly means 
that it's a much more controllable situation and 
livestock are much more confined. The country that we 
graze, particularly the high mountain ranges in Wyoming 
near Yellowstone are very, very rugged to begin with and 
visibility is very limited. Secondly, because they are 
very fragile ranges in terms of the soils and the plants, 
we keep our livestock turned very loose [to prevent 
overgrazing] . . .  We pull them together somewhat but 
leave them very spread out . . . The good range
management practices that we've learned are essential on 
that type of fragile range are just the opposite of the 
type of herding practices that you would be forced into 
. . . if you are trying to protect your animals from . .
. wolf predation . . .  If you herd so as to minimize your 
. . . losses . . . you have a greater impact on the range 
and vice versa, so we just try to strike a happy medium 
but generally opt to protect the range because that's a 
long term investment on public lands and accept the 
losses or do what we can otherwise to minimize 'em but it 
makes it—  You can't just go out and say, "Well, through 
good management you can minimize your losses under this 
type of a situation."
Magagna's thoughts were summarized for Wayne Brewster
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during his interview. He agreed that "nobody knows what's 
going to happen here and that was made fairly plain." He went 
on to say, though, that "you have a situation in Alberta and 
those numbers were presented to them as well, and that's a 
situation that's virtually identical to Yellowstone. And the 
numbers aren't that much different in Minnesota." It seems 
apparent, then, that Magagna was using information selectively 
to support his contention that wolf réintroduction was not a 
viable option.
Summary
Certain elements of the formation of the Wolf Management 
Committee significantly influenced the whole negotiation 
process and the relationships between the Committee members. 
First and foremost was the fact that members were appointed to 
the Committee rather than voluntarily entering the 
negotiation, creating from the outset a certain frame of mind 
for all the negotiators. Controversy at the very beginning of 
the process set a tone of tension. The level of knowledge 
that each member brought into the process varied greatly. The 
need to spend time educating most members about wolf ecology, 
while highly important, took valuable time from an already 
limited time frame that could have been spent in negotiation.
These elements will be examined more closely in the 
chapters that follow, beginning with a discussion of the 
elements of relationships between negotiators.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3
ELEMENTS OF NEGOTIATION RELATIONSHIPS 
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most critical element of any negotiation is 
the relationship between negotiators. Relationships are 
influenced by such things as past knowledge of other 
negotiators, expectations of working with any other 
negotiators in the future, and attitudes of negotiators as 
they enter the negotiation. Relationships between negotiators 
may determine whether cooperation will emerge. This chapter 
will examine these elements of the relationships between the 
Committee members and discuss how their individual 
interpretations of the Congressional mandate influenced their 
mindsets and the negotiations that followed.
Previous Relationships of Committee Members
The background knowledge that negotiators have of each 
other, i.e., reputations, prior to the first meeting is one 
element that influences negotiations. Knowing each other 
personally may make the negotiation process easier. Previous 
knowledge may enhance understanding of where other negotiators 
are coming from. It can build a foundation of trust (Fisher 
and Ury 1981). One of the factors that is unusual in this 
negotiation is that most of the members of both committees had
50
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worked with each other previously in some capacity.
All of the Federal and State representatives on the 
Management Committee had worked together on the Interagency 
Grizzly Bear Committee (IGBC) and on other issues over the 
past years. John Mumma described the previous relationship of 
the Federal and State members:
In fact . . . the 3 State agency game directors,
Galen, Lorraine and I, all worked on the grizzly bear 
committee over the last many, many years . . .  so we've 
had an opportunity to cuss and discuss and debate and 
visit about management and what the needs are and we've 
had public meetings and we really had worked, I think, 
very closely together on management issues dealing with 
the grizzly bear.
In fact, Mumma had anticipated the need to develop a 
management plan for wolves, as wolf recovery began to occur 
through natural dispersal, during the years of working on the 
IGBC. He had proposed that the IGBC begin discussion on that 
need.
And since we were some of the main actors as all the 
wolf information was coming forward, we would 
periodically discuss how do we deal with that. In fact, 
I made a formal proposal to the grizzly bear committee. 
I said, "We're going to have to start devoting some time 
to wolf management issues. I mean, we are responsible 
for the land and the animals in the three-state area 
where all the wolves are in the West, and we just can't 
shirk that responsibility. We've got to start dealing 
with it." And it was interesting because more and more 
time at the grizzly bear meetings, we were having to add 
time on because of wolf issues coming up. Letters being 
written to us as agency administrators, dealing with the 
wolf or some issue surrounding the wolf. I would have to 
say [this happened over] probably the last two or three 
years because some of these bills were starting to come 
forward; they were being discussed, you know, like 
McClure's proposals and such.
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Most Committee members had no previous acquaintance with 
George Bennett but knew of him. Pete Petera stated that he 
didn't know Bennett that well. Jerry Conley had worked
previously with Bennett on issues in Idaho. K. L. Cool did 
not know Bennett, Dougherty and Magagna.
Jim Magagna knew Petera well, having worked closely with 
him on Wyoming issues. He knew Fischer and Dougherty well, 
knew Bennett somewhat, had met Mumma previously but did not 
know Buterbaugh and Mintzmyer, Conley, and Cool. George 
Bennett did not answer directly the question regarding 
previous knowledge of Committee members. Instead, he wrote, 
"the reputations and prior associations with the wolf issue 
were generally known to all participants."
Most members of the technical committee had worked with 
each other on, or knew of each other's work from, similar
types of assignments over the past several years. The only 
person who was unknown to the other committee members was Lois 
Van Hoover.
How were members of both committees influenced by their 
past knowledge of each other? Because of IGBC's previous
discussion of wolf management, six Committee members entered
the negotiations knowing the positions of each other
philosophically, personally, and politically. Jerry Conley, 
when answering a question on a different subject, revealed how 
his past knowledge of the conservation members affected his 
thinking.
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. . . recognizing that you had Defenders of Wildlife 
that were probably gonna be very difficult to bring in 
and you had the Wildlife Federation that were, that would 
probably also be pretty cautious about agreeing with some 
of the solutions pointed up by maybe the wool industry 
[Magagna] or maybe even by George Bennett.
Conley also suggested how his own reputation may have
influenced others.
I have no objection at all to having wolves in the 
state . . .  as well, as long as they're managed like any 
other species of wildlife, and again, you need quite a 
lot of flexibility which on a couple of votes, uh, I 
think led to expectations from environmental groups that 
I would probably . . . split off from the other directors 
and maybe vote more with them . . . and in reality it
really didn't take place.
Magagna commented that he was not influenced by anyone's 
reputation.
I don't know that their reputations influenced me an 
awful lot. . . I would probably have looked more at the
reputations of conservation members and I knew Hank as 
being very dedicated to this cause, so I didn't expect 
him to really waver on it, although I felt I could work 
with him . . .  I had worked with Tom Dougherty before and 
felt that he was generally a responsible person coming 
from the conservation community . . .  I guess my overall 
feeling was positive toward the members of the Committee 
at the beginning.
Buterbaugh said, "I don't know that the reputations made 
it more difficult or easier, I don't know that that had 
anything to do with it."
While respondents generally didn't place too much weight 
on their prior knowledge of other Committee members, it can be 
expected that their thinking was influenced by that knowledge 
"because the cumulative whole of experience and information 
that you have on someone must always influence how you relate 
to them" (Askins, pers. comm., 1992).
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Previous acquaintanceship may also negatively influence 
cooperation and cause stereotyping (Axelrod 1984). 
Stereotyping occurs when preconceived ideas lock one image of 
a person into the mind of another. Respondents didn’t seem to 
like the word "stereotyping.” Many of them claimed that 
stereotyping didn't occur, stated that they wouldn't put it in 
the context of stereotyping, or tempered stereotypic 
statements with justification. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
stereotyping did exist.
Jim Magagna was viewed as being champion for the 
wool and cattle industry in an opposition mode . . . The 
makeup of the . . . Committee called for a representative 
of the livestock industry and he was that, so he was kind 
of carrying that particular championship for that 
interest (Mumma).
Oh, I rather doubt [that any stereotyping occurred]. 
I think that fairly early on in the process . . .  If 
there was stereotyping, you know, there might have been 
in some of our minds toward the Federal people, just as 
Federal bureaucrats, so to speak (Magagna).
Well, I think. . . with the main Committee, what
happened was is that you have people that are put in the 
position of having to represent . . . No matter what a
person's personal feelings may be, if you're there as the 
representative of the livestock industry, you have to do 
your best to follow that line, just like if you're 
representing the Defenders of Wildlife. You have to do 
your best . . . People knew other people—  When it kind
of gets down to it . . . people have some positions they
can't compromise. So in terms of stereotyping, I guess, 
when it . . . got down to the end anyway, there were some 
votes that were taken and different people have different 
roles to play and . . .  I don't think you can avoid that 
when you have a voting group of people like that (Dood).
That is one of the basic problems, that there's very 
little trust on either side about the motives of the 
other side and willingness to work with the other side at 
all. Well, maybe Defenders will work us on this but what 
about Fund for Animals? They'll sue. Same with us . . .
Maybe the Wyoming Woolgrowers will go along (Tucker).
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What happened was that those folks . . . that were
sort of representing ag on there, really Jim and George 
Bennett basically, sort of came with the—  The way that 
I think that the State directors viewed them is that 
these two individuals are going to come here and push for 
. . .  no introductions or very, very limited—  What can 
we do to do the minimum and yet not cause any problems of 
any kind to the livestock industry or to a sportsman 
anywhere in the state? On the other hand, you had the 
Defenders of Wildlife coming in and . . . [with the]
preconceived idea on the part of the ag interest saying, 
hey, these guys want wolves everyplace. So, I think that 
that did have an impact. There was a lot of suspicion 
about what . . . private agendas were being worked out.
I mean, did people want wolves because they wanted to 
stop timber cutting, livestock grazing, or did they want 
wolves because it was required and they truly wanted to 
establish the wolf (Conley).
Despite the existence of a foundation of previous working 
relationships, it appears that trust did not emerge from those 
prior relationships. In fact, the previous relationship 
between some Committee members may have actually caused the 
distrust. Perhaps one reason for that lack of trust was an 
ongoing conflict between Federal and State agencies over 
wildlife management control. Another reason for the lack of 
trust was disbelief in the scientific data and strong belief 
in myths about wolves. These ideas will be discussed more 
fully later.
Future Working Relationships
Expectations that negotiators may need to deal with each 
other again makes it possible for cooperation to emerge 
(Axelrod 1984). Choices made during this negotiation may 
influence choices that will be made in a later meeting. 
Axelrod (1984) defines the possibility of future relationships
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as "discount parameters." Payoffs for choices made are 
weighted (discounted) in the minds of the negotiator relative 
to previous choices made. Such discounting aids a negotiator 
in deciding whether or not to cooperate. When the negotiator 
places a high discount on a choice, it is more likely that the 
future relationship is important, and therefore, the 
negotiator will find a way to cooperate. With a low discount 
parameter, the future relationship, hence cooperation, is not 
important.
Of those asked, all members, particularly the Federal and 
State representatives, at the time of the Committee meetings, 
expected to have more contact with some or all of the members 
involved, if not on this issue, on some other issue. Thus, it 
would be expected that the discount parameters of those 
members would be high. Three Committee members did appear to 
have high discount parameters.
John Mumma was very aware of the possibility of future 
work together since he worked so closely with the states. He 
commented that he fully appreciated where the directors were 
coming from on the States' rights issue.
A technical committee member observed that Pete Petera 
seemed to consider future working relationships during the 
negotiations. "You know, he's in the same state with Magagna 
and the Wyoming Woolgrowers hold a lot of influence in the 
Capital. I'm sure that had a huge influence on the way 
Petera—  (informant's emphasis)." Petera confirmed that he
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was able to work fairly closely with Magagna, saying "Jim 
Magagna's a fine person and very reasonable man."
Fischer was acutely aware of needing to maintain a 
working relationship with Cool, and approached him ahead of 
time to let Cool know that he was aware that State management 
was a key concern of Cool's and that he would support him on 
the state management issue.
Two members appeared to have low discount parameters. 
Cool stated that he expected to work with some Committee 
members in the future but that it did not influence his work 
on the Committee. Cool was generally "uncooperative," 
according to several informants. Fischer also thought that 
although the other State directors voted with Cool, they lost 
a lot of respect for him. It would seem, then, that Cool 
didn't view future working relationships as important.
Jim Magagna also expected to be working again with 
Committee members in the future, but he also had a low 
discount. He did not consider future relationships important 
during these negotiations.
I didn't expect the issue to go away and probably 
all of us . . . will continue to remain players except
perhaps for the Federal people who have retired. And of 
course, uh, at least with my own game and fish director, 
Pete Petera, I work with him on other issues quite often, 
so that was an ongoing relationship. It really didn't 
[affect how I participated on this Committee]. I think 
this was issue driven and not personality driven. I 
don't think it [influences whether I'm willing to make 
concessions] in this case . . .  I really did not 
approach, I don't think at anytime, in terms of how this 
would affect some relationship that I or my organization 
might have with any of these people or their 
organizations.
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Several members said that the possibility of working with 
other Committee members in some capacity in the future was not 
an influencing factor during their work on the Committee. The 
concept of being influenced was apparently seen as negative, 
as though there was something inherently wrong with being 
concerned about future relationships. However, concern for 
future working relationships was evident in the manner in 
which respondents spoke about each other. Most were careful 
in their choice of words as they spoke of the difficulties of 
this negotiation.
I wouldn't want to say that they were hard to deal 
with. I would just say that they were a challenge to 
deal with in some ways. She tended to have a little bit 
different opinion about some things than perhaps some of 
the rest of us did. She did bring, however, a certain 
amount of expertise and interest to the subcommittee.
Jim Magagna as an attorney would be the type of 
person that a State director, for instance, might seek 
for advice. . . though I think all of the people on the
Committee at one time or another asked Jim Magagna about 
particular legal interpretation about different 
questions, his opinion regarding things (Claar).
Now, I'm not saying George did a bad job on the 
Committee at all (Conley).
I think that when the final recommendation was made, 
that concerned Tom Dougherty fairly heavily. I think 
that he wanted, you know, he felt that, and I don't want 
to put words in his mouth . . . (Petera).
Well, for the most part, you would see some of
[voting coalitions]. But there would be other members 
that would be going one way or the other, too. Certainly 
the three states had interests that they were trying to 
represent and there was a commonality there, I mean, that 
was very obvious. The same could probably be said about
the Federal ones . . . Now, that's just as I saw it.
T he re's other people that may have not seen it that way 
(Mumma).
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So, well, and this is still fairly political. I'm 
trying to be fairly circumspect about what I say 'cause 
all these people are still involved in this (Neal).
Jerry Conley's interview contained frequent use of "sort
of" and "tended to". Those phrases seem to be a regular part
of his vocabulary, but the overall effect of the phrases was
to soften any statements that would appear to be directed at
any Committee member.
What happened was that those folks, uh, that were 
sort of representing ag on there, really Jim and George
Bennett basically, sort of came with . . .
People wanted to, tended t o . sort of wanted to put 
off reaching an agreement.
Expectations of working together in the future were also 
a consideration for the technical committee. It was highly 
predictable that members would continue to work together at 
some level on some issue in the future (Claar, pers. comm.) 
because of their professional positions. Renee Askins said, 
"I guess I just assume all these people are people that I
would work with. And I just have a basic belief in civility
and . . . basic work principles, professionalism no matter
what the situation is."
In one case, these negotiations resulted in improved 
relations for two members of the Committee following the 
conclusion of the negotiations. Jerry Conley reported:
An interesting thing that did occur —  Actually we 
had had a lot of differences with George Bennett here in 
state from a department standpoint over a variety of 
issues in the past and actually working together on this 
Committee did create a much better working relationship 
with George here in state and the groups he represented. 
And actually it was a real positive thing . . . We've
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just been able to work together quite a lot better since 
having served on the Committee and it really came not so 
much from . . . agreements or disagreements during the
formal time but informally sitting at the airports, you 
know, waiting there at public meetings. Afterwards, 
eating dinner together. Getting to know, you know, each 
other. You know, there was just a little bit better, uh, 
more willingness to trust each other that did grow out of 
that group.
Conley followed that remark with a suggestion for 
improving relationships when entering into this type of 
negotiation.
Yeah, I ’m not so sure that a group like this 
shouldn't, when they start a project like this they 
shouldn't take the first two days, go into a retreat, 
say, hey, let's get to know each other. You know, let's 
not even worry so much about what we're covering now. 
W he re're you from and what's your family like and what's 
your view on this and w hat's your background and w hat'd 
you do last year and what are you gonna do next year? I 
really think if . . . we'd probably done that a little
more . . . we might have understood philosophically more
where each person was coming from. Might have been a lot 
easier and people might have been a lot less suspicious.
In fact, that is what Fisher and Ury (1981) suggest. 
They say that knowing the other side personally makes 
negotiation easier. It's easier to attribute evil intentions 
to unknown parties. They suggest finding ways for negotiating 
parties to get to know each other informally before the 
negotiation starts. In discussing a mediation effort, 
mediator Leah Patton of the Institute for Environmental 
Mediation, commented that "much of the mediation process is . 
. . getting people to know each other" (Talbott 1983) . For a 
group such as the Wolf Management Committee whose members have 
in some cases known each other for many years, spending 
substantial informal time together prior to negotiations could
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be especially beneficial. Where previous knowledge of a 
person is based on only one role, learning to know each other 
in a difference capacity can break down barriers created by 
stereotyping and enhance cooperation.
Cooperation
Reputations and the possibility of working together in 
the future determine, in part, whether cooperation emerges 
during a negotiation (Raiffa 1982, Axelrod 1984). Committee 
members had strong incentives to be cooperative because of the 
distinct possibility that some of them would need to work 
together again in the future.
Discussion of cooperation with respondents revealed 
several things. Terms such as "cordial, business-like, and 
civil" were used to describe the spirit of cooperation. At 
the same time, though, there clearly were tensions between 
some members, particularly between the conservationists and 
Magagna and Bennett (Bean, pers. comm.). John Mumma mentioned 
more than once that he thought the Committee had an impossible 
task because of the "very strong different viewpoints out 
there." It would appear that while Mumma was prepared to work 
hard to do the job they had been given, at the same time he 
was doubtful that the Committee would be able to develop a 
plan that would meet everyone's needs and approval. Jim 
Magagna mentioned that the cooperation "probably got tested 
pretty hard right at the end." Other comments from
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respondents suggested that members were committed to putting 
together a plan, but that they were still protective of their 
interests to the point that factions developed.
Underlying components of cooperation are honesty and 
trust. With the history of previous working relationships 
among several Committee members, it would likely have been 
difficult for those members to be dishonest with each other 
(Fisher and Ury 1981, Raiffa 1982). Dishonesty could have 
been spotted fairly easily because of members' past knowledge 
of each other. Another factor making it difficult for members 
to be dishonest with each other is that several of them had 
made public statements regarding their feelings or position on 
the issue. While members may not have been able to be 
dishonest with each other, some were, nonetheless, unable to 
fully disclose their true priorities.
While there appeared to be a cooperative spirit among 
Committee members, actual cooperation in terms of being 
willing to make concessions and trusting information was 
limited. Trust apparently was difficult for some Committee 
members. Tucker expressed the idea that one of the basic 
problems of the process was an unwillingness of some members 
to trust the government's management system. That led to an 
reluctance to work with the other side because of distrust 
about the motives of those representatives. Magagna revealed 
he was feeling a certain distrust of the Federal agencies. 
"We did not feel in the livestock industry and the other
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groups that I represented that we could have something that 
was strictly in the hands of the agencies.” A further 
indication of the lack of trust was Mumma ' s comment that some 
prejudices and biases remained throughout the process and that 
a lot of good information was discounted.
Lack of cooperation on the part of some members was 
evidenced by firmly holding to basic agendas toward the end 
(Mintzmyer, pers. comm., 1992). According to several people, 
Cool stated his position at the first meeting. He was adamant 
that the Endangered Species Act must be amended, that the 
States be given management authority over wolves, and that 
northwest Montana be included in the Committee's report. He 
locked himself into that position to the very end, a classic 
case of positional bargaining (Fisher and Ury 1981).
The purpose of positional bargaining is to let the other 
side know what is desired and "provides an anchor in an 
uncertain and pressured situation." There are consequences, 
though, of taking a position. The harder a person argues from 
a position, the more difficult it becomes to move from that 
position and make concessions. Ultimately, the likelihood of 
reaching agreement diminishes (Fisher and Ury 1981).
A comment by George Bennett confirms the idea that basic 
agendas undermined cooperation.
"Efforts were made to be cooperative although not at 
the expense of underlying goals. Generally speaking, 
professional peer pressure was effective [to elicit 
cooperative behavior]. When that was not enough, issues 
were put to a vote."
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In addition to engaging in positional bargaining. Cool 
was uncooperative in other ways (Fischer, pers. comm.). At 
times he was rude to other members and wouldn't let them 
speak. He took up valuable time with filibuster. Fischer 
thought it was probably a successful ploy because it turned 
attention away from the issues at hand to what Cool wanted; 
thus Cool got more of what he wanted.
The burden of attempting to elicit cooperation fell to 
the chairman of the Committee, Galen Buterbaugh. He discussed 
his perception of the cooperation and how dissension was 
handled.
Well, there was dissension amongst members of the 
Committee right from the very first—  I mean, just based 
on the people that were selected and their perspectives 
that were put on the Committee . . . Everybody was pretty 
professional about it but there was major disagreements 
and it made it very difficult to . . . get any agreement
on anything at all . . . to . . . function as chairman
because there was major disagreement on almost every 
issue. . . We talked it out. I mean, we had many, many
meetings where we just sat down and discussed this until 
we worked it through and in some cases, if it was a 
biological issue or a very technical issue, we went back 
to the technical committee and asked them to try to work 
out a compromise and in other cases we went out and got 
outside experts to come in and talk to us . . . about
various issues and then based on the information we got 
from this whole process, we tried to come up with some 
agreement.
Perhaps the best assessment of the cooperation among 
Committee members comes from Pat Tucker.
They really avoided getting into any real issues or 
discussion of issues until that second to the last 
meeting . . . And so, until the very last, there was
really no good give and take . . . between these
Committee members and . . . Everybody gave the
perception of getting along and being big chums and I 
think everybody was trying to act like, you know, if they
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could get along . . . and have a good time together . .
. when the final vote came, they'd somehow, all their 
differences would be resolved because they'd all know 
they were good guys and gals and everything.
Jim Magagna felt that Committee members had come together
in a cooperative spirit. He believed that the technical
committee was directly responsible for the cooperation on the
Management Committee.
Probably one of the functions that the technical 
committee served was to allow some of the more direct 
confrontations to take place in that committee rather 
than in the Management committee. I . . . have a
feeling. . . [that] those people went more head to head
on some things . . . were more confrontational perhaps
than we were on the Management Committee. The fact that 
some of those things could be vented there probably 
helped make our work go a little more smoothly.
Jerry Conley viewed the technical committee as having
more problems with suspicion and distrust than the Management
Committee. In particular he noted that Lois Van Hoover,
George Bennett's representative, was very suspicious of
conservationists' proposals. However, his was the only
opinion from that viewpoint.
In contrast to these two opinions regarding the
cooperation on the technical committee, all technical
committee members interviewed did not view their committee as
being confrontational. There, too, committee members felt
that they maintained a cooperative spirit.
Renee Askins thought that the technical committee was
much more adept at decision-making and credited that to the
technical committee being more immediately steeped in the
information. She stated further that the "Management
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Committee was so politically . . . influenced that it was
harder for them to make distinct decisions."
One ground rule appears to be the key reason for 
cooperation among technical committee members. Pat Tucker 
explains.
I don't think there was any [effort to rule out any 
alternatives] once we'd decided that wasn't really our 
mission . . . We had a pretty easy go of it because we
weren't trying to . . . really resolve anything. We'd
all been through all the alternatives and the pros and 
cons in our own minds for ever and so, some people were 
. . . willing to . . .  at least have it all down on paper 
and not try to . . . hide what the problems were within
the alternative . . . And we had to clarify [our mission] 
a few times during the process . . . Somebody would start 
arguing about something and somebody else would say, we 
can write that down. There's no reason that the 
Committee can't see this. But, in retrospect. I'm not 
sure . . . how we would have done it exactly, but it
would probably have been better had we fought it out a 
little more among ourselves. Just so there would have 
been a little less for the Committee to be dealing with.
The second benefit of the above ground rule is that
emotions did not become an overriding influence on the
technical committee's work. Wayne Brewster assessed the
emotional level of the technical committee.
It wasn't so much [emotional] in the technical 
[committee], because we pretty well clearly understood 
that it was not the purview of the technical committee to 
recommend new legislation, so our role was, okay, here's 
what the law says. Here's what the regulations say. 
Here's what you can do likely under this.
Emotions
The wolf issue has and probably always will continue 
to be a very emotional issue . . . [It] is, up to a
certain point, is a technical issue but . . . when it
comes down to the real decisions and so forth, it's an 
emotional issue (Mintzmyer).
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When emotions enter a negotiation, the result may be an 
impasse or a complete breakdown of the negotiation process. 
Emotions come from both the negotiators and their 
constituents. It is important to recognize and understand 
emotions, to be specific about them and acknowledge them as 
legitimate (Fisher and Ury 1981).
One thing that can be helpful in dealing with emotions is 
a specific discussion of emotions as a focus for one meeting 
of a negotiation. Such discussion will free people of the 
burden of emotions and enable negotiators to work more 
cooperatively thereafter (Fisher and Ury 1981). Most members 
of the Committee recognized the existence of emotions in the 
process and the rights of people to have those emotions. 
However, it appears there was some difficulty defining 
emotions during the Committee process, as well as some 
uncertainty about how to handle emotions.
When asked specifically how emotions entered into the 
process, Pete Petera related one instance of what he perceived 
as emotion.
I think that when the final recommendation was 
made, that concerned Tom Dougherty fairly heavily. I 
think that he . . . felt that, and I don't want to put
words in his mouth, but I think he felt that . . . both
he and Hank Fischer felt that the harassment 
recommendation in the Committee report probably was 
excessive.
Later in the interview, however, Petera appears to equate 
emotion with display of anger. His assessment at that point 
was that emotion was not a part of the process at the end.
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I felt [that the discussion of the final proposal] 
was fairly congenial. It was a difficult subject and uh# 
everybody had, of course, their own views on each issue 
but, there was no name calling or shoe throwing or 
anything like that.
That assessment is contrary to what the other Committee 
members perceived. They reported several occurrences of 
emotional reactions or displays, particularly during the final 
meeting.
The time that the most emotions were expressed was 
in that last meeting . . . the most emotion that I saw
voiced was actually by K. Cool and that was when . . .
Hank asked that Mike Bean be allowed to discuss the 
repercussions of having, . . .  of whether Congress would 
be willing to amend the Act, which was what would have be 
required for this proposal to go anywhere (Anon.).
K. Cool of Montana . . . from time to time
displayed some, what I would describe as latent animosity 
toward the environmental members of the Committee. There 
was one occasion, I think it was at the last meeting . .
. I believe Fund for Animals had [just] filed [a lawsuit] 
over grizzly bear hunting in Montana and Cool had 
apparently been served with some sort of subpoena, just 
before this meeting, and . . .  he was . . .  in a poor 
frame of mind when he came to the meeting and seemed to 
regard the environmentalists present as indistinguishable 
from people who had just sued him and . . .  I think maybe 
was the most traumatic example of that. There was never 
to my knowledge any scene in which anybody yelled or 
threatened any physical harm or lost control of his 
emotions but there were . . . moments when it was evident 
that . . . people were . . . trying to be civil to each
other while at the same time making no secret of their 
disdain (Anon.).
We'd have some pretty good exchanges, but I didn't 
see anything out of the ordinary. You kind of expect 
those things, you know. You expect people to . 
express a certain viewpoint . . . Montana was certainly
one of the most vocal . . . They would speak up and
state their position very emphatically . . • They were
willing to express their viewpoint very loudly, almost to 
the point of I've got to have this (Anon.).
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The most: heated discussions were between the
conservation groups and Jim Magagna and George Bennett 
(Anon.).
There was a lot of emotion. For example, there was, 
it came out throughout the meeting that the wolves would 
kill people. And that was probably one of the most 
emotional issues . . . and there were certain members of 
the Committee that we could never get convinced that had 
never happened and wasn't going to happen . . . The issue 
of damage to livestock owners, cattlemen and sheepmen .
. . was certainly an emotional issue for [Jim and George] 
and rightly so . I think those two issues were
probably the most emotional that came out of it and made 
it the most difficult to rationalize with people and to 
deal with facts versus hearsay and old wives tales and 
fairy tales and things like that. I think of all the 
species that we work there is more misinformation out 
there about wolves than any other species by far. So, 
that makes it extremely difficult to get people to . . . 
understand the true facts and then deal with that rather 
than with the emotions and . . . half truths or just flat 
out misinformation (Anon.).
I think there was, at times at least, a fairly high 
level of emotion . . .  I mean for all of us. I mean, 
it's an economic issue for me, but it's also a very 
emotional issue, too, in the sense that, uh, I can 
foresee a potential scenario where . . . wolf
réintroduction and perhaps not alone but coupled with 
some other policy decisions on public land grazing could, 
could spell the end of livestock grazing in that area. 
And the livestock industry is very dear to me as . . .
are the natural resources in that part of Wyoming, so .
. . in that sense, it's emotional for me. I think a Hank 
Fischer, for example, who has devoted a large part of his 
career in recent years to this single issue . . . has to
feel very strongly emotional about it. I would not 
expect it to be otherwise. Uh, I guess there were a 
couple of boiling points . . . as we got particularly 
toward the end, I think is when it began to show. I know 
that . . . oh, perhaps at our last meeting but prior to
our developing the plan that we finally came out with, .
. . John Mumma . . . became very frustrated with us over
what he saw as our inability to reach a consensus . . .
but I'm sure he wasn't the only one feeling [that, ] 
particularly of the Federal people (Anon.).
John Mumma admitted that he "got plenty irritated" at the
whole process but that, except for the meeting at which he
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expressed his anger, it was a cordial business-like 
relationship. According to Jerry Conley, during the 
Committee's discussions, "There was a feeling of frustration 
from time to time about why can't we get everybody to agree on 
a point that seems pretty clear?"
Even though at least one of the emotional displays was 
directed at Fischer, he stated that emotions were not a big 
problem.* Cool adamantly stated, "Emotions did not affect the 
proceedings. Emotions did not affect the final Committee 
report" (respondent's emphasis).
Despite these examples of emotional displays or 
reactions, Pat Tucker perceived a lack of acknowledgement that 
emotion was an issue that needed to be addressed.
There was a real avoidance on that Committee, I 
felt, of really trying to get down to brass tacks and 
really allowing people to get mad at each other and I 
think there was a need for that. I mean, there was a 
need for it right from the beginning and if it fell apart 
in the beginning, then it fell apart.
That avoidance is contrary to Fisher and Ury's (1981) 
notion that it is important to allow negotiators to let off 
steam. Being able to vent some feelings may make it easier to 
talk rationally later. Despite the fact that a couple of the 
Committee members viewed the technical committee as the place 
where emotions were a problem (Bennett 1991, Conley, pers. 
comm., 1992), it appears that the technical committee did a 
better job of acknowledging emotions as a factor. 
Specifically, that committee established a ground rule that 
only one person could get mad at a time, thereby recognizing
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the need for members to express emotions. A second benefit of 
such a rule is that persons are "allowed” not to respond to an 
emotional outburst, thereby helping people control their 
emotions (Fisher and Ury 1981).
Mindsets
The attitude, or mindset, that a participant takes into 
the negotiation process in part determines the willingness of 
a negotiator to bargain. Attitudes are shaped by past 
relationships with fellow negotiators, expectation of future 
relationships, and emotions (Fisher and Ury 1981, Axelrod
1984) . Several other factors also frame that mindset. What 
background information influences that attitude? What 
constituency does the negotiator represent? Is the
participant willing to negotiate? Is it necessary for the 
negotiator to report back to a supervisor, boss, or ratifier? 
Are there outside influences putting pressure on negotiators? 
What issues does a negotiator bring to the table? Some of 
these components have already been examined. Others will be 
discussed later. It is important, though, to keep those
elements in mind when examining the mindsets of the
negotiators at the outset of the negotiation process.
As parties anticipate entering into a negotiation, they 
begin to conceive ideas of how that negotiation might proceed 
(Raiffa 1982) . They begin to plan their moves and how to get 
what they want. They imagine strategy, other parties' needs.
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what other parties might be willing to give up (concede) , and 
where their own advantages lie.
Such thoughts may not be evident at the first meeting but 
become apparent as they emerge throughout the process. Many 
people had clear thoughts about what was in the minds of 
Committee members as they met for the first time, based on 
what they observed throughout the negotiation process.
Dan Neal reported how the initial controversy surrounding 
the appointment of a hunter's representative established 
certain mindsets and helped set the stage for the 
negotiations.
The first thing I saw . . . really happened before
the Committee got going and that was when . . . they
appointed a fellow from D.C. to be on the Committee, and 
uh, he declined to be on it and went to Alaska and then 
they appointed the—  from the cattlemen's association in 
Boise. Bennett . . . And . . . when that happened . .
. the feeling I was getting from people was that . . .
gee, you know, we've got three federal agencies that are 
very interested in advancing wolf réintroduction. We've 
got two environmentalist organizations that are very 
interested in it, and then this other fellow that went to 
Alaska. So, they felt like, going into the Committee, 
that they basically had the votes to do what they wanted. 
My feeling was the people in the conservation and 
environmentalist organizations basically, the wolf 
proponents, felt like they had a real advantage, and they 
did from what I could see. The stock people howled and 
so [Somerville] decided not to accept the appointment and 
you ended up with George Bennett being appointed as a 
representative of the hunters. So, that maneuvering 
before the Committee really got off the ground changed 
the attitudes that people have, because now you suddenly 
had Magagna and Bennett and—  So you had Buterbaugh, 
Mintzmyer, Mumma, and then the two guys from the 
conservation organizations and then Somerville, that was 
6, and then you had the 3 [State] directors who people 
going in I felt like weren't really sure where they were 
coming from but felt like that local politics might 
direct their position . . .  So then—  Okay. So that 
left you 5 sort of pro people and then Magagna, Bennett,
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and the 3 [State] directors as . . . being either
absolutely in the anti-wolf or somewhat there.
So, according to Neal, the balance of the negotiation
suddenly shifted away from being advantageous for the
conservationists. Now, the Committee appeared to be split
evenly into two groups, making it less difficult to pull votes
in the direction of the anti-wolf faction, since only one
swing vote to either side created the six votes needed to
approve a plan. Michael Bean provides further insight into
the mindsets of Committee members.
I think the mindset of . . . Tom [Dougherty] and
Hank [Fischer] was one of hopefulness that it might be 
possible to come to terms that would largely be 
satisfactory . . . and that this process might succeed in 
bridging gulfs with some of the other interests. On the 
part of Magagna and Bennett, and this was maybe most 
acute in the case of Bennett but not much left, though, 
in the case of Magagna, I think the mindset was to give 
no ground, and from the point of view of the three 
Federal agencies, I believe the basic objective was to 
get [6] people to agree on anything and they didn't much 
care what it was, as long as they could get [6] people to 
agree on. In the case of the 3 State directors, uh, I 
think there was . . .  a little more openness to try to 
search for a workable alternative but, a very heavy 
burden of feeling that this was yet another example of 
Federal government interfering in a matter that ought to 
be the responsibility of the States to resolve and sort 
of carrying that extra baggage along in this context. In 
other words, . . .  I think that the main handicap . . .
infecting their frame of mind was that it was impossible 
for them to look at this issue divorced from the larger 
history of conflict between state and federal governments 
over who gets to manage wildlife.
Neal further supported Bean's perceptions on the other 
Committee members.
Cool, I thought, came in feeling pretty frustrated 
over the way grizzly management has been handled by the 
Feds—  Conley basically was a mystery to me at the start 
and, uh. I'd say, at the end largely was too .
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Mintzmyer came in clearly wanting to have wolves back in 
Yellowstone. Thought she had a mandate . . . that there 
should be wolves in Yellowstone. Buterbaugh obviously 
saw it as his responsibility to recover an endangered 
species so he was supportive of a real effort to 
reintroduce wolves. Obviously Dougherty and Fischer were 
major supporters of wolf réintroduction. Mumma . . . saw 
it as his responsibility, he'd been directed by Congress 
to come up with some kind of a plan to reintroduce into 
Yellowstone and northern Idaho and so that was his job. 
That's what he was going to try to accomplish. So then, 
Magagna obviously came in ardently opposed to wolf 
réintroduction and sort of feeling like he had to talk 
about it because he was on the Committee and basically 
trying to get the best deal he could for stockpeople.
Lorraine Mintzmyer concurred with the assessments above.
There were some people who wanted in this process to 
propose a . . . change to the Endangered Species Act as
a part of this project . . .  I think there were some who 
. . . saw this report as an avenue with which to defeat
the . . . réintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone.
Some came with . . . the optimism that the report would
pave the way for that to occur and as it turned out, 
neither faction was right . . .  I think the State 
directors, just by sheer virtue of being that - State 
directors - regardless of what their personal and 
professional opinions were, but because they did 
represent the State . . . their very agencies were funded 
by the interests that were against the wolf 
réintroduction, so you can imagine that they came with 
that kind of agenda. As I say, I think there were people 
there whose agenda was not to do anything as far as . .
. wolves were concerned other than to see it as a way to 
amend the Endangered Species Act. Not only avoid the 
réintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone, but also to 
hopefully deter other actions under the Endangered 
Species Act is my speculation. I do not have a name and 
so forth that I can give you on that but that was just my 
sense.
John Mumma also observed that there were some Committee 
members who probably had a mindset against wolf recovery. He 
said it was fairly clear that there were members who were not 
pleased with the charge that was given by Congress. Despite 
those feelings, however, they had a charter and constituent
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groups to represent and they were going to do their job.
The State directors' mindsets were each partially framed 
by their state policies. That quite naturally affected their 
attitudes, whether or not they personally believed in the 
policies. It is well-known that political appointees such as 
state game directors usually believe in and adhere to the 
policy of the governor who made their appointment. The 
interviews reveal that the State directors of Montana, 
Wyoming, and Idaho were in full support of their individual 
state policies.
The policy of Montana stems from the governor's 
opposition to wolf réintroduction (Dood, pers. comm., 1992). 
It hasn't always been that way. At the time of the approval 
of the recovery plan, the state of Montana had a governor who 
supported wolf recovery.
In 1987 . . . [Governor Schwinden] wrote a letter to 
the Fish and Wildlife Service and he at that time 
offered—  He supported wolf recovery—  He offered to fund 
wolf recovery in our state, and even supported possible 
réintroduction into the Park but there was one catch and 
that was that the wolf be delisted.
During the interim, the conflict over grizzly bear management
intensified and is now the basis for much of Montana's
opposition to wolf réintroduction. As a result of the
conflict over grizzly bear management, Montana wants more
control over management of recovering wolf populations. Arnie
Dood explained at great length the feelings and perspective of
the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks.
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We in Montana and, myself brought to the table the 
perspective that we've had real problems with how the 
grizzly bear program has run and . . . our ability to
participate in the program in the long run where the 
decision-making is done . . .  in terms of the Federal 
support for the program. There's increasing demands and 
yet the support for the program keeps dwindling and so we 
brought a lot of those concerns with us and the same 
holds true for the wolf program . . .  We see as the key 
to the long term future of the wolf in our state is to 
fit the wolf back in as a component of our wildlife 
system, not as if the wolf is at the peak of the pyramid 
and everybody gets to fit in underneath it . . .
Obviously the perspective of some of the other groups is 
more narrowly defined, like the Fish and Wildlife Service 
in terms of their perspective is to achieve a certain 
level and that's recovery. In particularly, they're 
running off the level of the approved recovery plan . .
. And you see, what we see . . . obviously wolf habitat
is resident ungulates . . . elk and deer and sheep and
moose and those are things that we have the legal 
responsibility to manage. So, there can't be . . .
separate programs and it's our feeling that the sooner 
that our local biologists are involved in the program the 
better off it will be for the long term future of the 
wolf . . . And, you see, there's some other things with
our state perspective that we go back and look at the 
recovery plan in '87. When it was done, we wrote a 
fairly extensive comment to the Fish and Wildlife 
Service and we told 'em that we didn't think the approach 
that was recommended in there was right and a lot of 
people in other interest groups, they chose to, uh, 
interpret that as the State was opposed to wolf recovery 
and that's not the case. But we . . . didn't feel that
it was presented in a way that was reasonable or that was 
in fact desirable . . .  We felt that the concept of 
recovery areas wasn't a good one for the long term future 
of this program. And obviously that's been shown to be 
the case. That the majority of wolves are outside those 
areas . . . Some other ones were the control issue . .
. We see there's a fundamental problem in . . . the
language of the Act and the court interpretations of the 
Act. It's not legal, and so i t ’s just a matter of time 
until some interest group will take it upon themselves to 
stop that. For example, the Fish and Wildlife Service 
killed five wolves on the Rocky Mountain Front and 
because they're listed as endangered under the Act, that 
really isn’t legal. The Act is very clear. It says you 
cannot take, which means kill, harm, harass, all that, 
endangered species under any circumstances and that’s 
what it says . . . I t ' s  just a matter until the Wolf
Action Group or somebody may decide to take it on . . .
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If you build a whole program up and you say to people, 
"Yes, if your cows are killed, we'll come in and deal 
with the problem and help you out." If you make those 
kind of commitments . . . and your program is based on
those and your program gets stopped because of this flaw 
which we see and very real that it could happen, similar 
to what happened with our grizzly bear hunt, uh, you've 
lost your public support for the program and we don't 
think that's right. . . My own feeling is that we need
to get to the place where Federal agencies provide the 
support to the States to develop their plans but the 
plans for wolves in the State is developed through the 
State processes . . . Yet the Fish and Wildlife Service 
can indicate what they'd like to see for a recovery goal, 
which they have, which is ten pairs.
Just prior to the establishment of the Committee, Cool 
broke a long-standing silence on the subject of wolves and 
talked to a newspaper reporter about Montana's desire to 
manage wolves. He said that the state agency intended to 
"take its head out of the sand." He wanted the wolf delisted 
and turned over to the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 
for management (Devlin 1990). The mindset of Montana was seen 
very clearly, as a result of Cool's positional bargaining and 
the previous history of the grizzly bear conflict, and 
reported by several respondents.
Characterizing the attitude of the State of Wyoming 
toward wolves is the state law classifying the wolf as a 
predator. Such a law is in direct opposition to the 
Endangered Species Act. However, the ESA does supersede the 
state law (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1987). 
Nevertheless, that does not prevent Wyoming from having its 
law on the books. According to Dan Neal, the law is the 
result of the history of Wyoming as a rural, ranching state in
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which the agricultural interests have dominated policy. 
Petera commented at the April 10-11 meeting that Wyoming 
doesn't believe that wolves are biologically endangered but 
rather are locally extirpated (Minutes, April 10-11). As the 
fish and game director of a state in which agricultural 
interests play such an influential role, Petera*s mindset was 
quite likely also affected by agricultural considerations.
Petera felt that he entered the negotiations with an open 
mind, saying that he didn't go with any best case or worst 
case scenarios in mind. Neal, through his reporting on the 
State of Wyoming legislative sessions, was able to shed light 
on Petera's mindset as he entered the negotiation process.
So, Petera, before the Committee started had asked 
the [Wyoming Game and Fish] Commission to give him a 
minute at a meeting that they were opposed to wolf 
réintroduction. Oh. What Petera asked for was a minute 
from the Commission saying that he would support wolf 
réintroduction if wolves were delisted . . . Petera came 
in pretty clear opposed to wolves. In fact, he told me 
one time, he says, "X—  ." He talked to some guys in 
Canada who told him, they couldn't understand why we 
wanted wolves down here anyway and he sort of wondered 
why himself. So, that's where Petera was.
Despite Petera's assertion that he had no preconceived
scenarios in mind, other remarks indicate where his mindset
lay. "My preference to begin with was that they be delisted
and go ahead and manage them as we would other species."
"There's no way the State of Wyoming, that is the hunters and
fishermen, could generate enough money from licensing a season
on wolves, for example, to ever pay for the program" (emphasis
added). Some members believed that Wyoming's law would allow
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
79
wolves to be taken at will, indicating that there was a lack 
of knowledge that the ESA overrode that law. A certain amount 
of distrust arose because of that law (Mumma, pers. comm.).
Jerry Conley's mindset was shaped in part by Idaho's law 
which prohibits all but a few expenditures for wolf 
réintroduction (see pg. 3 3-34). The recent discovery of the 
presence of wolves in the state also shaped his mindset.
We have not seen any pack activity in the state. We 
have one wolf that's collared that’s, uh, in the state 
that came in from Montana. We had a female—  It was a 
male. We had a female earlier in the state. We were 
thinking they were sort of trying to get together but 
they must have missed each other. But so far we haven’t 
really had any verified pack activity. Which in our 
minds means that in essence we don't really have an 
established population. What we have is solitary wolves 
wandering in and out of the state. At any one time there 
might be 8, 10, 12 wolves in the state . . .  It could be 
[part of their territory] or they could be probably . .
. offcasts from other packs that were kind of looking to 
establish territory and just haven't found the right 
place yet. They're just kind of wandering through and 
back out. They may not come back again but another one 
from another pack may come through six months later 
(Conley).
The question of whether there was a pack in Idaho and,
therefore, a population, turned out to be of major importance
in writing the final plan (see pg. 93-95).
Jerry Conley felt that he had less pressure on him than
probably anyone else on the Committee and, consequently, he
thought he was able to enter the negotiations from a more
neutral stance in terms of wanting to know more about wolves.
At the same time, though, he was:
concerned from our standpoint that we be able to control 
under certain circumstances. I have no objection at all 
to having wolves in the state . . .  as long as they're
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managed like any other species of wildlife [with] quite 
a lot of flexibility.
Of the mindsets of other Committee members, Conley said.
Actually, I felt that everyone on the Committee . .
. was committed to a certain level of recovery where, uh, 
the least might have been as long as they stay in the 
wilderness and don't eat any big game animals to any 
great degree, that's okay . . . That was probably the
most restrictive viewpoint and certainly the other 
viewpoint was probably represented by the Defenders of 
Wildlife . . . Again, they didn't say they wanted
unlimited numbers but they wanted wolves recovered in all 
three states in very adequate numbers and as long as they 
weren't basically causing a problem, uh, then they should 
be free to go about anywhere.
Fischer viewed the mindsets of some members as still at 
a point of whether there should be réintroduction, not how it 
should be accomplished. They appeared to have no interest in 
developing a workable management plan. Their goal seemed to 
be to come up with a plan that would not allow recovery to 
move f orward.
Cool disagreed with idea that some were at a position of 
"whether" rather than "how" recovery should take place. The 
Committee assignment dictated "réintroduction"; however, some 
members did not (respondent's emphasis) support wolf recovery.
Some Committee members entered the negotiations with a 
bottom line in mind. A bottom line is defined as a position 
that is not going to be changed (Fisher and Ury 1981). It is 
a negotiator's worst acceptable outcome. A bottom line can be 
a form of protection for a negotiator in that it makes it 
easier to resist pressure and temptations. However, a bottom 
line has certain costs. It limits a negotiator's ability to
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benefit from new information that comes out during a 
negotiation. Creativity in coming up with imaginative 
solutions is limited by a bottom line. A bottom line is often 
set too high and is usually too rigid.
Jim Magagna listed some fundamental things that needed to 
be a part of anything that he could agree to. His bottom line 
turned out to be very rigid.
They would be such things as that all wolves would 
be treated the same, irregardless of their source within 
the given geographical location. Uh, that wolves 
impacting livestock or whatever the other uses, but 
primarily livestock, . . . we'd have to have the freedom 
to deal with them . . . not subject to constraints of the 
Endangered Species Act . . . The one I mentioned earlier
for me was a bottom line that anything that we came out 
of there with that involved a réintroduction had to have 
an upfront sanction by Congress. It couldn't just be an 
agency process.
The Congressional designation that Magagna was seeking was the 
declaration of all wolves in Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming to be 
experimental, non-essential. Such a designation was clearly 
outside the Endangered Species Act since one of the 
requirements of Section 10(j) of the ESA is that such a 
designation cannot be applied to existing populations of 
endangered species. Another requirement of Section 1 0 (j) is 
that the designated populations must be wholly separate 
geographically from any existing endangered populations.
K. L. Cool's totally unyielding bottom line was State 
management. George Bennett's bottom line was "state
management and effective control of the wolf by those directly 
affected, (hunters, livestock operators, fish and game
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managers and negatively impacted citizens).” He would have 
preferred the delisting alternative. Bennett's bottom line 
was not as rigid as Magagna's, because he did not stick to it 
until the vote on the final proposal.
As Hank Fischer went into the Committee process, his 
bottom line was no change in the ESA and biologically sound 
(defensible) solutions. His bottom line was also firm, but 
not rigid. He willingly supported an alternative that did not 
agree with his bottom line. Fischer was also concerned that 
the Committee process would be one more delay in beginning the 
EIS process. Conservationists had been pushing Congress to 
fund an EIS since the approval of the recovery plan in 1987. 
At the time of the announcement of the legislation appointing 
the Committee, Fischer expressed hope that an EIS could begin 
immediately (Greenway 1990). The legislation that
established the Committee also deleted a section of a previous 
appropriations bill that prohibited any money being spent for 
an EIS related to wolf réintroduction into YNP. It was 
unclear whether a study could begin immediately. If it was 
necessary for a delay in beginning an EIS until after the 
Committee's work, then Fischer felt that time was wasting 
(Greenway 1990).
The philosophical differences of the Committee members 
and technical advisors played a role in the perspectives of 
the negotiators. Jim Claar described some of those 
differences.
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For instance [the] State Fish and Game Departments,
. their clients tend to be consumptive users as 
opposed to the general public that the Forest Service 
serves which includes hunters, fishermen, photographers, 
bird watchers, all sorts of people. The State of Montana 
is beginning to change; that's evidenced by their 
Watchable Wildlife program . . . There are some
differences as well . . . that probably relates back to
the different missions of the different agencies . . .
The private conservation groups tend to interpret . . . 
threatened and endangered species recovery, in some 
cases, as the most important objective whereas the Forest 
Service has to integrate guidance from several laws and 
regulations. So, those are some of the differences that 
have a legal basis and a basis in the mission of the 
agencies, but people who stay with a particular agency or 
a particular role over a period of years tend to do that 
because of personal preferences.
According to Pat Tucker, the three Federal agencies and 
the two conservation representatives were basically in 
agreement philosophically and fundamentally. Galen Buterbaugh 
agreed.
I think that's fairly accurate, yes. Thinking back 
on it now that was, seems to be on many of the issues, 
that's generally where we found ourselves. See, the 
three Federal agencies are bound by the Endangered 
Species Act. All three of them. And of course the two 
conservation representatives certainly were supportive of 
the Act and . . . were even more conservative about it or 
more aggressive about it. So that just automatically put 
the five of us in many issues relating to the Act and 
what we could do, you know, saying the same thing or 
agreeing.
However, in this situation, philosophical agreement did not 
translate into agreement on the final proposal.
Interpretation of the Congressional Mandate
One of the primary influences underlying the mindsets was 
the interpretation that each Committee member placed on the 
Congressional charge. The law clearly states, "The
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Committee's task shall be to develop a wolf re-introduction 
and management plan for Yellowstone National Park and the 
Central Idaho Wilderness Area" (see pg. 29) (emphasis added). 
Some Committee members viewed it as a mandate to come up with 
a plan to reintroduce wolves. Some of these Committee members 
were not faithful to the interpretations that they gave to the 
legislative language. Others felt that there was considerable 
leeway and that the Committee had the option of turning in 
nothing. Those interpretations also influenced the
negotiation process.
Interpretation of Federal Members
It is common knowledge that Federal employees must 
operate under such legislative directives as a part of their 
job, since their funding comes from Congressional
appropriations bills. Therefore, the assumption can be made 
that administrative officers at the regional level of Federal 
agencies are used to interpreting the intent of Congress 
within the language of legislation such as the bill
authorizing the formation of the Wolf Management Committee. 
The Federal Committee members clearly interpreted the language 
of the legislation as a Congressional mandate to develop a 
réintroduction plan.
John Mumma clearly felt that Congress had a issued a 
mandate that the Committee should prepare a plan to
reintroduce wolves. "All they did was . . . [ask] us to
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prepare this plan to reintroduce [wolves]." He explained that 
once the appropriations bill is signed by the President [of 
the United States], that's a contract and the task has to be 
accomplished by the Federal agencies. He said further, "I 
felt that the three [of us] were willing to do a lot of things 
to get the job accomplished that Congress gave us." Dan Neal 
reported that "Mumma was always pretty clearly trying to find 
some . . . way to answer this mandate from Congress, that they 
come up with a plan." Galen Buterbaugh suggested that the 
legislation mandated compliance with the Endangered Species 
Act. The legislation does not say that. The three Federal 
representatives were, however, bound by the ESA (Buterbaugh, 
p ers. comm.).
Evidence of John Mumma's agenda, if it can be said that 
he had one other than complying with the Federal mandate, can 
be found in the following statement. "If [the] concerns could 
be identified, and then we could look at some ways to deal 
with [the] issues and still provide for reintroducing wolves, 
that would end up being the best world for everybody" (Mumma, 
pers. comm.).
As Lorraine Mintzmyer saw it, the NFS agenda required 
wolf réintroduction and that it take place under the ESA.
Well, of course, all along, there was on the part of 
the National Park Service a desire for the report to come 
up with a recommendation for the réintroduction into 
Yellowstone, and . . . the National Park Service's
position, of course, would have been under . . . the
umbrella of the Endangered Species Act.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
86
Jerry Conley also noted the strong desire on the part of 
the Federal Committee to produce a report for Congress.
Other factions kept saying we've gotta have it. I 
gotta deliver it. You know, like Galen's part. I've 
gotta deliver it to Congress this Committee by this time 
. . . I think there was a little bit of feeling, on the
part of the environmental groups that the Fish and
Wildlife Service came down on the wrong side at the very 
last because they wanted to turn out a product for
Congress (emphasis added).
While the Federal members may have felt that they had a 
mandate, they didn't seem to have a particular plan in mind, 
according to Wayne Brewster. The apparent agenda of the
Federal representatives, i.e., to produce a report of any
kind, had a negative effect on the technical committee. 
According to Brewster, " [there] was a lot of the frustration 
with a lot of the members of the technical committee in that 
there was virtually no direction from the Management Committee 
because they had no universally accepted charge except to 
produce something by May 15."
Interpretation of Other Members
Some of the other Committee members interpreted the 
Congressional legislation in the same manner as the Federal 
representatives. Hank Fischer read the charge as a directive 
to develop a réintroduction and management plan. Conley's 
view of the Congressional charge was that "[t ]he basic thrust 
was . . . [to] see if [we could] draw up a plan that could be
accepted by everyone that would speed up the introduction of 
wolves or at least . . . somehow speed up the recovery into
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central Idaho and Yellowstone areas.” George Bennett agreed 
that "the committee was charged to produce recommendations for 
a wolf recovery plan for central Idaho and Yellowstone Park. 
Specifically a wolf réintroduction plan.” Cool said that the 
Committee assignment dictated réintroduction.
Jim Magagna did not interpret the Congressional language 
in the same manner as the other Committee members.
I think quite a number of us who were not Federal 
Committee members. . . felt. . . because our charge came 
actually from Congress itself, that it was within our 
realm to recommend legislative changes to Congress, if 
that's where we arrived, that we didn’t have to be bound 
by current law . . . There were others of us [non-Federal 
members with] certain fundamental principles that we 
weren't willing to violate to get [an agreement].
Those interpretations framed the conflict surrounding
discussions of the Endangered Species Act and later shaped the
final proposal.
Summary
This chapter has shown how the past relationships of the 
Committee members and their expectations of working together 
again in the future played a role in the manner in which they 
related to each other during the negotiation process. The 
reputations from past experiences, in particular, determined 
the mindsets and cooperation of the negotiators as they began 
the negotiation process.
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CHAPTER4
THE NEGOTIATIONS 
INTRODUCTION
Having described the circumstances under which the stage 
was set for the negotiation and having examined the 
interpersonal elements that affected the negotiation process, 
it is now appropriate to investigate the negotiations 
themselves. A chronological summary of the meetings is 
presented first, followed by discussion of the controversy 
about the Endangered Species Act, the alternatives, and the 
two final proposals.
THE MEETINGS
The first meeting was held in Denver, Colorado, on 
January 23 and 24, 1991. At that meeting, ground rules were 
established and a multitude of "housekeeping" details, such as 
lodging and expenses, were handled. Some Federal technical 
committee members gave technical reports. Committee members 
outlined their concerns. The second meeting was held in 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, on February 6. The technical committee 
presented a list of issues that it felt needed to be addressed 
by the committee. The educational process began for the 
Management Committee. Margot Zallen of the USDI Solicitor's 
Office initiated explanation of the legalities of the 
Endangered Species Act. Two experts presented testimony.
88
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The March 6-7 meeting was held in Boise, Idaho. There 
was further legal discussion of the ESA. Alternatives and 
general technical information were presented by the technical 
committee at this meeting as well as the following meeting in 
Helena, Montana (April 2-3). Additional expert testimony was 
received at both meetings.
The April 10-11 meeting was held in Denver. More 
alternatives were presented for the Committee’s discussion. 
Members voted on alternatives presented by Pete Petera and 
John Mumma and a motion for monitoring the Idaho wolves. 
M um ma's alternative passed with a 9-1 vote. It appeared that 
the Committee had met its charge. By the final meeting on 
April 2 9 and 30, the agreement had fallen apart. Consensus 
now seemed farther away than it ever had. What happened 
between the two meetings that destroyed the agreement?
The Endangered Species Act
Events leading up to the crumbling of Mumma’s alternative 
centered around the Endangered Species Act, the most emotional 
and contentious aspect of the discussions. The Wolf 
Management Committee negotiations necessarily had to take 
place within the limits of the Endangered Species Act. The 
gray wolf is an endangered species in all of the lower 48 
states except Minnesota where it is listed as threatened (U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service 1987). However, the ESA also 
provides for the designation of "experimental nonessential"
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for reintroduced populations of endangered species outside 
their current range. The Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf 
Recovery Plan recommends that wolves re introduced into 
Yellowstone National Park be designated an experimental 
nonessential population, but recommends that natural 
recolonization be allowed to occur in northwest Montana and 
central Idaho (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1987). Wolves 
that are listed as endangered have far greater protection than 
those listed as experimental, nonessential. The experimental 
designation allows each member of an experimental population 
to be treated as a threatened species (with a few exceptions). 
That, in turn, allows greater management flexibility for both 
wildlife managers and livestock operators for wolves that are 
involved in predation of domestic animals.
Because of the recommendation of the recovery plan, many 
Committee members were aware of, and interested in, the 
Management Committee exploring the experimental nonessential 
designation. However, one facet of that designation was 
disagreeable to some other Committee members. Any member of 
an experimental population that crosses the boundary of the 
designated area is treated as endangered. Therefore, those 
Committee members believed that the experimental designation 
was still too restrictive and wanted the Committee's report to 
recommend delisting the wolf immediately. When attorneys 
explained that it was unlikely that Congress would act on such 
a proposal (Minutes, April 10-11), the experimental
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nonessential approach became the preferred option for those 
who had favored delisting. Still, that concept was more 
complicated than most Committee members realized. Michael 
Bean explains.
Well, I remember quite clearly the first meeting I 
attended, which was in Boise. There had been one or more 
meetings prior to then and I arrived not long after the 
technical committee meeting . . . had begun, . . . and I 
should point out that at least some members of the 
Committee often were present and took part in the 
meetings of the technical committee . . .  I remember the 
first meeting I attended . . .  It was immediately evident 
to me upon arriving at the meeting that nobody else 
understood the fact that under the experimental 
population . . . provision of Section 10(j) of the
Endangered Species Act that an experimental population 
could not encompass an area in which . . . animals of
that same species occurred without being introduced there
Specifically, the law states:
[T]he term 'experimental population* means any 
population (including any offspring arising solely 
therefrom) authorized by the Secretary for release under 
paragraph (2), but only when, and at such times as. the 
population is wholly separate geographically from 
nonexperimental populations of the same species (emphasis 
added).
. And I remember when I pointed this out to 
people, it took them all by surprise. And the 
significance of that . . .  at least in part, is that the 
final plan recommended by the Committee . . . included a 
significant area in which wolves either do or likely may 
occur . . . already . . . and . . .  in part that was, I
believe, a product of the fact that the Management 
Committee had . . . started out with this misperception
that they were free to draw the boundaries of an 
experimental area however they chose and, uh, were 
reluctant to . . . abandon that . . . desire even after
they later learned that it cannot be done under existing 
law. The technical committee at that time was meeting .
. separately from the Management Committee, although 
George Bennett was in the room . . . and so the technical 
committee and George Bennett . . . when I walked in, . .
. were talking about drawing the experimental population 
boundary here or there or somewhere else and it was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92
quickly apparent to me that they were including in that 
area, areas where I thought wolves were, and, uh, so I 
brought up this point and it was immediately apparent 
that that group was unaware that they weren ' t free to 
draw the lines as they chose . . . (Bean).
The actions that Bean observed had occurred despite
advice to the contrary from Margot Zallen. The minutes of the
February 6 meeting reveal that Zallen had previously informed
the committees that the Act prohibits an experimental
designation where there is already an existing population.
There must be geographic separation. She had also instructed
them that when they were defining geographic boundaries to
avoid drawing a boundary line immediately adjacent to an area
where a population already existed.
Once the Committee had been convinced that there were
limits to where the boundaries of an experimental population
could be drawn, their focus turned to defining "population" in
order to continue an attempt to draw boundaries where they
desired. Discussion became contentious. Some Committee
members were determined to find a way to include all wolves in
the experimental designation because of the management
flexibility encompassed within that designation. Other
members were just as determined that the Committee not
undermine the Endangered Species Act.
. . . Well, after this issue was fully aired there
then ensued over the course of several weeks, some effort 
to stretch, if you will, the language of the law by 
exploring the question, well, what does it mean . . . for 
a population of naturally occurring wolves to be present 
in an area? Does that mean . . . there must be evidence 
of reproduction there? Does it mean that there must be.
. . regular and repeated . . , and continuous presence in
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that area? Uh, there was a fair amount of effort on the 
part of . . .  a group that consisted of, . . . for the
most part non-lawyers, to . . . guess what Congress
meant. And I think by the time the process ended . . .
at least some members of the Committee may have felt that 
the words of the Act were sufficiently . . . ambiguous
with respect to an animal like the wolf, that they . . . 
send lone individuals long distances . . . from time to 
time but [they don't] necessarily continuously occupy and 
reproduce [in] any particular area, that they could get 
away with what they were doing. With each new bit of 
evidence, if you will, as to the nature of wolf presence 
in Idaho, there was a new . . .  rationale why we should 
ignore that. First of all, there was reluctance on the 
part of some to acknowledge that there was any reliable 
documentation of wolves being present anywhere in Idaho. 
Secondly, even if there were reliable documentation of 
wolves being present, there was no evidence that they 
occurred regularly more than intermittently, and even if 
they [did] , there was no evidence that they were 
reproducing there, as though those things were 
determinative of whether you could include the area 
within the boundaries of an experimental population 
(Bean).
Well, certainly in the areas where there are 
currently wolves that, and that of course was one of the 
issues that we laid on Congress in the final report was 
that using the experimental nonessential designation 
where you already have wolves is clearly outside of the 
intent and the language of the Endangered Species Act and 
only Congress can do that. Now the gray area comes in 
sort of like if a wolf just walks through an area, does 
that automatically void the experimental non-essential 
designation or does it mean that you have to have a 
reproducing population established in the area. For 
example in Yellowstone. And do these sightings that have 
never been verified in Yellowstone mean anything in terms 
of experimental nonessential? And of course we took the 
position that what it probably meant was that you had 
resident—  that you had—  The species was there living in 
a permanent population and it was probably reproducing, 
there was no way we could use experimental nonessential 
if there was clearly an established pair of wolves in an 
area in the Yellowstone ecosystem, for example, and even 
more so if they had, there'd been reproduction, it was 
ruled out. But some folks wanted to believe that you 
still could do that. And so what we ended up with was we 
wanted to have that flexibility to use that designation 
which all of us agreed is good, but that only Congress 
could do that because it was clearly outside the current 
language in the Endangered Species Act (Buterbaugh).
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What could you do with existing populations[?] In 
fact, that was one of the real key elements of the whole- 
- Whole another agreement was how to deal with the State 
of Montana, for example, that had existing animals or, 
for that matter, Idaho. Did a population exist and, if 
so, what was called for? What could you do? Could you 
introduce into existing populations? . . . W e ' d  start to 
say, well, now, umm, we think we could all agree on this 
. . . and the attorney would say, well, it's not clear in 
the Act that since you have existing population —  Well, 
what's a population? That's my point. Well, we're not 
sure. And we'd get into this big drawnout discussion of 
what a population actually was. One animal, two animals, 
ten, two packs, four packs, what? (Conley).
The Endangered Species Act does not explicitly state that
an endangered animal must be part of an identified population
in order to be protected under the Act. The confusion over
the need to have a definition of a population apparently grew
out of the fact that an experimental "population" is
specifically defined under Section 1 0 (j) as separate from
nonexperimental "populations." It reads, " . . .  any
population (including any offspring arising solely therefrom)
authorized . . . for release . . . only when, and at such
times as, the population is wholly separate geographically
from nonexperimental populations of the same species". Idaho
in particular was concerned with defining a population of
wolves because wolves had been sighted there only recently.
Such wolves would have to be managed as endangered animals,
because they were there through natural dispersal, not
réintroduction.
We have not seen any pack activity in the state. We 
have one wolf that's collared that's . . .  in the state 
that came in from Montana. We had a female—  It was a 
male. We had a female earlier in the state. We were 
thinking they were sort of trying to get together but
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they must have missed each other. But so far we haven't 
really had any verified pack activity. Which in our 
minds means that in essence we don't really have an 
established population. What we have is solitary wolves 
wandering in and out of the state. At any one time there 
might be 8, 10, 12 wolves in the state (Conley).
Jerry Conley's explanation seems to reveal an anxiousness
to be able to declare those wolves experimental. The
reasoning for that designation would be that if there is no
verified pack activity, then an established population does
not exist and that solitary wolves do not merit the endangered
status. Conley did make a statement at the April 10-11
meeting that there is no evidence of a population in Idaho.
Some Committee members believed that the Committee had
the option of coming up with a plan that would require
Congressional action on the Endangered Species Act, while
others maintained that the Committee's plan should be within
the realm of the ESA.
Well, [the Endangered Species Act] certainly 
restricted some of the things that were discussed or came 
up at different points as not being feasible because they 
were illegal under the Endangered Species Act. In fact, 
when we got all through, there's still some question that 
our final document didn't comply with the Act and 
actually it does not . . . fully stay under the . . .
authority of the Act, but that was done on purpose and it 
was sort of like up to Congress if they want to implement 
that. The Committee members knowingly, or the majority 
of them came up with a proposal that they knew was 
outside of the authority of the Endangered Species Act. 
In effect, what they said was. Congress, this is what we 
think ought to be done. If you like it, you're gonna 
have to pass legislation to make it go into effect. It 
can't go into effect without that (Buterbaugh).
Well, [the ESA] was a real, probably one of the 
biggest stumbling blocks in some ways [with] everybody's 
different interpretations . . .  It tended to limit very 
much the flexibility because, I think [the attorneys]
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were sort of saying, you don't have as much flexibility 
as the Committee members thought they did for the same 
reading of a particular law. I think that the Federal 
folks that were on there . . . basically concluded that
to get to any kind of solution, they were going to have 
to . . . use the maximum flexibility as they saw it, and
they went ahead and said, well, we're just going to 
assume that the law could be interpreted this way, which 
will allow the following to take place. You know, we can 
introduce, even though we have a population there, we 
could work out a system where State control could take 
place under these circumstances (Conley).
There was a distinct disadvantage with the terms of 
the Act or for the need for the Act . . . altogether on
the part of some Committee members. And, so, there were 
some people who wanted in this process to propose a . .
. change to the Endangered Species Act as a part of this 
project. There were those of us who were on the Committee 
knew of the abiding disinterest on the part of the 
Congress to open the issue of the Endangered Species Act 
and that still is the case. If you read the papers right 
now, you'll see that in the case of the spotted owl, that 
there still is that reluctance on the part of Congress to 
even address the issue and, uh, to open it up, so we were 
able to, through that kind of communication persuade 
those who thought that was the way we should go, that 
that certainly was going to be the kiss of death for the 
report's survival (Mintzmyer).
Well, maybe that's one of the things that got lost 
either inadvertently or deliberately but the 
nonessential experimental population—  There's a law and 
regulations that very specifically describe that process 
and procedure and what that means. The experimental 
population recommendation that finally came out of the 
Committee is just that; it's their perception of an 
experimental population. I mean, that . . . their final 
proposal likely could not be done legally and they 
recognized that. That in order to implement their 
version of an experimental population you would have to 
have special legislation or amendment of the Endangered 
species Act . . . Basically . . . what the one side was
arguing for . . . would require amendment of the
Endangered Species Act and . . . certainly an abrogation 
or a . . significant departure from the common
procedures on doing EIS's and special regulations and 
would have had to have had support of either 
Congressional sanction or other laws to make it not 
legally challengeable (Brewster).
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The conservationists were concerned not only with 
amending the Endangered Species Act but with the ramifications 
of such an action for other species as well.
But even the one we did end up with, . . . the one
that the Defenders and Federation felt they couldn't 
support, I think their legal advice—  Maybe their 
philosophical feeling was that this was gonna be too big 
of a change on the Endangered Species Act (Mumma).
Why, certainly I think the Endangered Species Act 
. . . had a tremendous impact on, not only on the product 
that we finally came out with but perhaps even more so on 
the fact that we weren't able to reach a unanimous 
decision on that product. And I really came to feel as 
we went through the process that, and this is my 
perspective on some of the pro-wolf groups that were 
involved, not necessarily on the individual players on 
the Committee but at least their constituencies that 
maintaining the integrity of the Endangered Species Act, 
uh, was a primary consideration (Magagna).
So, if the Act could be amended for wolves it would 
open it to be amended for other species . . . We
certainly believed that . . . one of the amendments that 
would have been required of the Endangered Species Act 
[would be] to basically relist a naturally occurring 
endangered species as experimental nonessential, which is 
not at all in keeping [with the Act]. I mean, you could 
do the same thing with spotted owls. We'll introduce a 
few owls to the Pacific Northwest and call the whole 
schmeer experimental nonessential and go about our 
business. So, that was kind of the scenario that 
environmentalists see immediately when that kind of stuff 
comes up (Tucker).
One technical committee member described what he viewed 
as a flaw in the Act.
The fact is, there's a flaw in the Endangered 
Species Act with regard to experimental populations and 
the wolf and it isn't gonna work and so that's why we 
felt it needed to be pointed out, and most of the 
Committee members did, that there had to be some 
Congressional action because if you read the Act under 
experimental populations, it says you have to have a 
réintroduction . . . You can't put the designation on an 
existing population . . , The flaw is that the Act says
that . . . an experimental population has to be wholly
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separate geographically from a natural population and 
there's no way to separate central Idaho and Yellowstone 
from what's already there. I think it's a safe thing to 
say that all of the Committee members agreed that the 
flexibility available under the experimental population 
designation was desirable but the glitch was that it 
wasn't possible. I mean, there was enough gray area 
there about whether it was possible, and then from our 
perspective in Montana, too, was that, how does this help 
us with the wolves we've already got. I mean, what we 
see is that the flexibility necessary to manage wolves in 
the Rocky Mountain Front is no different than that needed 
in the Paradise Valley by Gardiner. You need the same 
flexibility, no matter where the species occurs. So, see 
there was that problem there and the only way to get 
through that was some sort of Congressional action 
(Dood).
Attornevs
Because of the significance of the Endangered Species Act 
upon the Committee's negotiations, attorneys were a part of 
the process. Their purpose was to clarify the meaning of the 
Act and intent of Congress in writing the Act. As mentioned, 
Michael Bean is an attorney who specializes in the ESA. 
Margot Zallen of the Solicitor's Office, Fish and Wildlife 
Service, attended all the meetings. Carolyn Paseneaux and Jim 
Magagna are also attorneys. Attorneys from the Defenders of 
Wildlife and National Wildlife Federation were also in 
attendance (Mumma, pers. comm.). Bean and Zallen contributed 
significantly to the discussion of the ESA, but at times 
created uncertainty for the Committee. Their opinions 
conflicted primarily around the experimental, nonessential 
designation.
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Bean clearly thought that there were . . . points
where she was saying that—  The Solicitor's office 
believed they could go ahead and do some things and Bean 
was saying, no, this clearly conflicts, [particularly 
around the experimental designation] . . . That, of 
course, is where Bean's expertise is . . . and it seems 
to me that . . . he kept making that point enough that .
. . Buterbaugh eventually was saying that, you know, we
may have to get Congressional approval to do this . . .
I think Zallen was trying to find a way that they could 
draw these lines and, uh. Bean was there constantly 
saying, it's very hard to draw these lines. I think 
basically by the end of it, his opinion had won out. I 
think everyone agreed that they were going to have to 
have a Congressional stamp of approval that said, we as 
Congress accept these lines. That otherwise they would 
be challenged (Neal).
Some Committee members expressed frustration with the 
constant attorney attention.
Seemed like we had more attorneys following us 
around. You had an attorney representing the Solicitor's 
office for the Department of Interior that attended the 
meetings. Carolyn Paseneaux's an attorney. Jim 
Magagna ' s an attorney. And we had attorneys from the 
Defenders of Wildlife and National Wildlife and we were 
just kind of followed around by all these legal minds and 
all with a different interpretation of what this meant or 
didn't mean or what it would mean or wouldn't mean 
(Mumma).
And we had, you know, attorneys from the Department 
of Interior interpreting the laws and . . . one of the
real hangups was the constant . . . attorney .
interpretation saying, well, this is what you can do, you 
can't do, and this is an area they're not sure about. 
We'd start in a certain direction trying . . .  to form a 
solution to a particular problem and the attorneys would 
say, uh, uh. Woop, lookie here. On section so-and-so, 
page 12 of the, whatever, Endangered Species Act or 
certain interpretation of the Courts, you may not be able 
to do this . . . And that tended to . . . limit very much 
the flexibility because, I think they were sort of 
saying, you don't have as much flexibility as the 
Committee members thought they did for the same reading 
of a particular law (Conley).
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The Alternatives
During the negotiation process, the Committee considered 
nine alternatives which were constructed by the technical 
committee. All of the alternatives were related in some 
manner to the Endangered Species Act, either in full 
compliance or requiring amendment. Based on the Committee's 
report (1991) submitted to Congress, the alternatives are 
outlined below.
Alternative A provided for natural recovery of both areas 
and full protection under the Endangered Species Act wherever 
the wolves would occur. This alternative was a "no action" 
alternative since that is the management plan now in place in 
accordance with the recovery plan. States were encouraged to 
participate, "as far as permissible," in developing management 
plans. They were also encouraged to demonstrate interest in 
recovery and management in order to reduce public resistance 
to recovery. Control of depredating wolves would continue as 
currently practiced in Montana.
Alternative B provided for réintroduction under the 
designation of "nonessential experimental" under three 
different options. All of Idaho and Wyoming, and the portion 
of Montana south of Interstate 90, Highway 12 and east of 
Interstate 15 would have been designated the "experimental 
population area." This alternative would have required legal 
definition of "population" and "geographically separate and 
distinct." States would have been allowed increased input
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
into the management plan. There would have been greater 
flexibility in the management of the species itself, 
especially as it impacted ungulate populations. Wolf control 
would continue as currently practiced in Montana. Take by 
private citizens would be limited to an animal in the act of 
depredation and reported to the proper authorities within a 
specified time.
Alternative C provided for legislative alteration of the 
classification of wolves. Two options delisted wolves in the 
three-state area, except northwestern Montana. A third option 
delisted wolves completely in the three states. Management, 
except in the protected areas, would have been turned over to 
the States with wolves managed as other game or nongame 
animals.
Alternative D was simply a provision that Congress would 
modify or confirm any alternative that the Committee came up 
with. Alternative E delisted wolves in the three states under 
two options, one with réintroduction, the other without. 
Management outside national parks and wildlife refuges would 
have been under State authority and according to individual 
State classifications, e.g., a predator in Wyoming.
Alternative F was presented by Pete Petera. It would 
have delisted wolves in the three states, except within the 
national parks, and given exclusive management to the States. 
Two options provided for réintroduction while the third did 
not. The States would be responsible for allowing private
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take, designating "no-wolf" areas, and regulating hunting, 
while at the same time, managing for recovery of the species.
Alternative G was presented by Larry Shanks, Chief of 
Endangered Species of Region 6 of the Fish and Wildlife 
Service. This alternative was a "Tri-State Management Plan." 
Wolves would have been reintroduced into YNP and central Idaho 
under the experimental designation. Buffer zones were to be 
created around those two areas. A joint team of State and 
Federal personnel were to prepare management plans. The 
intent of this alternative was to maximize State management 
flexibility. Control of wolves continued according to current 
practices, and private take was allowed if a wolf was in the 
act of depredation.
After presentation of the above alternatives, the voting 
process began at the second to last meeting. Jim Magagna 
moved that the Committee accept Alternative F, Option 1 
(réintroduction into YNP, natural recolonization in Idaho). 
Five voted in favor of the alternative, four against, and one 
abstained^. Two additional motions were made to modify the 
alternative. After their consideration, the alternative was 
again voted on, resulting in a 5-5 split. The stage was now 
set for the final confrontation.
M u m m a * a Proposal
At the April 9-10 meeting, John Mumma presented 
Alternative H, termed a "very delicate negotiating option" by
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Lorraine Mintzmyer. He combined several parts of the above 
alternatives in an attempt to put together a proposal that all 
Committee members could support. The alternative incorporated 
the experimental nonessential designation in all areas of the 
three states except the Glacier National Park area. The 
management aspects of Alternative F, Option 1 would be used as 
a guideline to prepare a management plan as long as they did 
not conflict with other provisions of Alternative H. This 
item met the needs of those who desired more state control. 
The alternative called for a Federally funded joint Federal- 
State EIS. All funding for development and implementation of 
management plans would be provided by Congress. Funding for 
management of wolves was a primary concern of all three State 
directors, so this line met that need. The three States and 
Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture were to work out 
cooperative agreements for monitoring and review. A standing 
committee would be established to review the activities 
provided for under this alternative. Further, a subcommittee 
would be established to carry out information and education 
activities, meeting the concerns of the conservationists and 
Mumma himself regarding public education. Mumma explained 
what happened next.
If . . . concerns could be identified, and then we
could look at some ways to deal with those issues and 
still provide for reintroducing wolves, that would end up 
being the best world for everybody. And, in fact, that's 
kind of what the Committee really tried to do. In fact, 
we had a 10-0 vote going until the last minute when Jim 
Magagna pulled out, did an about-face on us . . . 1  got
plenty irritated at the whole process and made a proposal
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that had everybody working on the wording. Giving 
everybody something that they wanted and still working 
toward the objective of introducing wolves and taking 
care of all those concerns. So we went through it very 
methodically, everybody participating, and Jim was 
participating very actively, and then at the last minute, 
we had a vote and it was 9—1. And I said I wanted a vote 
that the entire committee could endorse, a 10-0 [vote], 
even though the appropriation language said you only had 
to have a vote of six . . .  It sure was ironic watching 
that whole process develop, 'cause a lot of people saw it 
happen, and, you know, him participating and then at the 
last minute canceling his vote . . . [Magagna was in
favor of wolf recovery] under a certain . . . extremely
tight conditions, you know. But that's what I said we 
did. We went through and methodically addressed those 
particular issues that people would bring to him and he 
would bring forward and all that. And we accommodated 
every concern. Every concern that was there.
Mumma was obviously upset that Magagna had voted against
his proposal, thereby thwarting an opportunity for true
consensus. Mumma had no desire for his alternative to go
forward as the Committee's recommendation without the complete
agreement of the Committee. Nevertheless, it did command the
required minimum of six votes, so the alternative was turned
over to the technical committee to detail the management plan.
The technical committee worked until 2:30 A.M. the night prior
to the next meeting of April 29-30, finalizing the draft plan.
What happened at the Committee meeting the next day is not
clear. Memories of respondents reveal different details. The
minutes reveal the beginning of the collapse of the agreement.
The decision was made to vote on pieces of the draft
recommendation rather than the whole document. At that point
Jim Magagna and George Bennett stated that they had voted only
for the concept of Mumma's alternative. Mumma objected,
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saying that the Committee had "agreed to the parameters of the 
draft." Bennett responded that he had voted only for the 
technical committee to write the draft.
Several respondents attempted to explain how the events 
surrounding Mumma's proposal got so complicated.
Mumma came up with what I thought was a fairly 
decent compromise at one of those late April meetings .
. . that I thought that everybody could go along with,
and then somehow . . . Bennett and Magagna and those guys 
figured out that they really had . . , developed more 
control over the situation and they dug their heels in 
and then . . .  I think they figured out that someone 
would send a directive to these agency heads that they 
had to reach a compromise, so then they really held back 
and . . . turned Mumma's fairly decent compromise into a 
compromise that . . . really the environmentalists
couldn't handle. Mumma . . . said, look, we will just
draw a line and say on this side, they're experimental 
and on that side they're . . . regular endangered
animals. And . . .  I think that . . . Fischer and
Dougherty, maybe not Fischer, but Dougherty might have 
gone for that except with the stuff that happened 
subsequently . . .  I was thinking about that last 
meeting, and . . . how . . . what had started out as the 
compromise that these guys might be able to go for . . .
really sort of turned into something that they just 
couldn't stomach . . . Mumma was really interesting . .
. The day that they finally came up with this plan, the 
first day of, he really laid into Bennett . . . and
Magagna on how . . . you guys have got to compromise, and 
. . .  it looked like they were finally coming around . .
. and then it was like the . . . compromise took on a
completely different complexion once they started working 
it out and . . . turned out that Dougherty and Fischer
were the ones who couldn't handle it . . . And [Mumma]
made a very . . . eloquent appeal . . . that . . .  in
classic situations like this one, people have to be 
willing to give and . . . was making the argument that
his plan was the one that they could give on (Neal).
John Mumma tried very, very hard . . . He made a
very eloquent presentation of why they had to do it
within the existing law, why they had to address not only 
livestock concerns and hunting concerns but I guess the 
higher moral ground of conservation because to do less 
would not sell to the American people and to the 
Congress, so I think he had —  Well, he did. He forged.
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at least the philosophy and the framework of an 
alternative that all except Jim Magagna voted for, and 
that . . . was when the light went on in my mind that .
. . Jim didn't necessarily care whether the alternative
was accepted. And when it came up the next day, when we, 
when the technical committee started fleshing it out . .
was when George Bennett figured out that he was 
supposed to be voting with Jim Magagna (Brewster).
Well, what happened in my humble opinion is that 
relations with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the 
State of Montana —  We thought we had an agreement from 
one meeting on what the report was going to say and so 
forth and the technical committee was supposed to write 
it in that fashion- We came to a subsequent meeting and 
during the intervening time, there had been a major 
broohah-hah between the State of Montana and the Fish and 
Wildlife Service on a particular issue unrelated to the 
wolf issue but nonetheless, it polarized the two to the 
point where that very delicate negotiating option which 
was put together by John Mumma was subsequently just —  
The State and the private sector converged to end up with 
a majority that just threw it all out all over again 
(Mintzmyer) .
[At the] next to the last meeting Mumma put forth a 
proposal that did include northwestern Montana and 
central Idaho as part of the big experimental population 
and it got voted on 9-1. Magagna was the only one who 
didn't vote for it and Hank and Tom Dougherty both voted 
for it and the reasoning was not that they agreed with 
that, but that they agreed that that could go forward as 
. . . a preferred alternative in an EIS and it was more
to promote the EIS process and both of them felt like 
that alternative would be when it was looked at, the 
experimental population would be shrunk because there 
were wolves in this area, and of course, that wasn't at 
all why the livestock or states voted for it and so, in 
a way, I think there was some not real great 
communication going on there during that preliminary vote 
because when it did get down to more specifics at the 
last meeting, it totally fell apart and nothing got done 
that afternoon of the last meeting (Tucker).
People had a different sense of what they were 
agreeing to on that original vote. It was late in the 
day and Mumma was really pushing hard to get people to 
buy into this thing and I think that there wasn't a clear 
understanding of what they were agreeing to- And that's 
why, in the end a breakdown. To the conservationists, 
they were agreeing to a concept of a compromise, that 
might explore [Mumma's proposal] and they were basically
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trying to facilitate keeping movement going. Whereas 
Mumma, I think, felt that people were agreeing more to 
specifics of his proposal. That's my own interpretation. 
And then when it came down to fleshing that thing out and 
the options, I just can't remember what came first, where 
things were derailed but I think it was basically a 
function of the fact that people were misinterpreting 
(Askins).
Perhaps the most interesting response (and an excellent
example of selective memory) to the query about what happened
on M um ma's proposal was Magagna's.
You know, I even have to stop and think. I'm not 
sure that I remember the nature of his proposal at this 
point in time. It'll come back to me if you give me a 
few hints . . .
A few hints did trigger his memory.
Okay. But as I recall . . . the fundamental reason
why I could not support it, even though there were a lot 
of points that I could support was what I felt, the need 
to have the upfront declaration by Congress. We did not 
feel in the livestock industry and the other groups that 
I represented that we could have something that was 
strictly in the hands of the agencies, given the power of 
the Endangered Species Act and that was the key point for 
me, that Congress would declare that all wolves in that 
area were experimental. Under John's proposal, you know, 
we were still bound by the Endangered Species Act and any 
wolves that might get in there other than through 
réintroduction were gonna have full force and protection 
of the law.
Of Magagna's decision to vote against his proposal after 
appearing to support it, Mumma said, "My sense is that 
finally he realized that we'd taken care of all of the 
concerns and still provided for wolves, and I'm not sure how 
he could go back to his constituents."
At this point in the process, the Committee voted on four 
different versions of Mumma's proposal. The minutes do not 
report what those versions were, but they are worth mentioning
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
108
because the results on three of them were five votes in favor 
(the votes against were not recorded), adding credibility to 
a suggestion that there was a 5-5 voting split among Committee 
members (to be discussed later). It appeared that a deadlock 
had developed. Both Mumma and Fischer told the Committee how 
disappointed they were at the unwillingness of some members to 
bargain in good faith. The meeting adjourned for the day, 
with the agreement that the Committee would try again the next 
morning for an hour and if no progress had been made at that 
time, a negative report would be prepared.
The Final Proposal
By the next morning, John Turner, Director of the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service, had gotten involved as a "third- 
party” intervenor. He was concerned that a stalemate seemed 
imminent. A third party intervenor is someone who enters into 
the negotiation in order to "enhance the harmony of the 
exchange and the probability of agreement” (Wall 1985). 
Typically, the third party is a neutral person who serves the 
role of intermediary, facilitator, mediator, fact finder, or 
arbitrator or any combination of those roles. While Turner 
was not an impartial third party, he had a strong desire that 
the Committee not present a negative report to Congress. It 
cannot be said with certainty that Turner enhanced the harmony 
of the negotiation, but he certainly enhanced the probability 
of agreement, not through cooperation but through concession
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and persuasion.
At some point there Turner, either personally or 
through one of his aides, had gotten to Buterbaugh that 
look, . . . there has to be a plan come out of this
Committee and we will go for this . . . version that . .
. Magagna's pushing and . . . w e ' l l  get Congressional
approval for it. And so Buterbaugh then, by then was, I 
thought, was just doing, you know, was basically being a 
good soldier and doing what his boss wanted (Neal).
Galen Buterbaugh described Turner's intervention.
Well, actually, [Turner] had been briefed. I was 
keeping him informed through the whole process, 
particularly as we got down close to the end so there 
were . . . numerous discussions with either he or Doug
Crowe on his staff, who was kind of his person that kept, 
actually came out here for one of the meetings . . . when 
we started to get down closer to the end and so there 
were discussions back and forth, mainly where I just 
informed them where we stood and the issues and 
everything so we just had a discussion, but at the very 
end he actually talked to Jim Magagna who —  The two of 
them went to college together. And so they were close 
personal friends and they actually had a discussion 
sometime the last evening as I understand it and then 
Turner called me the next morning and said that he had 
talked to Jim and that he had some suggestions on some 
things that he thought he could live with and wanted to 
know if I could live with them, if we recommended them. 
And so we discussed that at some length and I talked to 
my staff and part of my staff was opposed and part of it 
was for, I mean, you know, supported it so it was kind of 
I didn't get any really good feedback there but then it 
was brought up in front of the Committee and that's . .
. where we ended up with . . . the final recommendations.
Jim Magagna told of his conversation with Turner.
He talked with me and he said . . . what do you have 
to have? and I explained to him . . . the one or two
major, you know, assuming the details had pretty well 
been worked out, one or two major things that I had to 
have in terms of the upfront Congressional guarantee and 
I'm not even sure what all else and I presumed he talked 
to others, too, the same way.
Of his friendship with Turner, Magagna said, "Doesn't mean
that there's too much that we agree on it, but we are able to
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talk with each other and do so quite often."
Michael Bean explains what he perceived as the mindsets 
of Committee members as they were faced with the choice of 
supporting Turner's proposal or turning in a negative report.
I said a moment ago that I thought the Interior, the 
Federal agencies were determined primarily to get 
agreement on something and . . . there was
considerable . . . frustration at the last meeting that
in fact it might not be possible to get agreement on 
anything. . . And . . . the state directors and . . .
Magagna and Bennett . . . had stuck together on
everything up to that point and from the point of view of 
the Federal agencies . . .  if they wanted [6] votes for 
anything they clearly couldn't get [6] votes by casting 
their votes with the environmentalists so long as the 
industry and state directors stayed together, so I think, 
in the 11th hour of that process that Federal agencies 
decided that they would go along with whatever the state 
and industry interests wanted . . . for the purpose of
getting an agreement, that had the necessary [6] votes 
behind it.
Those who supported the final plan explained how they 
came to the decision to do so, despite the fact that it was 
outside the realm of the Endangered Species Act, thus 
requiring subsequent Congressional action before 
implementation could take place.
Well, [the final proposal] was essentially very 
close to the one I tried to get everyone on the 10-0 
deal. And we adjourned the meeting one day to see if 
people, to let people think about whether they really 
wanted to try to get a product through, and I said, you 
know, "It's gonna be really embarrassing for 10 educated 
people to turn back to Congress and say, well, we 
couldn't ever give you a plan because we refused to do 
something." But, the Fish and Wildlife Service 
Washington Office . . . offered up some items . . .  I
think those issues then had to do with some of the 
States' rights issues and the Fish and Wildlife Service 
was willing to do certain things . . . As I recall,
that's what ended up going forward and we actually voted 
on it. 'Cause the states were agreeable then . . . but
then it appeared we'd gone too far in one direction then
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away from conservation of the species, from an endangered 
species standpoint and the two wildlife [conservation] 
representatives then couldn't support us . . . And there 
was . . . legal debate, even between the different
attorneys that were sitting there watching and providing 
their oversight as to whether this could even happen or 
not. They just thought it might not have the legal 
foundation (Mumma).
In fact, when we got all through, there's still 
some question that our final document didn't comply with 
the Act and actually it does not . . . fully stay under
the. . . authority of the Act, but that was done on
purpose and it was sort of . . . up to Congress if they
want to implement that. The Committee members knowingly, 
or the majority of them, came up with a proposal that 
they knew was outside of the authority of the Endangered 
Species Act. In effect, what they said was. Congress, 
this is what we think ought to be done. If you like it, 
you're gonna have to pass legislation to make it go into 
effect. It can't go into effect without that . . . And
we ended up I think with a vote . . .  It was like, one, 
two, three, there was what seven out of ten. I was 
thinking the environmental community and Lorraine—  Oh, 
but she abstained. So, it would be 7-2 and one 
abstention. [And then there was a vote to add one more 
statement that she suggested and one that Jim Magagna 
suggested and then it went 8-2 ] I think the two 
environmental folks . . . were opposed to it then . . .
And I think there was some, there may have been more 
discussion that I still don't know about today, but I 
know that Jim was right in the middle of that and he 
probably had met with the State folks and, uh, I'm just 
not quite sure what all went on there at the last minute,
. . . in the evening and that morning because it got
pretty hectic there towards the end and I'm not sure any 
of us knew exactly what, frankly exactly where we stood 
on everything we voted on and, uh, afterwards, I think 
there was some folks that wish we'd have had more time 
and there was a better way to do it but we had a deadline 
and we had very little choice (Buterbaugh).
I think that to reach the final agreement . . .  I 
give full credit to the Fish and Wildlife Service . . .
sort of saying, well, we're in a real deadlock situation 
here. We gotta come up with something a little bit 
different on a couple of points and we tried before, and 
I think they made some concessions at the last that 
basically allowed the agreement that was reached to go 
forward. They made the rest of the Federal agencies feel 
comfortable and . . .  I think there was a little bit of 
feeling that, on the part of the . . . environmental
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groups that the Fish and Wildlife Service came down on 
the wrong side at the very last because they wanted to 
turn out a product for Congress . . . The acceptance of
. . . the final product . . . was sort of left up in the
air . . , You couldn't get 6 votes to go on this until
basically John Turner and Doug Crowe sort of working with 
Galen . . . came up with some slightly different version
. . . that were . . . some concessions on the Fish and
Wildlife Service's part toward the State . . . at the
last and the livestock folks were willing to buy off on 
that and so you ended up with kind of a coalition there 
of all the Federal agencies then saying, okay, it's 
acceptable. We can vote for this. So suddenly you had 
a 8-2 vote (Conley).
Buterbaugh defended the Committee's decision to formulate 
a plan that did not stay within the parameters of the 
Endangered Species Act.
And so what we ended up with was we wanted to have 
that flexibility to use that [experimental] designation 
which all of us agreed is good, but that only Congress 
could do that because it was clearly outside the current 
language in the Endangered Species Act (Buterbaugh).
Fischer felt strongly that the final proposal was not
legally sound and believed that Congress would reject it. He
also believed that the State directors went along with the
Turner's proposal, believing that he knew the laws. Mintzmyer
was disappointed that the final proposal took the direction
that it did and said that she would have been much happier
with the proposal that Mumma made.
As for other Committee members' feelings about the final
proposal, most were pleased with the product. Conley said
that he was comfortable with the final product "as were most
of the other folks there." Both Bennett and Cool indicated
that the final proposal was the result they were hoping for.
Bennett termed the final proposal "an acceptable compromise
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for all but the two more extreme pro-wolf advocates." Cool 
called it an "excellent management approach to an emotional 
and polarized controversial issue." He also stated that he 
"was disappointed in the failure of the Congressional 
Committee to recognize the merit of the [Wolf Management] 
Committee's final report."
The final proposal incorporated many of the same 
components of the other eight alternatives. It recommended 
designating all of Idaho, Wyoming and Montana, with the 
exception of the Glacier National Park area, Yellowstone 
National Park, and National Wildlife Refuges as nonessential 
experimental areas. Inside the national parks and refuges, 
wolves would be classified as endangered. Management 
authority outside the national parks and wildlife refuges 
would be given to the States. The States were required to 
develop management plans in agreement with the Secretary of 
the Interior. Included in the management plan would be the 
"right of the States to manage wolves and their unacceptable 
impacts; and the responsibility to pursue wolf recovery." One 
of the unacceptable impacts included in the final proposal 
that was significant in losing the support of the 
conservationists was the right conferred unto "livestock 
operators or their agents" to take a wolf in the act of 
"harassment." Harassment was too lenient a provision in the 
minds of the conservationists. That meant simply that a wolf 
walking through a pasture could be deemed to be harassing
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livestock and, therefore, highly vulnerable to being removed.
After the final alternative passed, the remainder of the 
time was spent in detailing the management matrix. The 
conservationists were, for all intents and purposes, excluded 
from the remainder of the process. Their comments and 
suggestions were ignored (Fischer, pers. comm. Tucker, pers. 
comm.). During that time, members were also concerned about 
catching flights home and so the final work was rushed through 
without consulting the technical committee (Tucker, pers. 
comm).
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CHAPTERS
ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
Thus far, this paper has primarily described the Wolf 
Management Committee negotiation process. Description alone 
does not explain why events end up the way they do. It merely 
sets the stage for a closer look. Some segments of the 
negotiation process have been examined previously in this 
paper. This chapter will complete the analysis of the 
negotiation process of the Wolf Management Committee from a 
broader context. Several factors are considered:
organizational questions, external influences, incentives to 
negotiate and underlying conflicts.
ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS
One place to begin when analyzing a negotiation is to 
examine the organizational nature of the conflict. Following 
Raiffa (1982), certain questions can be posed to begin the 
inquiry.
Is there more than one issue? Wolf réintroduction is a 
one-issue conflict (réintroduction versus natural recovery) 
with many sub-issues, such as predation and compensation. 
State or Federal management.
Are there more than two parties? Many parties are
115
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interested in the issue and may be either directly or 
indirectly affected by the outcome of the negotiation. 
Management agencies and citizens who live in a recovery area 
are examples of those who may be directly impacted. 
Conservation organizations and citizens who do not reside in 
a recovery area but have a vicarious interest are examples of 
those who are indirectly affected. Therefore, this was a 
many-party negotiation.
Is the negotiation repetitive? The Wolf Management 
Committee negotiations could be termed repetitive. That is, 
negotiations may occur again between the same parties (Raiffa 
1982) . Bargaining is likely to be more cooperative when 
repetitive. A high value would be placed on future 
relationships in a repetitive situation.
Are there linkages? When parties will meet again in 
other negotiations, linkages may be used to facilitate 
agreement. For example, the State directors were interested 
in more State management. In Montana, an agreement to give 
the State greater say in management of grizzly bears might 
have resulted in the State being more cooperative over wolf 
management.
Are the negotiations private or public? This negotiation 
was a very public affair, with the media in attendance as well 
as other observers.
Is third-party intervention possible? In this case, 
third-party intervention enabled the Committee to reach
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agreement.
Is ratification required? Ratification is the approval 
by one or more person, parties, or constituents in authority 
over the negotiator. All the negotiators to some degree were 
required to seek ratification, although the conservationists 
were more free of such constraints than any of the other 
members.
Raiffa (1982) describes these types of negotiators as 
cooperative antagonists.
Such disputants recognize that they have differences 
of interests; they would like to find a compromise but 
they fully expect that all parties will be primarily 
worried about their own interests. They do not have 
malevolent intentions, but neither are they 
altruistically inclined. They are slightly distrustful 
of one another; each expects the others to try to make a 
good case for their own side and to indulge in strategic 
posturing. They are not confident that the others will 
be truthful but they would like to be truthful 
themselves, within bounds. They expect that power will 
be used gracefully, that all parties will abide by the 
law, and that all joint agreements will be honored.
Were all parties represented that should have been?
A concern in a many-party negotiation is whether or not 
all parties with a stake in the issue are represented (Bingham
1986). In some situations, it may be difficult to determine 
who the parties are (Raiffa 1982). Parties may enter a 
dispute at different stages according to their interest in the 
issue. In natural resource disputes, there are often loosely 
formed conservation groups who may be concerned about a 
certain issue but are not organized enough to be known to
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persons organizing a negotiation effort. In some instances, 
there may be so many parties that it is difficult to identify 
them all and ensure effective representation (Bingham 1986). 
The wolf réintroduction issue is one that has many interested 
parties, so the question of whether or not all parties were 
represented does arise.
All responses to that query were basically in agreement. 
The feeling was that all the major parties were represented. 
To have involved more people would have been cumbersome and 
unworkable. The public meetings and mail-in comments provided 
an opportunity for anyone not involved in the negotiations to 
be heard if they so desired.
Were the hunters represented adequately?
Even though respondents agreed that all major parties 
were represented, concern had been expressed by some members 
of both committees that the hunters were not adequately 
represented, since George Bennett more accurately represented 
livestock interests. One technical committee member suggested 
that the State directors took over the responsibility of 
looking out for the hunters' concerns. Galen Buterbaugh 
concurred.
Well, the States were certainly looking out for the 
hunting interests. The States did an excellent job on 
that also. [The hunters' position was covered] very 
adequately (Buterbaugh).
Pat Tucker suggested that some hunters had representation 
while others did not. Renee Askins agreed.
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, A segment of hunters had good representation on the 
Committee because the National Wildlife Federation does 
representative a lot of hunters. I think the hunters 
that are very concerned about predation on big game and 
stuff didn't have good representation on that Committee 
because George Bennett was primarily representing the 
livestock industry (Tucker).
A lot of hunting constituencies, I think, felt 
really angry about the choice of [Bennett] as their 
representative because they weren't sure that their 
concerns would be portrayed or incorporated into the 
process. In some cases, I don't [think those concerns 
were incorporated]. I think again [Bennett] mainly took 
what appeared to me to be more livestock concerns. I 
don't think the kinds of hunting concerns that I ’ve heard 
raised over and over I . . . necessarily hear[d] raised
from him (Askins).
What was the quality of the leadership?
Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) describe two basic types 
of negotiations, assisted and unassisted. Assisted
negotiation means that someone is involved as a third party in 
managing the negotiation process. In an unassisted
negotiation, there is no such intermediary and leadership must 
necessarily come from within the group of negotiators. If 
there is no structure of any kind imposed either externally or 
internally, a many-party negotiation such as this may become 
chaotic (Raiffa 1982).
Since this negotiation was unassisted, leadership 
responsibilities for the Wolf Management Committee fell to 
Galen Buterbaugh, who was appointed Chair by the Secretary of 
Interior at the time of the formation of the Committee. 
Opinions vary regarding Buterbaugh's leadership ability. Some 
informants suggested that he did not handle the role of Chair
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very effectively while others thought he did the best he could 
under the circumstances.
I didn't have the sense that Galen Buterbaugh was a 
very effective . . . leader (Anon.).
We needed [Galen's] position as the Fish and 
Wildlife Service to be more assertive about Fish and 
Wildlife Service concerns. And because he was running 
the meeting, he felt obliged to be objective as the 
Chairman. Therefore, one major presence, the Fish and 
Wildlife Service and their opinions on this issue were 
not clearly represented. But as it was, having someone 
[chairing the meetings] from a major agency whose 
position on the issue was really important, it sort of 
like negated that whole position aside from Galen's final 
vote. But he just was really reluctant to enter into the 
fray of discussion and argument because he was chairing 
the meeting (Anon.).
Well, the discussions and the actions of the 
Management Committee Chairman . . . particularly when —  
You know, he was going to get something out, whatever his 
boss wanted . . . When one of the committee members is
dictating bottom lines to the Director of the Fish and 
Wildlife Service, and the Director of the Fish and 
Wildlife Service tells the Chairman, who he supervises, 
what the alternative will be, it sort of derails the 
Committee process (Anon.).
I thought that Galen Buterbaugh of the Fish and 
Wildlife Service did about as skillful job as [he] could 
to try to come to some resolution (Anon.).
Buterbaugh himself said:
[Major disagreements] made it very difficult to . . 
. get any agreement on anything at all . . . to . .
function as chairman because there was major disagreement 
on almost every issue. It was the toughest [committee] 
I've ever been on.
would a mediator have helped?
The desirability of having all negotiators participating 
fully in the negotiations process proves the need for an 
impartial third party to act as an intermediary in some
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negotiations. Despite the feelings of several informants that 
Buterbaugh's leadership was not as effective as it could have 
been, few people felt that a mediator would have been helpful.
Fischer thought a mediator would have helped immensely, 
especially for the conservationists' positions. He felt that 
Petera and Conley were more reasonable than Cool and could
have been swayed by a good argument from other Committee
members, if not for Cool's pressure. A mediator would have 
been able to help separate the emotions from the issues, help 
with the education process, and keep parties in line with the 
interests that they stated at the beginning. Fischer was the 
only one who was certain that mediation would have been 
helpful.
I think maybe a mediator would have helped in that 
maybe they would have gotten to some of the issues 
quicker. It might have all fallen apart quicker. The
vote may have come quicker, but . . . (Tucker).
Well, it would have had to be an awfully good 
mediator because you're dealing with folks . . . that are 
. . . used to doing a lot of mediation themselves and I
think that anything but a very high-quality mediator 
would have been a waste of time. It might have been the 
right individual that . . . could have helped
occasionally on . . . working out language . . . whereas 
the Committee tended to rely on the technical committee 
to work out language and . . . sometimes that worked
pretty good and sometimes it didn't (Conley).
Potentially [a mediator would have helped]. It 
would have had to be a very good mediator, but yeah. 
Because [Galen] was running the meeting, he felt obliged 
to be objective as the Chairman . . .  I felt like they 
should have brought in an outside chairman, have the 10 
people all represent their constituencies and arrived at 
something (Askins).
No, I really don't [think a mediator would have 
helped]. I think that Committee was homogenous enough to
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come [up] with their own proposals and I felt that it was 
well done, I really did (Petera).
No, I don't think [a mediator would have helped the 
process]. The experience that I've had with mediators, 
most of 'em come to a subject with some kind of 
background and no experience and really mediating . . .
most of 'em have been just absolute flops. We've had 
some of the best . . . and they always learn something
from the experience, but they don't help the process. 
When you get people so and polarized like they are in 
this state, I mean, mediation, I mean people would rather 
die than mediate. I mean, look at the wilderness issue. 
Look at the wolf issue in this state. I mean, there's a 
number of things you can, no amount of money that you pay 
a mediator. We hired 'em. We hired 'em to work on the 
Flathead and they absolutely threw up their arms in 
frustration. You know, one party would boycott the 
meeting after they both agreed to certain ground rules 
and what you have is, in my view, you have some very well 
educated people that are still trying to figure out what 
this mediation thing is all about. They draw big 
consulting salaries and they walk through a process and 
sometimes the results aren't satisfactory at all. So 
that's just my gut feeling. I do not think a mediator 
would have helped. See, I tried to fulfill that role. 
There at the end when we had that 9-1 solution, that I 
said, "Let's just everybody try to—  ", I said, "My
objective is to have everybody support what goes forward 
from here. Now, let's get the wording that everybody is 
comfortable with, " and we just took it, boy, step by 
step, the whole crowd, the whole audience was watching, 
the media was there, and I was up there and I'd give 'em 
a section. We started through. Okay, tell me what you 
object to. Give me some words that'll make this 
acceptable. Is everybody else okay? Everybody else 
okay. We did that. We went through and took care of all 
of ol ' Jim's—  okay, now let's vote on this, and he 
changed his mind. I'm not high on [mediators] (Mumma).
Nope. [I don't think that a mediator or
facilitator would have helped the process]. A mediator 
or facilitator can only do one thing which is try to 
bring an agreement among the parties involved and I 
thought that Galen Buterbaugh of the Fish and Wildlife 
Service did about as skillful job as they could to try to 
come to some resolution and when it was obvious that 
there were people there with such divided . . . agendas, 
it wouldn't have made any difference. A facilitator 
couldn't have accomplished any more. And I say that 
because I've been part of facilitated processes many 
times (Mintzmyer).
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That's a tough one. I'm not real sure. You mean a 
mediator helping in the Committee? No, I don't really 
believe it would have . . .  I think that might . . . have 
been a positive force if we had much more time but given 
a time frame that we had, we just didn't have time to sit 
down and go through some of the niceties . . .  of 
mediation and a facilitator. Now there may be other 
members of the Committee that feel different. 'Course I 
was Chairman so maybe I'm biased on that whole thing but 
just the way that process worked. I've been involved in 
some committees where we have had facilitators and not so 
much mediators . . . and sometimes it works and sometimes 
it doesn't and I'm not sure these folks—  This was 
fairly serious business and I'm not sure they would've 
even entertained that idea. In fact, I think we did 
discuss it at some point about whether we wanted to go 
that way and as I recall, it was very quickly put down as 
being no, we don't have that kind of time . . . Nobody
could agree on one that would probably be unbiased, that 
they would all agree would be somebody that yes, this 
individual could do the job, and we all trust him and 
accept him to be completely unbiased. I'm not sure there 
is such a person out there (Buterbaugh).
Despite members' feelings that mediation would not have 
been helpful, the potential for benefits from mediation did 
exist. As Askins suggested, Buterbaugh would have been able 
to participate more fully. As Fischer suggested, a mediator 
could have helped parties remain focused on the issues instead 
of positions. A mediator might have been able to develop 
linkages, a concept that was probably unfamiliar to Committee 
members. A mediator might have been able to satisfy all 
concerns and still kept the plan within the ESA. There were 
certainly potential mutual benefits to experimental 
nonessential réintroduction under the existing provisions of 
the ESA. A mediator might have convinced the anti-wolf 
factions that management under réintroduction was more 
favorable to their desires than management of naturally
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recolonizing wolves. Conservationists and Federal
representatives would have accomplished their goal of getting 
to the next step in the process of implementing the recovery 
plan. Any movement closer to recovery would have been 
movement toward the time that State directors could assume 
full management authority. Lastly, a mediator would have 
enabled the Committee to deal more succinctly with emotions.
Was the time deadline a factor?
The existence of a deadline may have different effects on 
a negotiation. One effect is that a short time frame may make 
it impossible to arrive at consensus (Susskind and Cruikshank
1987). A party that negotiates in haste may miss out on an 
agreement that is more favorable (Raiffa 1982). As Buterbaugh 
mentioned above, with more time, mediation might have been 
helpful. Most Committee members considered the short time 
frame a factor in the negotiations.
We had a very specific, a very difficult if not 
impossible task to accomplish in an extremely short time 
frame (Mumma).
I felt [the deadline] was unrealistic. I think 
that if we'd had another month even, although that's just 
hindsight and speculation, that we might have been able 
to refine and reach an agreement. We were very, very 
close on the entire Committee to an agreement. (Petera).
Well, [the time deadline] certainly was a factor, 
no question about that. It forced us to move very 
rapidly . . .  On the other hand. I'm not sure that having 
more time would have changed the outcome. It probably 
would have just further inflamed people even more and so 
it was probably good that we did not have anymore time 
than we did. By just looking at it now in retrospect. 
I'd say I think . . .  we had all the time we probably
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could have used . , . Positively it would just have gone
downhill. It was starting to already in terms of
polarization of various interest groups and things that 
were being said (Buterbaugh).
I think that [the time deadline] helped drive the 
system . . . We had the expectation Congress wanted a
report by a certain time and . . . people . . . sort of
wanted to . . . put off reaching an agreement and other
factions kept saying, we've gotta have it. I gotta 
deliver it . . . So, it was definitely a factor.
Without the time element, I think that . . . probably the 
discussion would have gone forever on some of the points. 
It was very beneficial because you had [to come to some 
decisions on some of those points] . . . by a certain
time period . . . and so when you went over [to the
meetings] , you were saying, look, this is—  We only got 
so much time left. We're wasting our time on this. 
Let's get on to something that's important. Let's quit 
doing whatever we're [doing] here and let's get on to 
some kind of agreement (Conley).
I think [the time deadline] very definitely 
affected the way we went about our work, yes 
Whether we could have come out with a unanimous report 
with more time is really very speculative to say at this 
time. But the process that we sort of went through . .
. I think was to start with a lot of specific issues and 
try to deal with them and then build toward the bigger, 
broader issue and that process took out a lot of time .
. . [and left only one meeting to draft the plan] . . .
I just think that, you know, we might have come back more 
entrenched than ever in our ideas. Some people might 
have changed their minds. I just don't know. It's kind 
of hard to analyze that (Magagna).
Fischer stated that at times deadlines are good because 
they force the issue to be finished. However, in this case, 
he felt that it forced a hasty decision. Cool commented that 
the group was irritated due to unrealistic short time frame. 
Only Mintzmyer felt that the time deadline did not affect the 
process. "[I ]f you'd given us . . . fifteen days or fifteen
months or fifteen years, it would have—  Human beings being 
what they are, they work within the time constraints and the
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basic decisions have to be almost the same.”
The deadline was a serious impediment to finishing the 
work on the management matrix of the final proposal.
Towards the end and I'm not sure any of us knew . .
. frankly exactly where we stood on everything we voted 
on and, uh, afterwards, I think there was some folks that 
wish we'd have had more time and there was a better way 
to do it but we had a deadline and we had very little 
choice (Buterbaugh).
They went through that thing in probably . . . the
last hour when people were trying to get planes, thinking 
of planes to be caught. These were biological issues. 
Uh, there was no discussion with any of the technical 
people on the Committee about [the management matrix] 
(Tucker).
With the imposition of a short time frame. Congress 
failed to consider several factors that would have benefitted 
from a longer time frame. The controversial nature of wolf 
réintroduction meant that there were many differences that 
needed to be worked out. Several Committee members needed to 
be given additional educational information on wolf ecology 
and management. Perhaps Congress believed that the knowledge 
would already be in place for nominees to the Committee 
because of their previous experience with the wolf recovery 
issue. That was not the case.
A short deadline, although desirable, was not necessary 
to bring about final resolution of the issue, because the 
issue had already been dragging on for many years. One or two 
more months would have allowed the education process to take 
place and still allotted sufficient time to work out the 
differences and possibly arrive at true consensus.
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Furthermore, all Committee members were employed fulltime and 
could not devote large chunks of time to attending meetings.
If the Committee would have had a little more time, the 
negotiations would have been allowed to move through the three 
negotiation stages that Wall (1985) describes. The first 
stage is that of establishing the negotiation range. During 
this stage, the bargainers identify the issues or problems and 
then establish the range within which they will negotiate. It 
is characterized by parties' tough verbiage and long speeches. 
The speeches contain threats, emphasize lack of agreement 
among negotiators, and stress that a deadlock is inevitable. 
Conflict is emphasized and parties stress their loyalty to 
their groups' positions.
Stage Two consists of forays into the bargaining range. 
Parties begin to retreat from initially stated positions and 
scrutinize other parties for signs of concessions. They put 
forth trial concessions that can be withdrawn quickly. The 
parties avoid commitments but work to solve any problems 
inhibiting future agreement. At the same time, they attempt 
to reduce the range in which they are negotiating, all the 
while continuing to emphasize that disagreement still exists. 
Behavior is more congenial and less threatening. Parties 
provide more information to each other about their true 
priorities. The atmosphere is more relaxed now that the 
parties have established the limits on their discussion and 
proved themselves as tough opponents and representatives.
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Several potential agreements are being considered.
In the third stage, the parties attempt to come to an 
agreement. Relationships become more tense again but at the 
same time cohesive. Parties "probe for resistance points and 
attempt to settle. They realistically examine their own 
flexible and rigid segments while consulting with their 
respective constituencies.” As the negotiators close in on an 
agreement, they become "somewhat united against all others and 
resistant to their constituents and other third parties who 
might exert pressures upon them." Wall (1985) points out that 
it is easy to confuse the first and third stages because of 
the tension among parties.
It is difficult to define three separate stages for the 
Wolf Management Committee negotiations without having had the 
opportunity to witness the meetings. Elements of each stage 
were present during the negotiations. A clear sorting of the 
stages was probably hampered by the time deadline. The need 
to have an education component delayed the commencement of the 
actual negotiations, thus delaying movement through the first 
stage and into the others.
It appears, though, that the Wolf Management Committee 
negotiations never got beyond the first stage. At the 
beginning of the process, members were working hard to get 
along. That characterizes not the first stage but rather the 
second. The characteristics of the first stage did not occur 
until the final meetings. Buterbaugh suggested that the
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parties were becoming polarized by the end of the process, 
supporting the idea that the negotiations didn't move out of 
Stage One. Conflict was emphasized when certain members were 
unable to move from their initial positions, either revealed 
or unrevealed. The practice of positional bargaining by one 
member with no retreat also kept the process at Stage One.
The consideration of several alternatives is a component 
of Stage Two. However, two key elements of the third stage 
were never present during the negotiations. Members were at 
no time resistant to outside influence nor were they united 
against all others. Final analysis suggests that the time 
deadline, in combination with certain members' participation 
in the process only to make sure that wolf recovery did not 
take any steps forward, prohibited the process from moving 
through the negotiation stages.
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EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
All negotiations are subject to external influences to 
some degree (Raiffa 1982). In particular, negotiations that 
occur in a political setting are subject to an extreme amount 
of pressure from a variety of sources, including politicians, 
constituents, and the general public.
There was enormous pressure on all the members of 
the Committee from their constituency groups and of 
course the Federal agencies are getting pressure from 
everybody and the States to some extent. There was just 
a tremendous amount of—  Well, it was very controversial 
. . . All of the meetings were very intense. There were
a lot of onlookers. There was a lot of press following 
and it was just . . . [a] very intense process with a lot 
of folks giving advice to all the members of the 
Committee (Buterbaugh).
Political Pressure
Not surprisingly, the political pressures that occurred 
during the years leading up to the formation of the Committee 
continued throughout the Committee's negotiations. All 
Committee members except the conservationists experienced 
political pressure. This pressure was reported by most 
respondents.
Political pressure applied by the Congressional 
delegations resulted in a pro-agriculture person being 
appointed to replace [Somerville] rather than someone who 
was truly a representative of the hunting community. 
[So that left 5 sort of pro people and 5 people] as being 
either absolutely in the anti-wolf camp or somewhat there 
. . . largely because of local political pressure (Neal).
We had to contend with . . . significant political
pressure throughout the process. If you look into the 
history of the legislation [appointing the Committee], 
you gotta go back before the actual appropriations 
language. You gotta look at the players on the
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Appropriations Committee. Senator James McClure, ranking 
minority member on the Senate Appropriations Committee of 
Idaho, since retired. But he had tried unsuccessfully to 
introduce a bill and get it passed that would have 
declassified the wolf’s status. That was probably in 
both '90 and early '91. Senator McClure could see that 
wolves had the ability to move great distances and could 
theorize that under certain circumstances, favorable 
conditions, why, wolves could come back and inhabit a 
large part of the West, just by their ability to produce 
offspring at a fairly rapid rate and to move considerable 
distances. My conversations with him, you know, I think 
his bill was an attempt to deal with that in advance of 
the problems and that was why the appropriations language 
was the process that he used to do that since he couldn't 
pass a bill through . . . But when that was done . . .
Senator McClure as a Republican, was a very powerful 
member of that committee, and when he did that, why, he 
infuriated the other Western Republican members of 
Congress by getting that language in there. Now, 
ironically in the three states, Wyoming, Montana, and 
Idaho, Wyoming has three elected national officials, 2 
Senators and a Congressman. Montana has 2 of each and 
Idaho had 2 of each. So that collectively is eleven 
votes. Ten of eleven members of those three states, both 
parties voted for the . . . appropriations act that had
that language. And yet the minute the ink was dry, some 
of the members set about to slow or stop or impede the 
process of getting that task accomplished. . . They were 
asking members of Congress to put a lot of pressure on 
things and . . . what became almost obnoxious at times
was when we'd have the full Committee meeting with the 
technical committee, everytime we'd have a short break, 
on the hour or something, they would run right out and 
call the offices of the [Congressional] members, and 
they'd run back in, and run back out and call, and 
sometimes that'd occur three times a day (Mumma).
I witnessed some politicking on the part of the . .
. anti-wolf factions that I guess is to be expected but 
I thought it was unwarranted. I witnessed where those 
individuals went directly from our meetings during 
different times, deliberations, and picked up the phone 
and called the Wyoming delegation in Congress and 
discussed things directly with them with the expectation 
that they would exert pressure down through channels on 
the rest of the Committee (Mintzmyer).
One informant related that he knew there were telephone 
calls from Congressmen because he saw the messages when the
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secretary brought them in. The suggestion was made by another
informant that:
When and if you interview Jim Magagna and Carolyn 
Paseneaux you might ask 'em 'bout how frequently they 
contacted Senator Wallop's office and kept him up to date 
on what was happening. Senator Wallop of Wyoming . . .
And George Bennett and his conversation with Larry Craig 
and Steve Symms. It was happening very frequently 
(Anon.).
It was real clear to me that Magagna was being 
lobbied heavily continually [throughout] the hearing. I 
think the people leaning on Magagna were people like 
Malcolm Wallop, calling Magagna up and saying what's 
going on . . . calling him during a Committee meeting
and, what's going on and how are you doing? and, so he 
was under . . . intense pressure from . . . Wallop
particularly. The thing is that with this happening out 
in the West and with the intense interest of the western 
Congressional delegations, I think [the 
Congressmen] were . . . putting a lot of pressure on
these guys to come up with something that they knew the 
western landowners . . . would take . . . because . . . 
they were all under pressure to do something . . . This
all . . . becomes very political and . . . these guys
sort of had to go for what they saw as their core 
constituencies and for A1 Simpson and Malcolm Wallop . .
. t hat's ranchers. And . . .  so . . .  at the end they 
were able to add a lot of stuff to Mumma ' s compromise 
(Anon.).
The Management Committee was so politically . . .
influenced that it was harder for them [than for the 
technical committee] to make distinct decisions . . .  It 
was an exhausting process with a tremendous amount of 
pressure and I also think people were exhausted by the 
political elements of it. Nothing was as it seemed and 
there was just so much manipulation behind the scenes 
that I , maybe more than others because I suspect that I 
travel those spheres less, was really shocked by it and 
somewhat disappointed by the . . . level of manipulation. 
But I also think that like Magagna's relationship . . .
with Wallop, and Wallop—  For instance at one of the 
early meetings, Doug Crowe [special assistant to the 
Director Turner, and formerly Assistant Director of 
Wyoming Game and Fish] so—  interesting history—  who was 
very instrumental in . . . structuring this whole thing
and conceiving the idea—  And Doug came out for one of 
the meetings . . . and immediately Turner's office got a 
call from Wallop, screaming that Crowe was out lobbying
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
133
or trying to influence the process. I mean, it was just 
like, you know, immediately. And so you just had this 
feeling, I mean, constantly, particularly Magagna was 
utilizing Congressional pressure . . . his relationship
to Simpson and Wallop to lean on the Feds to do what he 
wanted them to . . .  I think people were frustrated by 
that (Anon.).
When Doug Crowe, who was Turner's assistant, came 
out and attended one of the sessions, and then of course 
the evening sessions as well . . . Jim [Magagna] called
the Wyoming delegation and within hours, Doug was out of 
the meeting and on his way back to Washington. Because 
they didn't want that sort of lobbying and discussions 
going on. We had the meetings at the Fish and Wildlife 
Service office [in Denver]. You know, we had the regular 
sessions and then there were the evening sessions and 
there were not enough potted palms in the Comprie Hotel. 
[The evening sessions] were the informal, the dinner and 
the drinks and the discussions and the strategy, stuff 
like that so there weren't enough potted palms for each 
group to get around, or get behind. The analogy being in 
the old-time movies, when someone was plotting in the old 
Casablanca-type movies they always went behind the potted 
palm in the restaurant [and acted like nobody could see 
them] (Anon.).
What other informants viewed as political pressure on 
Magagria, he viewed as help. Perhaps Magagna did not perceive 
it as pressure because both he and his political constituents 
had the same end goal in mind. As suggested above, he may 
have utilized his relationship to Simpson and Wallop to put 
pressure on the Federal representatives to get the result he 
desired.
I really couldn't speak to that for anyone else. I 
know I can certainly speak for myself and . . .  I was 
perhaps in a position to have been as much or more 
influenced than anyone else or given advice, simply 
because I was from that area and have a Congressional 
delegation that have all been generally strongly opposed 
to wolf réintroduction. They were helpful to me whenever 
I asked for help. I can very honestly say that not a one 
of them tried to influenced any of my deliberations or my 
final position. And at no point did I go to them and 
say, "Should I be here or should I be there?" I felt we
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had . . .  an understanding and a good working 
relationship, not only on that but on other issues and I 
felt I had their support. That's doesn't necessarily 
mean that . . . my position was always where they would
have been or where they even wanted me to be . . .  I 
really can't offhand [say what help I asked for] and I'm 
not sure that . . . there was that much help. 1 may have 
asked them to, their staffs to get a document for me or 
something . . .  I probably communicated with them more 
than anything else on the public input process. Because 
X know that's important to them as Congressmen. If I had 
doubts as to whether the process we were using of public 
meetings was adequate to get input, . . .  I would go to 
them and ask for their input on it.
Cool stated that "there were outside influences but they 
were realistic and expected." Fischer observed that the Idaho 
congressional delegation also exerted much influence on 
Bennett and that the State directors were under heavy 
political pressure.
Most fish and wildlife directors of state agencies 
are appointed by their governors so it's a little hard to 
say that you wouldn't come under political pressure. 
Your job kind of depends on it (Anon.).
Other External Influences
Other outside influences, primarily agriculture
interests, affected the process. At the Cheyenne public
hearing, the Wyoming Farm Bureau organized a demonstration 
against wolf réintroduction that took place before the meeting 
convened. The meeting was then boycotted by the agricultural 
interests (Petera, pers. comm.). Consequently, it was poorly 
attended.
Dan Neal was asked to describe the controversy over wolf 
recovery in Wyoming, which helps explain the intense
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agricultural interest in the negotiation process.
I think that there tends to be among the younger 
ranchers some pretty fair political awareness of what's 
going on out in the world and I think that at some of the 
public meetings I saw, covering the Wolf Management 
Committee, there are still a lot of crusty old ranchers 
that are, say, 60 years old and older who are digging 
their heels in and just saying no to wolves. In fact, 
that general approach is the basic position of the 
[ranching] industry, but there is a slightly more 
progressive element in the ranching community, and 
largely younger people I would say, who can see the train 
coming and say, let's figure out a way we can accommodate 
this rather than being run over by it, and so, they're 
trying to work a little bit more but, you know, they're 
land owners and their power base is real solid because 
it's based on private ownership of land which is a 
principle that people hold a great deal of respect for, 
especially in this region . . . S o ,  you know, they're
seeing their lifestyles challenged by a lot of economic 
factors around the world and I think that wolf 
réintroduction has become a symbol of that, even though 
it's not particularly clear to me that wolves will have 
a significant impact on ranchers, but when you see the 
pgw#%.of. the symbolism here—  . . .  I think that [the
Wyoming Congressional] delegation is very tied into the 
ranching community. I mean, they're largely Republican, 
and . . . the ranchers in the West, from what I can see,
grow up learning that they've . . . got to . . .
understand politics to . . . stay where they are, so
they’re very effective lobbyists (Neal).
As a result of what could be termed fear of change, the 
ranching industry heavily lobbied certain Committee members to 
produce an outcome that they favored.
When Carolyn couldn't attend and Larry Bourret took 
her place, the technical group was probably at the point 
of developing the management plan that . . . probably was 
generally agreeable to most. Well, he was the one that 
insisted on insertion of the ability to kill wolves that 
are not only killing livestock but harassing livestock. 
And that was one of the fatal flaws . . .  of the final 
plan (Anon.).
[Magagna] was under intense pressure from . . . his 
own special interests . . . Absolutely the most
interesting thing was . . . the role of Larry Bourret,
who's the Director of the Wyoming Farm Bureau. He
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attended all those meetings in Denver, I don't think he 
got to Boise or Helena. He was at all the other meetings 
and . . .  by the end of the day that . . . they actually 
came up with the plan, Larry Bourret, who had not only 
been—  Well, at the technical meeting, Larry Bourret had 
been suggesting things that ought to be in the report. 
He's not on the list of who is on the technical 
committee, but he was offering suggestions for including 
things in the . , . grid that they came up with, how you 
would handle a wolf population, how you manage it. The 
classic one is the business about saying that a 
stockgrower ought to be able to shoot a wolf that he or 
she thought was harassing animals. That was a Larry 
Bourret proposal and it got right in. The thing that was 
more interesting than that for me was that by the next 
day when the Committee was meeting, or the next time the 
Committee met, it may have been that the technical 
committee met a couple of days ahead of them. Anyway .
. . Larry Bourret was sitting up at the stand, with the
Committee. What I'm saying is that, you know, he was up 
sitting up at the dias with the Wolf Management 
Committee. He was sitting up there next to Petera . . . 
That was pretty amazing to me (Anon.).
I think what was difficult on the Committee to some 
extent was that the agricultural interest in the three 
states involved was . . .  so intensely directed toward .
. . the directors on the Committee. And, to some extent, 
I think it made it difficult to make the decisions that 
we might have made if the problem were turned over to us 
and someone were to say, well, now, you work out the 
solution. Ignore everybody and come up with your best 
solution that balances everything in the state. Instead 
. . . I think . . . particularly in the case of Wyoming
where you've got a rather large livestock interest, maybe 
even more so percentage-wise than Idaho or Montana. Uh, 
I think that there ' s a lot of pressure brought to bear on 
Pete Petera in Wyoming and I think . . .  to some extent 
on all the State directors by the different ag groups. 
An almost-paranoia about what might or might not . . .
take place ultimately. Who might control what? What 
impact wolves might have? You know, what people back 
home wanted . . . The paranoia . . . was not so much with 
Jim or George as it was with the ag groups that . . .
attended the various public meetings and even the 
meetings in which we were actually doing some negotiating 
and talking about how to work out different problems. 
Farm Bureau [in all three states] was probably the worst 
. . . Very, very paranoid. No wolves. Any wolves—  You 
know, only good one's a dead one. You know, really very 
strongly in that area, organizing press conferences, news 
releases, attendance at the public meetings, and then the
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cattle association, particularly in Montana, maybe 
[Idaho] were next in line, paranoia-wise. And then 
certainly there were a lot of spinoff. There were 
sportsmen's groups that were very paranoid at the same 
time, so there was a lot of . . . role-playing in terms
of beliefs that people didn't come in with a clear clean 
mind trying to resolve the problem (Anon.).
I think that the livestock industry continued to 
try, just through sheer presence in numbers at these 
meetings, try to intimidate, and that's what I meant by 
lobbying. Like they'd go out to lunch and a member of 
the State, like say, Pete Petera, who has a lot of stake 
in terms of his relationship with the livestock industry, 
and he would be surrounded by maybe 10 people, including 
the guy from [Animal Damage Control], Larry Bourret, 
Carolyn Paseneaux, you know, the hunting guy, Bennett and 
his person would always hang out with the livestock 
person. I mean, it was interesting just to see the 
bodies and how they sort of kept together. But, you 
know, Larry started attending as did, umm, they brought 
in a public interest law firm guy at some of the final 
meetings in Denver that, who worked with Watts' law firm 
and he attended. I mean, they got all their ADC people 
. . . so they were definitely trying to influence things
by numbers (Anon.).
Other constituents were concerned about the process but 
apparently in a less intense manner.
This wasn't just with the stockgrowers or anybody 
else. I mean, when you had people representing other 
people they would . . . check back . . .  I know Defenders 
of Wildlife and the Wildlife Federation would check back 
with the higher ups. You know, "is this, can we live 
with this?" . . .  A lot of that stuff was going on 
(Dood).
Gosh, you know. I've heard several reporters say 
that they had never witnessed a more intense lobbying 
effort as . . . they had with the members of the Wolf
Management Committee and the different special interests 
. . .  Of all people, I think that the conservationists 
were lobbied the least because their positions were 
somewhat evident, whereas the States . . . were very,
very vulnerable . . . to manipulation . . . so I didn't
really see the conservationists being pushed. Umm, it 
just seemed like their positions were very clearly stated 
(Askins).
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It's an important issue to conservationists but . .
. there's really . . .  a lot of sort of these critical 
issues [we're] trying to hold the line at, and this is a 
totally different sort of issue in that we're trying to 
get something back. . . W e ' r e  not just holding the line 
here . . .  It's like, well, what's more important . . . 
to stop this timber sale that might exterminate this 
population of "this," or is it more important to go to 
this meeting to get wolves back to Yellowstone. Wolves 
haven't been there for 50 years, we can probably go 
another 20 years without that, so it's not going to hurt 
anything, but we don't want to lose "this," you know 
(Tucker).
One other external factor that added pressure of a 
different sort was the attention from the media. As a public 
process, the meetings of the Wolf Management Committee quite 
naturally attracted a lot of media attention (Mumma, pers. 
comm.).
Public Hearings
Pressure was also evident at the public hearings. As 
part of its process, the Committee decided to hold public 
listening meetings in the State capitals of each of the three 
affected states. At those meetings, the public participants 
were broken down into ten small groups for discussion so that 
each person who wished to speak would have a chance to be 
heard (Fischer, pers. comm.). Each group met with one 
committee member.
The public meetings did not reflect public opinion polls 
which show that a majority of those asked (44-75%) favor wolf 
réintroduction and recovery (McNaught 1987, Noreen 1989, 
Williams 1990, Wyoming Game and Fish Department 1991). At
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most of the meetings, opponents of wolf recovery were far more 
numerous than proponents. Buterbaugh said that probably 70% 
of attendees were against wolf recovery. Pat Tucker felt that 
having large numbers of opponents at the meetings gave the 
State directors, Magagna and Bennett real confidence to hold 
firm to their positions and intimidated the Federal agents "a 
little bit.”
Buterbaugh did not agree with the assessment of Tucker 
above. He commented that Committee members were not surprised 
at the outcome of any of the public meetings.
We knew before we went into it, most of us at least, 
that that would likely be the outcome and so I don't 
think it changed many positions, at least amongst the 
Federal agencies, the States, and the environmental 
community . . .  I don't know that it really changed . .
. the outcome or gave them a stronger . . . position,
because we knew that that did not reflect the general 
population in those three states . . .  It just reflected 
the folks that came to the meetings, but we did hear 
things from both sides at those meetings that we took 
into consideration as we put together the plan.
Askins said that everybody was surprised at the ability
of the livestock industry to mobilize their constituencies to
attend the meetings but that it didn't influence the
Committee.
Fischer stated that the public meetings were a problem 
because no business was conducted. There was considerable 
pressure from angry citizens and no issues or proposals for 
them to process. They left dissatisfied and still angry. 
According to Jerry Conley, the public meetings contained a 
great deal of emotion. After the second public meeting.
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Fischer suggested that the public meetings be used as an 
educational opportunity, to provide a relatively uninformed 
public with some good, accurate information. The Committee 
could not agree on what information should be presented, so 
the Chair determined that the Committee would not change 
procedures.
Dan Neal described the tenor of the opposition at the 
public hearings. At the Helena meeting in March there was 
sign in the lobby of the hotel where the meeting was held. 
That sign had a portrait of Saddam Hussein and a wolf side by 
side, implying that the wolf was the Saddam Hussein of nature.
Despite the feeling of most members that the Committee 
was not influenced by the pressure from groups opposed to wolf 
réintroduction, the tremendous pressure that the Committee 
experienced, undoubtedly affected the mindsets of members as 
they put together their recommendation for Congress.
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INCENTIVES TO NEGOTIATE
In order to be willing to come to the negotiation table, 
a party must have an incentive to negotiate. A party reaches 
a decision to negotiate by examining its Best Alternative To 
a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) (Fischer and Ury 1981), i.e., 
the best agreement that can be reached without negotiation. 
If a party believes its BATNA is better than a potential 
negotiated agreement, it has no incentive to negotiate 
(Bingham 1986, Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). Certain 
Committee members had no incentive to negotiate, because their 
BATNA (maintaining the status quo of no wolves) was better 
than what could be negotiated.
On the part of Magagna and Bennett . . . and
this was maybe most acute in the case of Bennett 
but not much left though in the case of Magagna, I 
think the mindset was . . .  to give no ground 
(Bean).
While those members had no incentive to negotiate an 
agreement that would change the current status of wolves in 
YNP and Central Idaho, they did have an incentive to come to 
the table (to protect their BATNA). Because they had no 
incentive to negotiate, they were unwilling to make 
concessions. If they had been willing to make concessions, 
they might have ended up with an agreement that would have 
allowed wolf réintroduction to proceed- The agreement that 
was ultimately reached, while on paper allows réintroduction 
to proceed, cannot be implemented and, therefore, still meets 
those members' goal of protecting their BATNA.
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Concessions
A concession is giving up one thing in order to gain 
another. In a negotiation setting, concessions are usually 
made in order to gain concessions from the other side. 
Concessions communicate intention and aspiration to the other 
side. They may alter the opponent's own intentions and 
aspirations. "Concessions are a method of gaining advantage 
as much as they are means of giving something to the opponent" 
(Bacharach and Lawler 1981). Concessions typically are made 
in the belief that they will hasten agreement (Pruitt 1981).
Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) describe this type of 
negotiation as a distributional dispute in that it focuses on 
allocation of resources or setting of standards. Typically, 
in such a negotiation the parties have "goods" that they are 
able to trade when making concessions. In the Wolf Management 
Committee negotiations, the only parties with goods to trade 
were those actually involved in management. Those
representing the private sector had no goods to trade- 
Nonetheless, they could compromise on their interests and 
affect the outcome.
Concessions were made at two key points during the 
negotiation. The conservation representatives made
concessions which allowed Mumma's proposal to progress to 
near-consensus.
Hank and Tom Dougherty both voted for it and the 
reasoning was not that they agreed with that, but that 
they agreed that that could go forward as . . . a
preferred alternative in an EIS and it was more to
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promote the EIS process and both of them felt like that 
alternative would be, when it was looked at, the 
experimental population would be shrunk because there 
were wolves in [northwest Montana and central Idaho] 
(Tucker).
To the conservationists, they were agreeing to a 
concept of a compromise, that might explore [Mumma's 
proposal] and they were basically trying to facilitate .
. . keeping movement going (Askins).
Basically, the conservationists agreed to give up their 
desire to have an agreement that was fully within the bounds 
of the ESA. This agreement designated Central Idaho as an 
experimental nonessential recovery area, ignoring the 
requirement of the Act that such a designation could be 
applied only to wholly separate geographic populations. 
Conservationists also conceded on the issue of State 
management, allowing that inclusion.
In trying to accommodate K. L. Cool's demand, John Mumma 
had included designation of all of Montana except the Glacier 
National Park area as experimental nonessential in his 
proposal. That, too, was outside the realm of the Endangered 
Species Act. After Mumma's proposal fell through, it became 
clear to everyone that someone would have to make some major 
concessions to get any agreement at all. That lot fell to the 
three Federal representatives. Mumma said that he felt that 
the three Federal members "were willing to do a lot of things 
to get the job accomplished that Congress gave us." Several 
other respondents observed the same thing.
From the point of view of the Federal agencies, uh, 
if they wanted [6] votes for anything they clearly 
couldn't get [6] votes by casting their votes with the
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environmentalists so long as the [livestock and hunting] 
industr[ies] and State directors stayed together, so I 
think, in the 11th hour of that process that Federal 
agencies decided that they would go along with whatever 
the State and industry interests wanted . . . for the
purpose of getting an agreement that had the necessary 
[6] votes behind it (Bean).
I think the Feds were much more willing to 
compromise . . .  I think they felt the onus of having to 
come up with a solution . . . especially since Galen had 
it on his shoulders that . . . the deadline of the report 
was a certain time. And so, in many ways, I think they 
were much more eager to compromise (Askins).
Well, of course, all along, there was on the part of 
the National Park Service a desire for the report to come 
up with a recommendation for the réintroduction into 
Yellowstone, and while . . . the National Park Service's 
position, of course, would have been under . . . the
umbrella of the Endangered Species Act . . .  it was 
during . . . the Committee deliberations that the . . .
thought process came forward of doing it as an 
experimental population, which we did not know that that 
was a possibility. And so we then said that . . . in the 
interest of reintroducing into Yellowstone, we would 
certainly agree to that kind of umbrella (Mintzmyer).
Magagna also commented on the pressure on the Federal
representatives to come up with an agreement. He also felt
that all parties except the conservationists made concessions
in reaching an agreement.
I had a feeling that for the Federal players on 
there, . . . whether it was a pressure they felt or
because they saw this as part of their jobs that there 
was a much stronger feeling that somehow we had an 
obligation to all give until we had a consensus on 
something . . .  I don't think they were inflexible so 
much as they were somewhat determined to get a consensus 
report or a majority report, I should say, the six-member 
report at all costs . . . Had everyone signed off on the 
plan that we came up with, had it been unanimous, then I 
would say that at least from the two sides of the issue, 
we probably made . . . somewhat comparable compromises.
But when you have the conservation side who didn't sign 
off on the plan, in one sense you could say in the final 
analysis they didn't make any compromises, even though as 
we went through the process they certainly made some.
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I t ’s sort of like they made them but then, and I'm not 
saying their reasons were not valid or anything, but when 
it came right down to the end, they took them away. When 
it comes to the Federal members and the State members, if 
you assume that they . . . supposedly weren't coming from 
a strictly pro or con réintroduction perspective, then 
I'm not sure where you judge their compromise. I guess 
certainly there were some compromises made between the 
Federal and State people . . .  in the plan that we 
adopted, in terms of the relative level of authority. 
That plan envisioned the Federal people, once the State 
submitted a plan for management, the Federal people 
relegating an awful lot of the authority to the State, so 
that's compromise. It involved the State people 
nevertheless recognizing that they had to operate within 
Federal guidelines, so I guess that's compromise on that 
particular issue.
A negotiator who makes concessions may bear an extra cost 
as a result of that negotiation. Outside observers may expect 
that negotiator to make the same sort of concessions in the 
future. Thus, the cost of negotiations goes up when dealing 
with those outside parties (Wall 1985). As a result of the 
actions of John Turner, the Fish and Wildlife Service may well 
be expected to make similar concessions in negotiations in the 
future.
Essentially, then, there were two "losers" from this 
negotiation —  the Federal agencies and the conservationists. 
The Federal agencies won by getting any agreement that could 
be presented to Congress, but lost in getting an agreement 
that could be implemented. They perhaps also lost in the 
perceptions of those watching the process. The
conservationists lost in their effort to keep the 
réintroduction plan within the bounds of the ESA and, with the 
harassment inclusion, adequate protection of wolves.
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Incentive to Appear Effective
Negotiators who represent constituencies desire to appear 
effective to those constituencies (Axelrod 1984). 
Occasionally, they will employ certain tactics that enhance 
the appearance of effectiveness while at the same time
recognizing that nothing will be gained by those tactics. In 
the case of the Wolf Management Committee some members made 
motions knowing they wouldn't be passed, so that they could 
appear effective to their constituents. Some informants felt 
that all Committee members were doing some of that, but that 
most of the motions came from Jim Magagna.
Some of the motions that were made . . . by, say the 
livestock industry on some issues, people went through 
the motions of voting knowing that they weren't gonna get 
6 votes . . . but sort of I can go back and tell my group 
back home . . .  I tried to get this done but I didn't. 
There was a fair amount of that that went on (Anon.)
I think there was no question about it that that 
took place, and maybe some other folks did that during 
the process to some extent, too, but more so I think from
the livestock industry because Jim Magagna was under
intense pressure from folks. He actually . . . took a
pretty liberal view, compared to many of the people he 
was representing and I think he did have to bring some of 
these issues up just to show that they were considered 
and that they were voted down . . . So, there were
various things . . . but Jim was under a lot of pressure
and there were issues that came up. But George Bennett 
I think was doing the same thing and the States once in 
a while would do that, too, because of pressure from 
their constituents (Anon.).
Virtually all of them [made an effort to look 
effective for their constituents]. I can recall Jim on 
several occasions. K. Cool did it a couple of times. 
Hank did it, you know, stating his position and trying to 
get it into the record, knowing pretty much full well 
that, that he had already counted noses and the votes 
weren't there. Tom Dougherty did it more or less to—  
All of them to establish it on the record that this was
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Where they were coining from. . . . The Federal people I 
don't think went into the Committee with a position or a 
plan so they weren't working a particular plan and didn't 
seem to do that. Pete Petera did it a couple of times 
(Anon.).
I guess my first reaction to that would be to say 
that [efforts to appear effective] most likely occurred 
to . . . some unknown degree, with the Federal and state 
people who have constituencies that they have to be 
concerned . . . As far as the private sector people, . .
. I would hope we were influenced to some degree in the 
sense of as we analyze things, not just analyzing them 
from a personal perspective but analyzing them from . .
. how they would affect or impact and how they would be 
viewed by our constituents (Anon.).
No, I never got that impression at all [that any 
Committee members felt any incentive to appear 
effective]. I felt that every Committee member was 
sincere in his deliberations and work and felt strongly 
about certain issues, of course (Anon.).
In summary, all parties had incentives to come to the
table. The Federal and conservation representatives wanted to
end the delay in reintroducing wolves to YNP. The State
directors had concerns about management. The livestock and
hunting representatives were interested in keeping wolves out
of YNP. However, they had no incentive to negotiate. They
came to the table only to attempt to thwart any réintroduction
plan.
In the end, one holdout created a situation where the 
Federal representatives felt forced to make major concessions 
to get any agreement. The holdout brought forth a proposal 
that suited the State and hunting representatives even better 
than the one they had previously agreed to. The
conservationists, who had compromised on the previous 
alternative had to pull back to their original stance because
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of one particularly disagreeable inclusion. Finally, all 
parties engaged, to some degree, in making motions in order to 
appear effective to their constituents.
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UNDERLYING CONFLICTS
The unwillingness of some members to negotiate and make 
concessions stemmed, in part, from several underlying 
conflicts that affected the process. One conflict was the 
voting coalition that arose between the State directors and 
the livestock and hunting interests out of a second conflict, 
the issue of States' rights in management of endangered 
species. These two conflicts were driven by two Committee 
members, who focused on their own positions. Other underlying 
conflicts were the inconsistency of some members in 
negotiating from their initially stated interests, an 
unwillingness to suspend certain beliefs and the involuntary 
nature of the negotiation.
Negotiators' Consistency
According to one Committee member, the final proposal 
would have been a better plan if it would have been developed 
from the interests stated at the first meeting. His feeling 
was that some members abandoned those initial interests. 
Therefore, it is useful to compare the concerns listed at the 
first meeting with those mentioned during the interviews, and 
then examine the actions taken during the negotiations to see 
if they are consistent with the issues stated. At the same 
time, however, it is necessary to recognize that such actions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
150
are part of the posturing that occurs during negotiations 
(Susskind and Cruikshank 1987).
Hank Fischer and K. L. Cool were consistent throughout in 
issues stated and actions taken. Jerry Conley's actions were 
somewhat contradictory to issues stated at the first meeting. 
He was not asked to list issues during his interview. One 
issue in particular that he mentioned in the first meeting was 
that he was in favor of réintroduction without changing the 
ESA. While the final proposal does not call for an amendment 
to the ESA, it is outside the parameters of the ESA. 
Therefore, Conley's support of that proposal demonstrates some 
inconsistency. Adequate information is not available to 
assess Pete Petera's issues from the first meeting. His 
actions were consistent with the concerns he mentioned during 
his interview.
The Federal representatives were consistent with their 
stated interests until the final proposal when they all 
focused primarily on putting together any agreement that would 
get réintroduction moving forward. At that point they made 
major concessions.
Jim Magagna was not consistent, either in words or 
actions. The best way to compare his inconsistency is to look 
at his words in three instances.
At the first meeting, he listed the following concerns:
1. réintroduction should not create undue burdens, 
economic or otherwise, being placed on the 
livestock industry;
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2. quality of product was important to protect as well 
as compensation;
3. adequate wolf control would be preferable to 
compensation;
4. a maximum degree of predictability;
5. the wolf should be represented for itself, not as a 
surrogate for other issues; and,
6. this effort should not be a forum for amending the 
Endangered Species Act; however, exempting or 
lessening the constraints of the ESA should be 
examined by the Committee (Minutes, January 23-24).
When asked specifically to list his personal issues
during the interview, he replied:
I tried to take the approach that I really had a 
broader-based constituency [than livestock] and that I 
represented any businesses, any negative economic impact 
that could result as a result of a wolf réintroduction 
and that I needed to be broad-based enough to recognize 
all of that even though, the very specific concerns and 
issues I took were relative to livestock, so I certainly 
was looking . . . at the inadequacy of any economic
analysis that had been done at that point in time about 
potential impact. I was concerned about the species 
themself, or the subspecies I should say, whether what 
was going to be reintroduced or "reintroduced" in fact 
was a réintroduction. I don't have the technical 
expertise but I certainly was aware of it and raised the 
issue as to "Are we doing an introduction or are we 
really doing a réintroduction of a subspecies that 
existed before?" Uh, certainly the whole issue of 
compensation for loss of livestock or property of any 
sense. I think just the whole economic impact is 
probably the best way to describe the general approach 
that I took into the task with me.
One issue above, the subspecies concern, is not mentioned
in the minutes of the first meeting. When he was discussing
his conversation with John Turner about what he had to have to
come to agreement, he said.
They would be such things as that all wolves would 
be treated the same, irregardless of their source within 
the given geographical location. Uh, that wolves 
impacting livestock or whatever the other uses, but
primarily livestock, would have, we'd have to have the
freedom to deal with them, . . . not subject to
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constraints of the Endangered Species Act. Uh, the one 
I mentioned earlier for me was a bottom line that 
anything that we came out of there with that involved a 
réintroduction had to have an upfront sanction by 
Congress. It couldn't just be an agency process.
None of the issues listed above was mentioned previously.
Not only were Magagna's statements of issues inconsistent each
time they were mentioned, but his actions were inconsistent
with the issues he listed. As near as can be determined, he
never once mentioned the above items during the negotiations
as inclusions that he had to have in any alternative that
would be agreeable to him.
Magagna put forth the notion that several non-Federal
Committee members felt they could recommend legislative
changes to Congress.
"I think quite a number of us who were not Federal 
Committee members. . . felt. . . because our charge came 
actually from Congress itself, that it was within our 
realm to recommend legislative changes to Congress, if 
that's where we arrived, that we didn't have to be bound 
by current law . . . There were others of us [non-Federal 
members with] certain fundamental principles that we 
weren't willing to violate to get [an agreement] 
(Magagna).
If that in fact was true, then those members who stated that 
they were in favor of réintroduction within the bounds of the 
ESA were also inconsistent on that point.
Voting Coalitions
At the end of the process, decisions were made by voting. 
The primary drawback to voting is that it creates a win-lose 
situation (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987) . Negotiators who have
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similar interests may form groups (coalitions) in the belief 
that they can put together a more satisfactory agreement by 
working in concert against one or more of the other parties 
(Raiffa 1982).
A voting coalition was instigated by K. L. Cool between 
the three State directors and Magagna and Bennett (Fischer, 
pers. comm.) and driven by Magagna (Askins, pers. comm., 
Tucker, pers. comm.). An examination of the votes in the 
minutes reveals a pretty clear division on several votes. The 
coalition arose out of another conflict, that of States' 
rights, i.e., the issue of management of wolves and who would 
be in control. That was also one of the primary reasons for 
the conflict around the Endangered Species Act because the ESA 
does not allow states to have full management authority over 
endangered species until a species is fully recovered.
The split was basically a States* rights split . .
. whether the states are going to be in control or 
whether the Federal government is gonna be in control and 
if the states were gonna be in control, that required .
. . amendments to the Endangered Species Act basically.
And . . . the Federal agencies and the conservationists
were fundamentally opposed to that, and the states and 
[Magagna and Bennett]. . . would love that . . . The
fundamental reason is because the one side sees the Act 
as being a very important act and being a real helpful 
act for endangered species, and is very concerned about 
endangered species. The other side sees the Act as 
getting in the way of the way they do business . . .  I 
mean, they would deny this, but, really on the part of 
them, they're not. Endangered species are not their top 
concern or priority (Tucker).
I think there was division along the lines of how 
much State authority there should be. Certainly that's 
an issue on which the State fish and game players and . 
. . myself were very much in accord on maximizing the .
. . level of State control over the wolves. I think that
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was not acceptable to that degree at least to some of the 
other players (Magagna).
When we got down to the end, [voting coalitions 
were] the case but during a lot of the discussions and 
the votes during the process, there wasn't that clear 
coalition. Many times the States voted with the Feds 
and, I mean, the environmental community. So it kind of 
was all over the board. But when it really got down to 
the important things that's roughly the way it came out 
(Buterbaugh).
The issue of States' rights developed from a long­
standing difference of opinion between the State of Montana 
and the Federal government, particularly the Fish and Wildlife 
Service (USFWS), concerning management of endangered species. 
The other two States didn't have as much history of conflict 
with Federal agencies but had concerns of their own in terms 
states' rights.
One of my main concerns was who's going to pay for 
all this extra work and monitoring that's going to be 
involved in wolf recovery. There's no way the State of 
Wyoming, that is the hunters and fishermen, could 
generate enough money from licensing a season on wolves, 
for example, to ever pay for the program. We've run into 
that same program with other species, primarily the 
grizzly bear. For example, we spend . . .  a substantial 
amount of money on grizzly bear and . . .  a lot of it's 
state hunters’ money. In fact, I think as I recall, . .
. for the last fiscal year, we expended around $800,000 
on . . . grizzly bears and the Federal program provided
around $38,000. So, money is a big consideration. It's 
very expensive to manage an endangered species . . .  I 
felt that it was a national issue. It was primarily 
aimed at Federal lands and . . . while we wanted a say in 
the management of it, I thought it was wrong for the 
people of the State of Wyoming to have to pick up all the 
costs for it (Petera).
One concern for both states was that they had laws that 
were either contrary to the Endangered Species Act or 
prohibited money being spent for management of wolves. Wyoming 
classifies the wolf as a predator and Idaho prohibits
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expenditures on wolf recovery except under very specific 
circumstances.
The conflict between Montana and the USFWS began with a 
debate over the management of grizzly bears. The state of 
Montana feels that the grizzly bear is recovered and wants it 
delisted with the right of management reverting to the State, 
As a result of Cool bringing that personal agenda to the 
negotiation process, it became a focal point for conflict.*®
I think that the main handicap . . . infecting
their frame of mind was that it was impossible for them 
to look at this issue divorced from the . . . larger
history of conflict between state and federal governments 
over who gets to manage wildlife (Bean).
I think it became real clear right away that there 
was a 5-5 split on this Committee. There were the 3 
Federal agencies and then there were the 2 conservation 
representatives that basically philosophically and 
fundamentally agreed pretty much and then there was the 
3 state agencies and the sportsmen representative, hunter 
representative . . . and the livestock representative.
They basically . . . had a lot of agreement on a lot of
things and so it became a real matter . . .  of them
trying to get one person . . . from one side, and the
other side trying to get one person and so there was a 
lot of lobbying to try [to figure out] who's the person 
on each side that might be able to be moved to the other 
side. [The group of State directors and the others voted 
as a block] every time. Every time. There was nothing 
that they didn't agree on. I mean, that was real
disgusting to me . . . t o  watch State game agencies vote 
with a livestock representative and a "hunter" 
representative . . .  It became real apparent that [the 
State directors] were really concerned about the
livestock industry. They didn't want to cross the 
livestock industry from any point on any of this. They 
were unwilling to stand up at all to anything that 
Magagna said . . . The block of 5 consistently voted one 
way [on the matrix of the final proposal] and then one of 
the Feds would raise their hands, so they'd get there. 
And it just went down the line like that (Tucker).
Montana's agenda and to some degree the livestock 
industry and hunter industry agenda, was definitely—
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Montana was so completely—  This end run on the Act—  
I mean, they were using this process as another means—  
You know, the State of Montana . . . want[s] to change
the Endangered Species Act and they are using any 
endangered species issue to facilitate further discussion 
and advancement on their agenda and they clearly 
throughout the whole process, used the Management 
Committee process to try and achieve their agenda, which 
was basically assuring more States' rights, control in 
any endangered species program, and . . . weakening the 
Act. So, that was a frustration for everyone and they 
were lobbying the other two States so hard that . . . and 
the States always feel compulsion to stand united, so 
[lobbying] was just constant . . . There was no interest 
in reaching a solution but rather in disrupting the 
process and continually trying to promote this agenda of 
their own State's interests and the endangered species 
process . . . [The divisions] were pretty clear . . .
Usually the livestock industry sided with the States, or 
the States sided with the livestock industry and the Feds 
voted together and the conservationists voted together. 
Often times the Feds and the conservationists would . .
. be in line but not necessarily (Askins).
At the first meeting when listing issues and concerns,
Buterbaugh stated that the Fish and Wildlife Service wanted
states to have a major role in management outside the Park.
While that does not specifically mean management control, it
seems clear that the primary Federal agency with which the
State of Montana was in conflict was prepared to negotiate
over the issue. However, Cool's positional bargaining did not
permit negotiation.
While Cool was viewed as some to be the person
responsible for the development of the coalition, others
suggested that Magagna was the one responsible, albeit in a
very subtle manner.
[The State directors] were unwilling to stand up at 
all to anything that Magagna said. And Magagna basically 
ran the show for that side. It became really apparent on 
the very last morning. I have a of respect for Magagna.
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I'm not saying that in a real negative sense. He was 
good (Tucker).
I really do think that Magagna was the driving force 
on this Committee and that it was a clear illustration of 
the power and control that the livestock industry still 
wields, not only over the Federal policy decision-making 
but over the States. The States were terrified of the 
agriculture whiplash . . .  I guess in terms of 
reputation, I do feel that Jim Magagna, who has a 
tremendous amount of respect and power, wielded, you 
know—  I mean, from the git go he was an extremely 
powerful Committee member. But . . .  he handled that in 
a very quiet, unobtrusive way. I mean, rarely did you 
see it illustrated outwardly (Askins).
Jim Magagna as an attorney of course would be the 
type of person that a State director, for instance, might 
seek for advice. He's also, has been and is involved 
with some of the livestock association . . . Jim Magagna 
being from Wyoming of course was very familiar with Pete 
Petera and had known him for a long time and had worked 
together so there was a pretty good relationship there 
that had history and also professional working 
relationships in its basis and a relationship that may 
not have necessarily carried over to some of the other 
representatives (Claar).
[Wyoming's] a traditional ranching state and [Jim's] 
the president of the American Sheep Association and . .
. is involved with the ranching community in southwestern 
Wyoming, so, he has considerable influence among that 
community and I think those people have . . . fairly
major influence on the Wyoming legislature . . .  I don't 
particularly think that Jim Magagna can, you know, call 
up Pete Petera and make something happen but I'm sure 
that he can call Pete Petera up and get his attention and 
I'm sure the same thing happens when he calls up any of 
the state politicians, that they feel like he represents 
a fairly major constituency (Neal).
Those persons mentioned as being a part of the coalition 
agreed that they voted together but downplayed the 
significance of it.
Not so you'd really notice [that groups kind of 
voted the same] that much although . . .  it was my 
impression that the States were fairly unanimous in what 
they would like to have seen done. [There were others 
that felt pretty much as the States did and voted with
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us] to a certain degree^ and there was others, of course, 
that didn't agree with that . . . and voted against it
(Petera).
It turned out that the splits that occurred voting- 
wise on the Committee really didn't have much to do with 
what state you were from . . . George was sort of . . .
with the State directors as it turned out . . . and . .
. it really turned out the livestock representative on 
there . . . also tended to vote with the State directors 
by and large and the key on the voting pattern that 
emerged really tended to be, . . . where the Federal
officials were willing to go. And, so, we would get into 
sort of some awfully close votes and the real pivoting 
point on those votes would be . . . John Mumma, because 
Galen tended . . . to be pretty solid . . .  in his
approach, although . . . later on, the real key swing
votes . . . tended to be the Fish and Wildlife Service
and the Forest Service (Conley).
If you look [at] the final votes that were taken .
. . to me, that wasn't just the States but the Federal
agencies as well. The vote was 8-2 and the vote went 8-2 
when they went through the matrix on the different 
issues. It went that way on all of the issues . . .  I 
know that was the perspective that Pat Tucker on the 
technical committee had. One of [ ] was that the
States were just like kowtowing to the livestock 
industry, but I don't think that was the case. And if 
you're gonna say that, you have to look at the votes and 
say that everybody did except for Defenders and the 
Wildlife Federation . . . When the State agency is there 
representing the people of the State, it's not just 
representing the hunters . . . Even though they're
wildlife directors, they have to be concerned. . , how .
. . [wildlife] programs impact private landowners and .
. . so there is a concern that the needs of the livestock 
industry are met [and] at the same time, promoting 
wildlife . . . Yeah, there's some things there but I know 
Pat made some remarks to me about it and I don't see it 
quite the same way that she does (Dood).
I don't know . . . if I'd call 'em voting groups,
the terminology, but certainly I think as we got down 
towards the end that . . . we had some working—  and I
can't speak for the other side. There was certainly a 
working coalition involving the three State agencies, or 
there was an —  I should at least say an attempt to have 
on, the 3 State agencies and George Bennett and myself. 
And what there was on the other side. I'm not sure. If 
the Federal people and the conservation people were doing 
the same thing or not. And it doesn't mean we were in
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total agreement on everything, but we did feel that if 
there was going to be a report come out with six votes 
that . . . hopefully there could be a consensus of the
five of us and we could somewhere pull that sixth vote, 
which . . .  we finally did on the final plan (Magagna).
Bennett said that "the driving factor or motivation for
positions taken reflected a wide variety of professional and
career bias utilizing essentially the data [previously known
by the members]. Necessary voting alliances formed to secure
individual voting priorities." Cool’s response was that
"voting was not done by groups. Groups occurred because of
aligned philosophies." Fischer felt that the Idaho and
Wyoming directors, despite the political pressure, listened
and could have been swayed by a good argument, if not for
Cool's pressure.
One informant suggested that the coalition also
continually raised the ante (made more demands or sought more
concessions) everytime a compromise was reached. Raising the
ante is a type of defection (lack of cooperation), an action
that is typical of a game of Prisoner's Dilemma. Simply
stated, in the game of Prisoner's Dilemma, each of two
participants has the choice to cooperate or not cooperate
(defect) without knowing what the other participant is going
to do (Axelrod 1984). No matter what choice the other player
makes, defection produces greater individual gain than
cooperation. If both defect, however, the gain is smaller
than if both cooperate.
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Voting coalitions were furthered evidenced during 
caucusing and by seating arrangements during the final 
meeting.
Even the way they positioned themselves that last 
day, Magagna was very . . .  I mean, it was very clear
that he sat down next to Petera so that he'd be right
there next to him, and then . . . Bennett was right next 
to Magagna and as the votes came down, there was Larry 
Bourret, who's head of the Wyoming Farm Bureau was there 
as one of Magagna's advisors and he was actually sitting 
right next to, on the other side of Bennett, and telling 
Bennett how to vote (Anon.).
There was a lot of, not only seating arrangements, 
but back and forth across the room to try to persuade 
other individuals to their point of view . . .  I think 
there were various obvious efforts on the part of the .
. . States, the three of them, in other words, some . .
. little huddles among the State representatives and then 
there were also very obvious efforts on the part of . .
. Jim Magagna . . .  to influence the State agencies . .
. I could not hear what was going on. [But he was 
animatedly talking to them, and lots of gesturing and 
that sort of thing] (Anon.).
Yet when we'd have the little breaks, . . . there
they'd go, Carolyn and Jim and George, off to their
little corners and commiserate (Anon.).
There was caucusing done [during work on Mumma's 
proposal] . . .  at breaks and everything like that and it 
was just—  (Anon.).
In terms of the final program, I think that both 
Carolyn and Larry sat close to Magagna and conferred with 
him constantly. But you know, I think we all did that, 
I mean in situations we were always trying to discuss 
things with our representatives or our technical 
committee, or the Management Committee, the techs were .
. always trying to help them with information or 
whatever (Anon.).
Perhaps one key problem with this negotiation process was 
the stipulation by Congress that "consensus" would be six 
votes. One technical committee member described the struggle 
of the Committee to get to that point.
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The main Committee struggled—  Well, I know they 
did. You can look at the different votes that were taken 
and they struggled to get to some point . . .  to where 
there could be a consensus, or you know. Congress said it 
had to be six members had to agree, and that was a 
struggle to get to a point where there could be that kind 
of agreement (Dood).
Consensus is reached not by voting but by building an 
agreement that is satisfactory to all parties (Susskind and 
Cruikshank 1987). Two members noted that distinction when 
using the word "consensus" during a response by placing 
quotation marks around the word. Had Congress simply 
specified consensus, it could have affected the process 
significantly, for then each member of the Committee would 
have been equal —  anyone could have vetoed the plan (Talbott 
1983) . The result might then have been no plan at all, but it 
can be suggested that no plan would have been a better outcome 
because there would be no "losers" from the negotiation 
process.
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A Master Negotiator
One Committee member, Jim Magagna, was mentioned much 
more frequently than any other member. Two feelings were 
commonly associated with remarks about him —  frustration and 
respect. Committee members were frustrated in trying to 
understand Magagna's reluctance to accept what the rest of 
them were willing to accept in an agreement. Several 
respondents expressed respect touched with awe and amazement 
at Magagna's ability to use the negotiation process to produce 
the result that he and his constituents wanted. A closer look 
at Magagna will aid in understanding how he, more than any 
other Committee member, was able to negotiate from a position 
of strength and power, and was able to do so in such a quiet 
manner that the other Committee members weren't aware of the 
direction in which the process was headed, until it was too 
late.
Magagna's power base stems from a long tradition of 
ranching in the State of Wyoming. As President of the 
American Sheep Association, Magagna wields considerable power 
within the livestock industry, both nationally and within 
Wyoming, That was evidenced by the fact that the Wyoming 
Woolgrowers Association and the Wyoming Stockgrowers nominated 
him for a Committee position. His association with national 
lawmakers has been previously discussed (see pg, 13 3-135).
Magagna was asked to share how he became interested in 
and involved with the wolf recovery controversy.
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Well, I think the area of Wyoming that I run sheep 
in, particularly my summer range, is certainly within a 
zone that I think realistically wolves, if reintroduced 
into Yellowstone, could expect to, uh, migrate into so I 
have a strong personal interest in what the impact would 
be on my own sheep ranch. I've heard the subject [of 
wolf réintroduction] mentioned certainly for, oh, the 
past ten years. But, probably within the, oh, last four 
or five years since some of the work that was done, 
particular like at the University of Wyoming by Mark 
Boyce and some of those things that I saw begin to 
attract my attention to it.
Magagna's mindset and feelings about wolf recovery were 
fairly obvious to other informants.
Magagna obviously came in ardently opposed to wolf 
réintroduction and sort of feeling like he had to talk 
about it because he was on the Committee and basically 
trying to get the best deal he could for stockpeople 
(Anon.).
[Magagna was in favor of wolf recovery only] under 
certain, extremely tight conditions, you know (Anon.).
I would say it's probably true he was agreeable—  He 
recognizes the Endangered Species Act and he was 
agreeable with wolf recovery as long as it was done under 
certain terms and conditions. Mainly those that would 
tend to protect the interest of farmers and ranchers in 
particular - . . Especially in allowing what would be
considered a more liberalized take from his standpoint of 
wolves that might be in or around livestock than for 
instance the private conservation groups would agree with 
(Anon.)
I think, actually, Magagna was a little more open 
toward the whole experimental nonessential thing in the 
beginning than he was in the end. You know, it did get 
kind of complicated. I think everybody did realize that 
it was more complicated in designating and keeping wolves 
separate. And exactly how do you do it and what you 
would do with wolves outside the line. [He probably 
thought that you could somehow you could keep a boundary 
around them and keep them self-contained] . . .  It 
became [clear], especially with an animal like the wolf, 
it wasn't quite as clean, and . . .  he figured, you know, 
if there was any gray area, there'd be a lawsuit and 
ranchers would lose and so he was just not willing to 
have anything where all the i's weren't dotted and t's 
weren't crossed and it's really tough to do that with any
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sort of resource management and wildlife management
because they’re not static (Anon.)*
Several people hinted in other remarks at the notion that 
Jim Magagna’s personal agenda was to ensure that wolf recovery 
would not move forward as a result of the Wolf Management 
Committee process. The following question was posed to one 
informant based on those intimations: "Did you see anything
from Jim or George that would support the idea that they were 
trying to do anything to delay wolf réintroduction; that they 
recognized, especially Jim recognized, that with this kind of 
Congressional mandate needed, that it would delay the process 
even further than if the Committee actually came up with a 
recommendation that could go forth tomorrow?" His dramatic 
response was the slice of a finger across the neck, indicating 
that he wished to go off the record. The crux of his response 
was that Jim Magagna did indeed come in with a personal 
agenda, i.e., to come up with a plan that would ensure that 
wolf réintroduction would not proceed forthwith or in his 
lifetime.
While it was obvious to several informants from Magagna ' s 
actions that he had a personal agenda, Magagna himself didn't 
reveal any of his true priorities at a time when it would have 
benefitted the negotiation process. Although most of the 
Committee members knew of his public stance on wolves and 
suspected that he was there with that opinion, his actions did 
not reveal that stance until the vote on Mumma's proposal. He 
played the game of agreeing to each item that was being
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processed and then backed out in the final vote on that 
proposal.
Something happened right there, you know, after he 
fully participated in working out what seemed to be very 
agreeable and supportable wording on this one management 
plan alternative, uh, that took all the issues and dealt 
with them and then at the last minute changing his mind 
. . . My sense is that finally he realized that we'd
taken care of all of the concerns and still provided for 
wolves and I'm not sure how he could go back to his 
constituents (Mumma).
In essence Magagna played a classic game of Prisoner's 
Dilemma (see pg. 159) (Axelrod 1984). By defecting when the 
final vote was taken on Mumma's proposal, Magagna was able to 
maintain his unrevealed position (which can be said to have 
been revealed at that time.) Magagna was able to avoid 
revealing his true concerns because he let others bring up 
those concerns. Petera repeatedly tried to get Congressional 
sanction for changes in the Endangered Species Act. Petera 
and Cool fought the battle over State management. When they 
went along with Mumma's proposal, Magagna was forced to reveal 
his hand. While private take had been thoroughly discussed, 
no one had included an item that dealt adequately with the 
liberal control that Magagna desired. Thus, he had to defect 
on the final vote of Mumma's proposal.
By defecting at the end of the process, Magagna assumed 
a risk that the other parties would choose not to cooperate 
with him. He knew of the pressure on the Federal 
representatives to come up with an agreement (see pg. 145) . 
It is possible that he engaged in a waiting game, knowing that
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at some point, the Federal representatives would make major 
concessions to get an agreement. He was probably very willing 
to take the gamble that their desire to produce a report would 
yield an offer that fit his agenda. By frustrating the entire 
Committee so close to the end of their negotiations, he 
ultimately gained concessions from the Federal agencies that 
he likely would not have gained at any other point during the 
negotiation.
Ultimately, Magagna found himself in a position on 
Mumma's proposal where he had to find a way to save face, 
after reaching the point where unanimous agreement loomed. 
"Face-saving reflects a person's need to reconcile his stance 
in a negotiation with his principles, past words and deeds" 
(Fischer and Ur y 1981). If Magagna had actually followed 
through and voted for the Mumma proposal, he would have acted 
inconsistently with his principles, past words and deeds that 
did not support wolf réintroduction. His action would also 
have been inconsistent with his constituents' expectations of 
him. In fact, he made a comment at the April 10-11 meeting 
that he didn't believe he could sell the experimental 
population concept to his community.
Magagna's nomination to the Committee by the Wyoming 
Woolgrowers Association and the Wyoming Stockgrowers in part 
explains his relationship to his constituents, which is 
important in understanding his actions during the
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negotiations. Magagna explained how he viewed his
constituents,
I tried to take the approach that even though I was 
on there and viewed as representing livestock interests, 
that I really had a broader-based constituency and that 
I represented . . . any businesses . . . or in a sense, 
any negative economic impact that could result as a 
result of a wolf réintroduction, whether it's the 
livestock to oil and gas industry to the mining industry,
. . . even to tourism in some cases, and that I needed to 
be broad-based enough to recognize all of that.
When it was suggested to him that conflicts between
groups' interests might have occurred, he replied:
Of the groups I really saw myself representing I 
don't think on this particularly issue [any conflicting 
concerns arose]. Certainly we have our differences on a 
lot of different issues, but. I'd be dishonest with 
myself if I didn't say that I focused very heavily on the 
concerns of the livestock industry but I don't think that 
I found those concerns to be in conflict with those of 
any of the other, certainly the commodity users of 
resources.
His suggestion that he represented a broad constituency 
was contradicted somewhat by a later statement that he was on 
the Committee as an individual.
I was on there as an individual and therefore, I 
really did not approach, I don't think at anytime, in 
terms of how this would affect some relationship that I 
or my organization might have with any of these people or 
their organizations.
Perhaps Magagna as an individual would have supported the 
Mumma proposal, which would have been in line with the 
interests Magagna stated at the first meeting, but in the end, 
in order to represent his constituents' interests, he was 
forced to go against the proposal because it provided for wolf
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réintroduction and that was not in line with his constituents' 
desires.
The contradictory nature of the above statements may be 
indicative of some contradiction within Magagna himself, such 
that he was not fully clear at all times who he represented - 
his constituents or himself. "He actually . . . took a pretty 
liberal view, compared to many of the people he was 
representing . . . "  (Buterbaugh, pers. comm.).
One of the reasons for frequent mention of Magagna in the 
other respondents' interviews may be the confusion they were 
experiencing when trying to understand Magagna's actions. 
Ultimately the inconsistencies within Magagna may have been 
responsible for the confusion in the perceptions of the other 
Committee members.
Magagna's relationship to the Federal and conservation 
representatives was based on lack of trust. He was skeptical 
about the level of knowledge among Committee members and 
apparently did not trust the knowledge of some members of 
either committee. According to other informants, Magagna was 
at odds with the conservation representatives a good deal of 
the time. His feelings toward them are revealed by the fact 
that he did not ascribe to them the knowledge that they had 
about wolves.
Uh, I don't know that any of us had a tremendous 
amount of technical knowledge. Of course that was the 
purpose of the technical committee members, and I'm not 
sure that they did except perhaps for the Federal ones.
He seems to be suggesting that only the Federal technical
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advisors had any knowledge about wolves, completely ignoring 
the accumulation of knowledge of most of the conservation 
representatives based on their years of work on wolves.
Magagna had strong feelings about what he perceived as 
the agenda of the Federal representatives.
I would have to say that I was disappointed, really, 
in the, what I perceived to be the Federal players coming 
to the table with an agenda . . .  I think that the 
Federal players that were on the Committee were basically 
all committed to wanting to achieve a wolf réintroduction 
. . . in a workable manner but wanting to, that was their 
goal and given the fact that the time the Committee met 
and yet today that there's no Federal policy that says 
that there should be réintroduction of wolves . . .  I 
felt that was somewhat inappropriate and that they should 
have . . . played a more neutral role or perhaps a less
powerful role than they did. And that's not a reflection 
on them as individuals I think so much as what I think 
that their particular offices demand . . .  I don't think 
they were inflexible so much as they were somewhat 
determined to get a consensus report or a majority
report, I should say, the six-member report at all costs.
Magagna's mindset toward the Federal representatives was
further revealed in the following comments. He viewed them in
a stereotypical light and did not have much trust in them.
If there was stereotyping, you know, there might 
have been in some of our minds toward the Federal people, 
just as Federal bureaucrats, so to speak.
We did not feel in the livestock industry and the 
other groups that I represented that we could have
something that was strictly in the hands of the agencies 
(Magagna).
Magagna was asked, "If the opportunity existed to start 
all over again with this Committee what would you like to see
done differently?" His answer further reveals his attitude
toward the Federal representatives.
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If Congress were actually starting all over with 
calling for a committee, I guess the first thing I would 
like to see different, and this is just a fundamental 
premise, whether it was a committee for this or any other 
purpose, I don't think that the Federal agency people 
should be a part of the committee. If you're looking to 
get an independent committee to draft something, then I 
think they should be resources to the committee, but to 
me should have been made up of non-Federal people. So 
you have people who . . . are not feeling they have to
produce a product for the person over them or for their 
Secretary, [people who] have no stake in the process per 
se as opposed to the outcome. But what I say about not 
having Federal people on would go back to even before 
then. I mean, when the Congress first passed the 
legislation, before I even knew who was going to be on 
it, that was a concern to me when I saw the legislation, 
that I didn't think that agency people should have be a 
part of the actual Committee [for other types of 
controversies like this as well] . I just think if you're 
going out to the affected interests to get input and try 
and develop a plan. I mean, I served, for example, not 
on the current one that's in existence but six or seven 
years ago on a similar advisory committee that Congress 
authorized and the Secretary appointed on wild horse and 
burros. And the agency people were there to work with 
us, to advise us, to provide background and guidance but 
they weren't actual members of the committee. And I 
think it works better that way. And that would have, 
without making the Committee larger, would have created 
an opportunity for some other broader interest groups to 
be involved as well.
Other clues to Magagna's feelings are revealed in his 
discussion of the effect of the Endangered Species Act:
A: Why, certainly I think the Endangered Species
Act . . . had a tremendous impact on, not only on the
product that we finally came out with but perhaps even 
more so on the fact that we weren't able to reach a 
unanimous decision on that product. And I really came to 
feel as we went through the process that, and this is my 
perspective on some of the pro-wolf groups that were 
involved, not necessarily on the individual players on 
the Committee but at least their constituencies that
maintaining the integrity of the Endangered Species Act, 
uh, was a primary consideration and I might even say to 
some degree interfered [with] coming up with a workable 
solution on the wolf issue itself.
Q. : So it's your feeling generally that the
Endangered Species Act prevented the unanimous agreement?
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A. : I think that . . . it certainly prevented, I
think, some of those who did not endorse the proposal 
that we came out with from being able to endorse it . .
. I don't know if it's fair to say it prevented a 
unanimous agreement because . . . the other side would
say that some of the things that we stood for prevented 
it, but . . . it's my opinion, yes, that maintaining the 
integrity of the Act became paramount for some of the 
players to actually achieving a réintroduction of wolves 
because I feel that the proposal that the Committee 
endorsed in fact would have achieved that réintroduction 
and met the needs of all the players as far as getting 
wolves into Yellowstone.
Magagna does not acknowledge that the conservationists 
had more than one objective at this negotiation. In addition 
to reintroducing wolves into YNP, adequate protection of the 
animals was an objective and that provision was missing from 
the final proposal. Sensitivity to other negotiators' needs 
is an important part of the negotiation process (Fisher and 
Ury 1981). Through that recognition comes the opportunity to 
reach a mutually satisfactory agreement.
Magagna seems to ascribe certain undesirable intentions 
to other Committee members while adhering closely to the same 
type of intentions himself. He speaks above of
constituencies' influence on certain Committee members in 
"maintaining the integrity of the Endangered Species Act" as 
a primary consideration, as though constituencies' influence 
was something undesirable, yet he also was influenced by his
constituencies.
As far as the private sector people, . . .  I would 
hope we were influenced to some degree in the sense of as 
we analyze things, not just analyzing them from a 
personal perspective but analyzing them from, uh, how 
they would affect or impact and how they would be viewed 
by our constituents.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
172
This is an example of attributional distortion (Susskind 
and Cruikshank 1987). Attributional distortion occurs when it 
is acceptable for someone who is viewed favorably to do 
something but if someone who is viewed unfavorably does the 
same thing, it is not acceptable.
Attributional distortion also occurred with Magagna's 
notion that other members ought to make concessions, but he 
was not willing to make any himself.
I went into the thing certainly committed to working 
very hard to try and come out with a consensus plan. Uh, 
but also fully prepared that if we couldn't . . .  it 
didn't bother me to have to go back to the Secretary or 
to Congress and say, "We're unable to reach a consensus, 
but we've all given it our very best and earnest try." 
I had a feeling that for the Federal players on there, .
. . whether it was a pressure they felt or because they
saw this as part of their jobs that there was a much 
stronger feeling that somehow we had an obligation to all 
give until we had a consensus on something.
According to respondents, Magagna held much power on the
Committee yet wielded that power in a very quiet manner.
There were hints of awe in voices as they described how he
used the situation to his full advantage. His years of
experience in the ranching industry and as an active member of
livestock organizations put him into many situations where he
learned negotiation skills. As Neal explained, ranchers have
learned to understand politics and become effective lobbyists.
One Reluctant Bargainer
Informants discussed K. L. Cool's impact on the process 
almost as much as Magagna's , but with no confusion whatsoever.
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His agenda was quite clear to each one who mentioned him. in 
addition to his role in the voting coalition. Cool was 
important to the process because "he was one of the few early 
on that . . . drew a hard line in the sand and said, 'I'm not 
crossing this, * and . . . played the other State
representatives and the States' rights issue big time" 
(Brewster, pers. comm.). Cool's positional bargaining froze 
up the process and really blocked it because he was not 
willing to do anything without including northwest Montana 
(Tucker, pers. comm.). He was also adamant that the ESA 
needed to be amended. Several informants noted ways in which 
Cool frustrated the negotiation process.
I thought Cool acted very unprofessionally. I think 
that he [had] tremendous disregard for the process and 
complete absorption with [his] agenda - . . There was no 
interest in reaching a solution but rather in disrupting 
the process and continually trying to promote this agenda 
of [his] own State's interests and the endangered species 
process. [During the last meeting,] he was [extremely 
rude to Hank]. I remember how we all felt about K. Cool 
(Anon.)
I think we would have made some progress on 
Yellowstone and how to manage wolves in Yellowstone but 
we were continually [dealing with Cool's agenda] (Anon.).
I think Cool missed some of the meetings. As I 
recall, he missed part of the meeting in Boise. I think 
the dynamic there that was most interesting is that I 
think people felt like, "Well, wait a minute. Isn't he 
taking this seriously?" . . . He had to cut out and go do 
something else . . . His legislature was meeting and he
had to go do budget presentation or something and . . .
it was sort of like people understood that he had to do 
that, but on the other hand, they all were there and it 
wasn't like they all didn't have political concerns at 
the same time. Especially the other directors. Petera's 
legislature was meeting, as I recall. And so . . . I 
think there was a little bit of . . . "Well, wait a 
minute. Why is K. L. Cool's everyday business so
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important that he can't be here and, but I've decided 
that this is important and I'm here," you know . . . "He 
doesn't think we're as important as other things here." 
And that's . . . clearly . . .  a reporter's observation 
and . . . not anything that I'm confident enough in to 
report. You know, I didn't report that in any of the 
stories . . . that people were angry that he wasn't
there. I think I reported that he had left early. I 
think it was important for me to tell people, because if 
the people in Montana feel like they're in part being 
represented by their game management agency director, 
they needed to know that he wasn't there. Now, what 
happened then was that Arnold Dood would then go up and 
sit with the Committee and represent Montana and . . .  I 
thought that Arnie was very capable. The one thing with 
Arnie is that he would have to communicate by telephone 
. . . before he could make any decisions (Anon.).
An interesting aspect of Cool's absence at any meeting,
particularly the last meeting, was that one of the ground
rules established by the Committee allowed voting by members
only. Their alternates could not vote in their place.
However, Dood apparently was allowed to vote at the last
meeting as the Committee was finalizing all the management
details of the matrix. He did have to confer with Cool by
phone, so his votes were not independently cast.
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Unwillingness to suspend disbelief"
Differences in the perception of reality among Committee 
members can be a significant source of conflict during a 
negotiation (Fisher and Ury 1981) . For each member, their
perception of reality is their reality. Differences in 
perception lead to disagreement, poor communication, and 
insensitivity to others' positions (Wall 1985).
During these negotiations, some members showed great 
sensitivity to other members' positions. The Federal members 
attempted to meet State concerns over management. States 
worked together with the livestock and hunting representatives 
in support of each other's concerns. However, the differences 
in perception created in some Committee members an
unwillingness to suspend their disbelief", i.e., to benefit 
from new information, which then led to disagreement. 
Adhering to childhood stories, myths, and rumors is an example 
of being unwilling to benefit from new information.
Magagna apparently had the idea that somehow wolves could 
be confined within a boundary and thereby kept self-contained. 
When it became clear that such a scenario was impossible, he 
became overly concerned with tightly tying up any loose ends 
in an alternative. As Pat Tucker explained it.
It became, especially with an animal like the wolf, 
it wasn't quite as clean, and he as an attorney, I think 
saw just, well. I'll tell you. I mean, he just was not
willing to suspend his disbelief at all. He figured . .
. if there was any gray area, there'd be a lawsuit and 
ranchers would lose and so he was just not willing to 
have anything where all the i's weren't dotted and t's 
weren't crossed and it's really tough to do that with any
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sort of resource management and wildlife management
because they're not static.
Magagna was also concerned with the anticipated losses of 
livestock and not inclined to believe the projections about 
such losses, saying "there was ongoing disagreement about, if 
you did have a wolf population, what the anticipated level of 
loss could be." He also did not believe that facts from 
Minnesota were applicable to Wyoming (see pg. 48-49). Prior 
to the convening of the Committee, Magagna had suggested that 
the deadline "doesn't leave any time for anyone to do any 
research" (AP 1991), indicating that he placed no faith in the 
existing science.
Petera was distrustful of information in the areas of 
compensation and predation. He suggested that a trust fund be 
established so that the Federal government would be 
responsible for any livestock losses that would occur. He did 
not think Defenders of Wildlife's compensation fund of 
$100,000 was adequate. Additionally, he wanted the Animal 
Damage Control unit (ADC) of the Department of Agriculture to 
be responsible for answering calls about predation. He also 
believed that depredation on wild animals would be much 
greater than that reported elsewhere in the United States and 
said that his fears were not allayed at all by technical 
information provided from Minnesota, where wolves and their 
prey have co-existed for decades. Petera's perception of 
reality seems to be that wolves will cause massive depredation 
of livestock and wild animals and that mechanisms currently in
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place to handle depredation concerns are inadequate. As 
Mumma said, "If you’ve got some prejudices and biases, and 
they remain throughout the process . . . you can be given a
lot of good information and discount it."
The discussion of the Endangered Species Act was rife 
with disputes, largely because of unwillingness on the part 
of some members to suspend the beliefs that boundaries for an 
experimental population could be drawn wherever they desired 
and that all wolves, even those naturally occurring, could be 
included in that designation.
Lastly, the unwillingness of some members to suspend 
their disbelief may be associated with lack of incentive to 
negotiate and their involuntary participation in the 
negotiation process.
An ’’Involuntary" Negotiation Process?
The Wolf Management Committee negotiations were not a 
voluntary negotiation which may be a critical factor in the 
breakdown of the negotiation process. A central authority was 
forcing cooperation (Axelrod 1984). All members were assigned 
to the task. As a result, the level of willingness to come to 
the table varied among the members, varying from lobbying to 
be on the Committee to obvious reluctance.
At least two State representatives were reluctant 
participants. Arnie Dood specified very clearly the attitude
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of the State of Montana regarding the establishment of the 
Committee.
When Congress set up the Wolf Management Committee, 
they designated who was to be on it and I guess one 
comment to make is that, you know, the State, our agency 
didn't ask for this Committee. I mean, the decision to 
put the Committee together wasn't ours and we had no 
input into the decision to put the Committee together.
K. L. Cool's reluctance was evident from his insistence on
positional bargaining. While representatives of the State of
Montana were unwilling participants, they did recognize a need
to be on the Committee, Pete Petera's reluctance was
demonstrated by his request that his Fish and Game Commission
give him the authorization to be cooperative only under
certain conditions (Neal, pers. comm.). He had also expressed
to Dan Neal his unwillingness to have wolves in the State of
Wyoming. Jerry Conley did not display any evidence of
unwillingness to participate. At one point, he stated that he
had no objection to wolves in the State so long as they were
managed like any other species of wildlife. He did explain,
nonetheless, that the State of Idaho had been reluctant to let
him participate but they also felt a need to have him on the
Committee.
The Federal members were selected by their superiors. 
Their willingness was based in part on doing their job. It 
did appear from the interviews that they were each willing 
negotiators. However, their past experiences with these types 
of efforts in mediation probably raised some doubt about 
whether agreement was possible and, consequently, instilled
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within them a bit of reluctance.
When negotiators do not "believe” in the issue that is 
being negotiated, as was the case for some members of this 
Committee, they will not be willing negotiators. The 
livestock and hunting representatives were not happy with the 
subject of the negotiation. They were willing to be there 
only to ensure that wolf recovery would not take any steps 
forward. "It was . . . fairly clear that there were folks
that were not pleased with the direction that was given" 
(Mumma, pers. comm.). Bean commented that Magagna and Bennett 
were of the mindset to give no ground. Neal stated that 
"Magagna obviously came in . . . ardently opposed to wolf
réintroduction and . . . sort of feeling like he had to talk
about it because he was on the Committee." Jerry Conley also 
perceived "role-playing in terms of beliefs that people didn’t 
come in with a clear clean mind trying to resolve the 
problem."
Conservation organizations had been lobbying hard to 
convince Congress to fund an EIS in order to begin
implementation of the Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery 
Plan (U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1987). Therefore, the 
conservationists were perhaps the most willing to participate 
on the Committee. However, as mentioned previously, one
conservationist expressed concern that the Committee process 
might just be a delaying tactic. Therefore, that member may 
have experienced mixed emotions about participating, perhaps
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feeling a certain amount of unwillingness to participate, 
while at the same time lobbying to be nominated to the 
Committee.
Another symptom of involuntary negotiation was the 
reluctance to negotiate.
It became apparent to a number of the technical 
members that —- We spent a lot of time compiling and 
presenting technical information to the Management 
Committee and it was basically irrelevant because . . .
they had come into it with a position and it appeared 
that no matter what information was presented, uh, they 
weren't going to base the recommendation on the 
information. They were going to be in a totally 
negotiative process on getting the best deal for their 
constituency that they could (Brewster).
Additionally, the negotiations took much longer than they
should have, according to Pat Tucker. As she explained, the
wolf recovery issue has been around for a long time, and the
issues are well known. The Committee was:
just playing and skirting around some of the tough 
issues. They waited until the last minute to really get 
down to some serious voting and negotiating. I mean, 
this is just, this is not a new issue. We've been 
through this for 5 years and everybody knows where 
everybody stands and it was a matter of seeing whether 
this Committee could agree, could really in fact agree on 
anything if they all sat down together. And it turns out 
that they couldn't.
It is unlikely that those Committee members who were 
representing anti-wolf constituencies were at the table to 
negotiate. It has been suggested that they were there only to 
protect the interests of their constituents who were against 
wolf recovery. According to John Mumma, when a negotiator 
represents such interests, it is necessary for that negotiator 
to champion that constituencies' interests. Because of
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pressures from those constituents, Mumma seemed to believe 
that the issue was unresolvable because some constituents 
would never be happy. Remaining faithful to those
constituents prevented their representatives from making any 
concessions. "As that champion of that interest . . .  if it 
looks like you've kind of pulled out, then you haven't 
represented those interests . . . and that just keeps the
fires burning, so to speak." Demonstrating a willingness to 
negotiate implies weakness to a negotiator's constituent (Wall 
1985) ; therefore, it is probable that certain members were 
unwilling to negotiate.
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CONCLUSION
The final criteria for assessment of the Wolf Management 
Committee negotiation process is whether or not the Committee 
was successful in meeting the Congressional mandate to develop 
a réintroduction and management plan. Michael Bean's 
experience in watching Congressional processes yielded this 
analysis.
I think [the Committee process] was unsuccessful 
because I believe that the charge of the Committee really 
was to figure out a way to aid in wolf recovery within 
the context of existing law and the Committee ended up 
recommending a course of action that could not be 
accomplished within the law. And at that, threw the 
matter back in the lap of Congress. Whereas I thought 
Congress had given some reasonably fair indication that 
it didn't want the matter brought back to it. It wanted 
the parties to come to terms on something that could be 
accomplished without further Congressional action.
Whether or not the Committee met the Congressional
mandate can be argued from two points of view. The language
of the legislation called for a plan to reintroduce and manage
wolves. The plan did that. The Committee's plan failed to
meet the mandate in two ways. The Committee was supposed to
develop a plan for wolves in Yellowstone National Park and the
Central Idaho Wilderness Area. By including all of Montana,
except the Glacier National Park area, the Committee did not
meet the Congressional mandate. The unwritten mandate
(intent) of Congress was that the plan should be within the
guidelines of the Endangered Species Act, an inherent
assumption since the wolf is an endangered species. The plan
failed to meet that mandate.
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If the Committee was unsuccessful in terms of fulfilling 
the Congressional mandate, was it nevertheless successful in 
putting together a good agreement? A good negotiated 
settlement results from four elements: fairness, efficiency, 
wisdom, and stability (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). A brief 
examination of each of those elements will determine if the 
Wolf Management Committee plan was a good settlement.
The Committee negotiations met some of the criteria for 
fairness. The process was open to public scrutiny. All 
parties had access to the technical information. Everyone was 
given an opportunity to express their views- All parties were 
represented. Accountability to constituencies is more 
difficult to assess. The hunter's representative was more of 
a livestock representative. The Federal and State
representatives have many constituency groups to represent and 
cannot be accountable to only one group. The livestock and 
conservation representatives were fully accountable to their 
constituents.
The process lacked fairness in that there was no means 
for a due process complaint to be heard at the conclusion of 
the negotiations. It is likely, however, that the
Congressional "umbrella" would not have allowed that mechanism 
to be in place. At the same time, though, before any rule 
could be put in place as a result of the report to Congress, 
the National Environmental Policy Act (83 Stat. 852, 42 USC
4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 as amended) requirements for public
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input would have to be met, thereby meeting, to some degree, 
the need for a due process complaint mechanism.
The most important judgment of fairness is whether or not 
the participants perceived the agreement to be fair. 
Perception of fairness occurs most often when the plan is open 
to continuous modification during the process. Continuous 
modification depends on the willingness of the parties to 
accommodate each other's special needs. The Wolf Management 
Committee plan did not fully meet this test of fairness.
The two conservationists and Jim Magagna probably did not 
perceive the agreement as fair. Magagna resented the 
participation of the Federal agencies in the process and said 
that he thought a better agreement could have been reached 
without them as a part of the process. The conservationists 
were completely shut out of the process of finalizing the 
management matrix at the end of the negotiations.
If an agreement is to be efficient, participants must be 
able to trust each other enough to reveal their true 
priorities. "The lack of trust that typifies political 
bargaining often prevents exchange of accurate information 
about true priorities" (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). The 
Wolf Management Committee negotiations surely failed this 
test. Magagna never had enough trust to reveal his true 
priorities.
Additionally, an inefficient agreement results when a 
party, particularly one with political power, chooses to act
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"unilaterally. Such an action may bring about speedy 
resolution but creates a false efficiency. Implementation 
problems usually arise from such action. The Fish and 
Wildlife Service acted unilaterally when Turner approached 
Magagna behind the backs of all the other negotiators to put 
together the final proposal. Implementation problems 
certainly have arisen from that action because the agreement 
was not able to be implemented at all without Congressional 
action.
One element of a wise agreement is that it contains the 
most relevant information. It is not based on advocacy 
science (one side attacking the validity of the other's 
science.) Magagna attempted to engage in advocacy science, 
suggesting one scientist as a guest speaker. The speaker then 
contradicted scientific information presented earlier to the 
Committee and compiled in Wolves for Yellowstone? A Report to 
the United States Congress. Volume II (Yellowstone National 
Park et al. 1990) , a series of studies done by noted 
scientists to gauge the effects of wolf réintroduction into 
the Park.
The fourth criteria of a good agreement is stability. 
Key components of stability are feasibility and endurance of 
the agreement. Feasible means that the agreement can be 
implemented. If implemented, it should hold up over time 
(Fisher and Ury 1981). Participants in a public dispute 
resolution should not strike a deal they will be unable to
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implement (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). By giving Congress 
something that required a additional action by Congress and 
which did not fulfill the mandate given the Committee, they in 
effect put together a deal that could not be implemented.
Was it possible for this group to reach an agreement that 
would have been satisfactory to all the parties? So long as 
each negotiator had to represent certain constituencies, given 
that the wolf recovery issue has long been a highly divisive 
and emotional issue, and given the long history of controversy 
attached to the issue, it was probably not possible to reach 
a mutually satisfactory agreement. The primary areas of 
contention that prohibited agreement were the desire of the 
conservationists to keep the plan within the limits of the 
ESA, the desire of the State of Montana to have full 
management authority before recovery, and the desire of the 
livestock constituents to have liberal take. The latter two 
concerns are diametrically opposed to the former and cannot be 
included in a plan that meets the intent of Congress.
In the final analysis, the Wolf Management Committee did 
not meet the Congressional mandate, nor did the negotiation 
process produce a good agreement. The long history of 
controversy over an extremely emotional and polarized issue 
ensured that this effort would not bring to an end the 
cacophony over wolf réintroduction and recovery.
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POSTSCRIPT
The Wolf Management Committee was a valiant effort to 
bring to an end the controversy surrounding the implementation 
of the Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan (U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service 1987). The process did ultimately 
convince Congress to end the political stonewalling and 
proceed with the Environmental Impact Statement. Once the 
report reached Congress, it disappeared for a time. Galen 
Buterbaugh explained.
It disappeared into a black hole. Now what happened 
is, see, all of the information from the public—  Well, 
there was another—  After we had the public hearings 
that the Committee wanted, there was intense pressure on 
the Secretary to have another round of public hearings 
right close to the end, actually past the point where we 
thought we could use the information. The Secretary 
forced us to have this round of public hearings. All of 
that information, and this was boxes and boxes of 
comments from people that we'd received in writing, were 
bundled up and given to the Secretary's office to be 
delivered to the chairmen of the two appropriations 
committees that had put the language in the Interior bill 
. . . in order to do the study . . .  I, to this day, do 
not know if that information ever got up there. Nobody's 
been able to tell me whether it did or didn't. I have 
the impression that it maybe got lost or it's somewhere 
in the Department, nobody knows where, and it just never 
did get up to Congress. Now, the report obviously was 
hand carried up and the [Appropriations] Committees [in 
the House and Senate] did get the report. So the reports 
were delivered to [the Committee Chairmen] . The feedback 
we got from staffers indirectly was they didn't like the 
report and it had just kind of disappeared into the 
woodwork and what came up as a compromise after that was 
in effect since we didn't really do what they wanted us 
to, or they weren't satisfied with the language in the 
report, then they came out with the instructions with 
doing an EIS and the money to write the EIS. So in 
effect their answer was, we're going to ignore the 
report, but I don't know that they've ever said that in 
writing. In fact I don't think there's ever been 
anything which is the feedback I've gotten is that they 
didn't, they just were not satisfied with the report and,
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uh, because there was, there is no good answer. I mean, 
there xs no position that's going to make everybody 
happy, no way you can do that, and so they said, get on 
with the EIS process, which is what we'd been saying all 
along from the very beginning.
Michael Bean, from his experience watching Congressional 
action, offered his appraisal regarding the decision of 
Congress to fund an EIS.
The fact that the Committee had . . . voted for
anything . . . was . . .  I think useful in persuading the
Appropriations Committee to discontinue the . 
impediment to the preparation of an EIS, that . . . the
[Appropriations] Committee had imposed up until that 
point. And since EIS's . . . are also supposed to
examine a range of possible alternatives, it was
persuasive, I think, to argue that . . . the EIS that
Interior might now do would be one that should look at a 
range of options including the option recommended by the 
Wolf Management Committee. So with that shared 
understanding . . . the process inched forward to the
step of . . . calling for rather than blocking the
preparation of an EIS.
Jim Magagna, as might be expected, was disappointed with 
Congress's inaction on the report.
It would have been very nice if Congress had simply 
taken the proposal and acted upon it. As it is, it was 
basically ignored by the committees that had requested it
. The House outright rejected it and the Senate 
really didn't do anything with it. But that doesn't mean 
it's dead and certainly doesn’t mean to me that the 
process was a waste. I think that now as the EIS process 
goes on and the alternative are developed and we have 
been assured that the Wolf Management Committee proposal 
will one of those alternatives . . .  I can see a scenario 
very easily where it will still surface as very much the 
workable solution, the middle ground to the problem. 
Maybe not entirely just as we drafted but it forms a 
potential for that.
Since submission of the Committee's report. Congress has 
ordered an EIS to be completed by May 1993. The Committee's 
recommendation is being considered as one of the alternatives.
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Congressmen from the Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming continue to 
pressure the process, calling for more public hearings, in the 
belief that the EIS process for public input is inadequate (AP 
1992),
Federal managers who were participants on the Wolf 
Management Committee are no longer Federal employees. All 
three were given forced reassignments and chose retirement 
rather take the reassignment. One member of the technical 
committee expressed the opinion that while there were other 
factors primarily involved in the reassignments the whole 
process of the Wolf Management Committee may have been the 
final straw.
Finally, the ultimate irony looms on the horizon. In the 
fall of 1992, a hunter shot a canid near Yellowstone National 
Park. Some wolf experts who viewed video footage of the 
animal believe it is a wolf. Official confirmation through 
DNA testing is being sought and results will be released soon. 
If the tests confirm that the canid was a wolf, researchers 
will search for the four or five other canids that were 
believed to be associated with the one that was shot. If they 
are wolves also, they will receive full protection under an 
endangered status, effectively ending the controversy over 
réintroduction for once and for all.
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NOTES
1. For clarification. Committee with an uppercase "c" refers to the 
Wolf Management Committee; committee with a lowercase "c" refers to 
the technical committee, although in most cases, the technical 
committee is referred to by its full name.
2. For example, the first question in No. l was omitted after the 
first several interviews and only the second question of No. l was 
asked thereafter.
3. This study employs methods from the fields of both Sociology and 
Forestry. The term "informant" comes from Sociology and implies a 
person who gives information in reply to open-ended questions, 
especially of a broad nature. The term "respondent" comes from 
Forestry and implies response of a limited nature to a survey or 
questionnaire. The nature of the questions used in this study are 
both open-ended and somewhat limited; therefore, both terms are 
appropriate to describe the people who were interviewed. They will 
be used interchangeably, with the term "informant" used primarily 
when the information given was of a confidential nature.
4. Rearranging can be done literally with scissors and tape or 
with the help of a computer, which thankfully has made the task 
much easier. The Ethnograph, a computer software program, has 
recently been developed to sort narrative through topical analysis.
5. Due to the politically sensitive nature of the wolf issue, and 
the need for some members of the committees to continue to work 
together, where the information is particularly sensitive, use of 
names has been judiciously restricted in order to attempt to 
preserve relationships.
6. *indicates those persons interviewed while ** indicates those 
who responded to a questionnaire.
7. Because of the liberal use of interview segments in this paper 
and in order to avoid extreme redundancy, when the segments appear 
in the text (name, pers. comm.) will be used. When a block 
quotation is used, it will be followed by (name) only. Where 
(Anon. Intv.) appears, the name was deleted because of a 
particularly sensitive statement (see Note 5). The date will be 
used with only the first pers. comm, for each person and will not 
be used with block quotations.
8. This is another example of concern for future relationships.
9. One respondent reported that this abstention occurred because of 
the importance of working relationships with certain publics. The 
abstainer did not wish to offend those publics and abstained in 
order to preserve the relationship.
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10. When discussing the conflict between the Federal agencies and 
the States, one respondent exhibited an extreme amount of anxiety. 
At one point, throughout a lengthy narrative, he was nervously 
playing with an item, unobserved during the interview, that made a 
pinging sound on the recorded conversation. At no other time did 
that sound occur. Having made his initial statement on the 
subject, he was then reluctant to further answer questions, 
suggesting that those answers had probably already been obtained 
from another person.
11. Credit for this term belongs to Pat Tucker.
12. As used in this context, disbelief can be defined as beliefs 
that are contrary to the evidence and technical information. The 
disbelief occurs in doubting information that is opposite the 
currently held beliefs.
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APPENDIX
Questions Regarding the Nature of the Negotiation Process of
THE WOLF MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
For Wolf Management Committee Members
1. How was the Wolf Management Committee formed? How were 
you selected as a participant?
2. How were Technical Committee members chosen? What was 
their assignment? Did they participate in the process 
other than formulating alternatives? If so, how?
3. Discuss the ground rules. What were the ground rules? 
What method/process was used to choose them?
4. What method was used to determine the issues? What were 
the issues you wished to see dealt with? Were there 
divisions along lines relating to issues (polarization)?
5. Discuss the impact of various laws on the proposed 
alternatives. What dissension occurred around the laws? 
How was that dissension dealt with?
6. How many solutions were proposed and how were they 
arrived at? How was the final proposal decided on?
7. What kind of background or confidential information did 
the parties have that was helpful in enlightening 
committee members?
8. How did the reputations of the committee members 
influence the process? Did stereotyping occur? Were the 
parties acquainted with each other prior to coming 
together on this committee? Was there or is there any 
expectation of working with any committee member again in 
the future? How were negotiations affected by that 
possibility?
9. What was your "bottom line", the "worst-case" scenario 
you were willing to agree to? What was the "best-case" 
scenario you were hoping for? At what point would you 
have considered "walking out" (ending your 
participation)?
10. From your observation, what was the mind set of each 
committee member? Did any shifts in mind set or attitude 
occur during the term of the committee?
11. Were all parties represented that needed to be? Was 
anyone intentionally left out? Should anyone else have
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been included?
12. Were efforts made to be cooperative? Were efforts made 
to elicit cooperative behavior? What happened when 
someone wasn't cooperative? How were disagreements 
resolved? Were unreasonable demands made? If so, how 
were they handled?
13. Was an effort made to separate emotions from the issues? 
How were deeply-held emotional convictions dealt with?
14. Were some parties taken advantage of? Did any party make 
more concessions than others? What concessions did you 
make to reach agreement on the final draft proposal?
15. How did the time deadline affect the process?
16. What influence, if any, did the change of location for 
some of the meetings have on the process?
17. How did the public involvement affect the process?
18. What could have made discussions more productive, if 
anything?
19. Would a mediator have helped the process?
20. If the opportunity existed to begin again, what would you 
like to see done differently?
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Questions Regarding the Nature of the Negotiation Process of
THE WOLF MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
For Technical Committee Members
1. How were Technical Committee members chosen? What was 
your assignment? Did you participate in the process 
other than formulating alternatives? If so, how?
2. Did the Technical Committee have ground rules. If so, 
what were they? What method/process was used to choose 
them?
3. How many alternatives were proposed and how were they 
arrived at? How was the final proposal decided on?
4. Discuss the impact of various laws on the proposed 
alternatives. What dissension occurred around the laws 
and how was it dealt with?
5. What kind of background knowledge did the committee 
members have?
6. How did the reputations of the Technical Committee 
members influence the process of putting together 
alternatives? Did stereotyping occur? Was there or is 
there any expectation of working with any committee 
member again in the future? How were decisions affected 
by that possibility?
OBSERVATIONS OF WOLF MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE INTERACTIONS
1. What method did the Wolf Mgmt. Comm, use to determine the 
issues? Were there divisions along lines relating to 
issues (polarization)?
2. How did the reputations of the Wolf Management Committee 
members influence the process? Did stereotyping occur? 
Was there any expectation of working with any committee 
member again in the future?
3 . From your observation, what was the mind set of each 
committee member? Did any shifts in mind set or attitude 
occur during the term of the committee?
4. Were all parties represented that needed to be? Was 
anyone intentionally left out? Should anyone else have 
been included?
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5. Were efforts made to be cooperative? Were efforts made 
to elicit cooperative behavior? What happened when 
someone wasn't cooperative? How were disagreements 
resolved? Were unreasonable demands made? If so, how 
were they handled?
6. Was an effort made to separate emotions from the issues? 
How were deeply-held emotional convictions dealt with?
7. Were some parties taken advantage of? Did any party make 
more concessions than others? What concessions were made 
to reach agreement on the final draft proposal?
8. How did the time deadline affect the process?
9. What influence, if any, did the change of location for 
some of the meetings have on the process?
10. How did the public involvement affect the process?
11. What could have made discussions more productive, if 
anything?
12. Would a mediator have helped the process?
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